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ABSTRACT 
For many developing oil exporting economies, oil revenue contributes to a relatively high 
percentage of government revenue and to the value of export commodities. The high dependency on oil 
revenue has raised concern about the impact of oil price shocks on these economies and their 
vulnerability to oil price fluctuations. In the modern Omani economy, petroleum is a vital economic 
sector. In 2018, the petroleum sector contributed (i) 40.8% to Omani real gross domestic product (GDP), 
(ii) 65.3% to Omani’s total exports, and (iii) 78.2% to Omani’s government revenue (NCSI, 2019). A
survey by the Central Bank of Oman highlighted a drastic fall in oil prices could be a threat to financial 
stability in Oman (CBO, 2016b). 
The first essay of this thesis studies the impact of oil price shocks on fiscal policy and real GDP 
in the Sultanate of Oman. It employs a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model with quarterly 
frequency data from 1989Q4 to 2016Q4. Impulse responses, variance decomposition analysis, and 
historical decomposition show that an oil price shock can have a significant impact on government 
revenue and GDP. An oil price shock explains around 22% and 46% of the variation in the government 
revenue and GDP, respectively. Decomposing the government revenue and GDP further into petroleum 
and non-petroleum related components, we find that an oil price shock explains around 26% of the 
variation in petroleum revenue and 90% of the petroleum-GDP. Petroleum and non-petroleum GDP 
respond positively to oil price shocks, while they respond negatively to oil price volatility. Government 
expenditure is not affected by oil prices, but it is affected by government revenue. This result 
demonstrates that government revenue is the channel through which oil price shocks impact government 
expenditure. The results also illustrate that the Omani government uses its reserve fund, and local and 
international debt to smooth, and reduce the impact of oil price fluctuations.  
The second essay examines the Twin Deficits Hypothesis on the relationship between fiscal 
and trade balances for Oman, where the fiscal balance heavily relies on oil export revenue. According 
to the twin deficit hypothesis, the casual effects run from fiscal balance to trade balance. For example, 
a rise in the budget deficit through tax cuts or government expenditure increases, raises the domestic 
absorption through import expansions, leading to current account deficit. Therefore, the Twin Deficit 
Hypothesis may hold for countries where the government expenditure is largely funded through tax 
revenue. Compared to that, for oil-reliant economies like Oman, taxes contributed only 9.18% of the 
government revenue in 2018 while oil contributed 78.24% of the revenue. In this paper, we use the 
SVAR model and a Structural Vector Error Correction (SVECM) model to assess the relationship 
between Oman’s fiscal and trade balances in the short and long-run. The results show that in the short 
run, Oman’s trade balance and fiscal balance are mostly determined by oil price movements, where 
both balances respond positively to oil price shocks and negatively to oil price volatility shocks. The 
trade balance’s response to oil price shocks is quantitatively larger compared to fiscal balance, while 
VII 
fiscal balance’s response to oil price volatility shocks is larger than trade balance. The fiscal balance 
responds positively and is statistically significant to trade balance shocks, while the responses of the 
trade balance to the fiscal balance shocks are statistically insignificant. In the long-run, oil price shocks 
have a statistically significant positive impact on fiscal revenue, exports, and imports. These results 
provide strong evidence that in Oman, the casual effect runs from the trade balance to the fiscal balance. 
In comparison, the fiscal balance is more endogenous, and the Omani government is able to adjust the 
fiscal policy in response to fluctuations in the oil price and trade balance, thus contradicting the 
traditional twin deficit hypothesis. We argue that for an oil-dependent small open economy, like Oman, 
policies that help to diversify away from depending heavily on oil revenue would help the economy to 
absorb international oil price shocks more effectively.  
The third essay of the thesis investigates the impact of the global shocks on the Omani economy 
through trade linkages using the Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model. The main objective is 
to assess the impact of shocks originating from Oman’s main trading partners, namely China, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use the 
GVAR model to assess shock transmissions to Oman. The GVAR framework allows us to present 
augmented VAR models that include both domestic and foreign variables such as output, inflation, 
short-term and long-term interest rates, and exchange rates along with oil price as a global variable.  
The period of study is from 1989Q4 to 2016Q4. The GVAR model enables us to carry out a rich analysis 
of the direct and indirect impact of shocks from Oman’s trading partners on its real GDP, petroleum 
GDP, and non-petroleum GDP. In addition, the use of different trade weights enables us to account for 
the changing trade patterns over time. The empirical results highlight that any unexpected shocks 
originating from East Asian economies will have a significant impact on the Omani economy. The 
impact of China is growing over time and currently has the largest effect, while the impact of Japan is 
declining. In general, the impact of the United States is modest and similar across times. The trade 
concentration and over-reliance on a particular destination and commodity could be risky for Oman and 
thus the Omani government should consider diversifying its trade relation and the composite of products 
that it exports. 
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Oil price, like other industrial commodities, depends on supply and demand as a consequence 
of global business cycle fluctuations (Kilian, 2009; Baumeister & Kilian, 2016). A growing body of 
literature recognizes the importance of oil price shocks for different types of economies, beginning with 
the assessment on the United States followed by the analysis on other developed countries. Thus, the 
impact of oil price shocks on developed countries is reasonably well documented. 1 
Over the past decades, oil revenue contributed a relatively high percentage to government 
revenue and export commodities value for oil-exporting developing countries. The dependency on oil 
revenue raised concerns about the impact of oil price shocks on these economies and their vulnerabilities 
in dealing with oil price fluctuations. Therefore, oil price shocks are an important source of economic 
fluctuations for oil-exporting developing countries, and a large and growing body of literature 
investigates the impact of oil prices on macroeconomic variables and policies of these economies.2 
For oil-exporting developing countries, fiscal policies are the propagation channel of oil price 
shocks to the economy (Alley, 2016). In these countries, oil contributes a high percentage to government 
revenue, and the oil revenue is mainly managed by the government. In addition, government 
expenditure has a dominant role in the economy (Al-Faris, 2002; Tazhibayeva et al., 2008; Arezki & 
Ismail, 2013; Alley, 2016). Further, in oil-exporting countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal 
policy is assigned to adjust the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic conditions (Koh, 2016). 
Oil exporting developing countries tend to be less diversified and heavily dependent on oil 
revenue, leading to a strong linkage between public saving and the current account balance (Arezki & 
Hasanov, 2013). The degree of economic diversification determines the relationship between the oil 
price and the current account, which determines the economy’s ability to absorb oil price shocks. For 
developing oil-exporting countries with low trade diversification, the current account balance is 
1 See for example Darby (1982); Hamilton (1983); Burbidge and Harrison (1984); Mork (1989); Mork et al. (1994); 
Lee et al. (1995); Hamilton (1996); Balke et al. (2002); Cooper (2003); Cuñado and de Gracia (2003); Bollino 
(2007); Kilian and Murphy (2012); Baumeister and Kilian (2016). 
2 See for example Eltony and Al‐Awadi (2001); Olomola and Adejumo (2006); Mehrara and Oskoui (2007); 
Mehrara (2008); Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009); Berument et al. (2010); Dissou (2010); Farzanegan (2011); 
Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011); Emami and Adibpour (2012); Al‐Abri (2013); Esfahani et al. (2013); Hamdi 




strongly linked to oil price changes, indicating a relationship between the current account and oil prices 
(Gnimassoun et al., 2017). Thus, with each oil price drop, these oil exporters must deal with two deficits 
due to the gap between the market oil prices and the external and fiscal breakeven oil prices. 
In the modern Omani economy, petroleum is a vital economic sector that contributed 41.8%, 
40.4%, and 40.8% to Omani GDP in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. Petroleum is also the main 
exported commodity and its contribution to Omani exports was 57.9%, 58.2%, and 65.3% in 2016, 
2017, and 2018, respectively. Oil is also the main source of government income and contributed 68.19% 
72.89% and 78.24% to government revenue in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively (NCSI, 2019). A 
recent survey by the Central Bank of Oman showed that oil price decreases are considered the greatest 
threat to financial stability in Oman (CBO, 2016b). 
Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) – including Oman, have a large public expenditure resulting 
from high wages, extensive public employment, and subsidies (Al-Faris, 2002). Even among oil-
producing countries, the GCCs are claimed to have the highest government size by measuring the 
government expenditure by non-oil GDP, and high correlation between oil prices and government 
spending (Tazhibayeva et al., 2008). Two-thirds of the government spending in Oman is classified as 
current expenditure, of which 73.5% was salaries in 2018 (NCSI, 2019). 
Both the fiscal stance and trade balance are linked to oil prices. While the realized oil price is 
fluctuating, the fiscal breakeven oil price is increasing steadily over time. The external breakeven oil 
price is also increasing but is lower compared to the rise in the fiscal breakeven price. The current 
realized oil price is below these breakeven prices, which results in the trade deficit and fiscal deficit. 
For example, between 2015 and 2016 the oil price dropped by 29.03%, and the fiscal balance deficit as 
a percentage of GDP increased from 17.2% in 2015 to 20.8% in 2016 and the current account deficit 
increased from 15.7% of GDP in 2015 to 18.6 % of GDP in 2016. The current account deficit in 2016 
was largely attributed to a substantial decline in merchandise trade reflecting low crude oil prices. 
The exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP is generally more than 90% in Oman, 
classifying it as a super trading nation, and Oman’s export commodity, oil, has a strong relationship 
with global economic activities. The Asian market is the main export destination for oil, as it is one of 
the most dynamic regions in global trade and a major driver of global economic growth. In addition, 
the boom and rapid growth of China over the past decades has been one of the main drivers of the rise 
in demand and prices of mineral commodity and energy. Therefore, oil exports to China have evolved 
over time. Currently, China is the main export destination, where up to 78%, 77%, and 83 of Oman’s 
oil exported to China in 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively (NCSI, 2019). This raises concerns about 





As oil is an exhaustible resource, with fluctuating prices that are sensitive to the international 
market, this imposes fiscal challenges and uncertainty for oil-exporting countries (Le & Chang, 2013). 
Given the importance of oil price in trade and fiscal stances, it poses challenges to policymakers in oil-
exporting developing countries. For example, when oil price declines the export revenue declines, 
tightening the government’s major revenue leading to trade and fiscal deficit. Moreover, high 
government spending and low realized oil price in specific times, escalated the public debt and the debt 
service costs. This further puts more pressure on the government to achieve fiscal consolidation, 
sustainability, and to move forward for diversification and pursuing deficit reduction. By pivoting on 
the oil price and Oman being the oil exporting country, this thesis examines issues relevant to the Omani 
economy, namely the roles of oil prices in fiscal policy and economic growth, its relevance to the twin 
deficits hypothesis, and on the transmission of shocks from the Oman’s major trading partners. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis  
The dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapters Two to Four present three self-contained 
essays. The last chapter concludes, highlights the policy implications and future research directions. 
The three self-contained essays move from examining the effects of oil price shocks on Oman’s (i) GDP 
and the fiscal balance; (ii) external trade and fiscal balance nexus; and (iii) trade linkages and shock 
transmissions from its main trading partners.   
 Chapter Two, titled ‘Oil price shocks, fiscal policy, and implications for the Omani economy’, 
explores the impact of oil price swings on the Omani macroeconomic and fiscal policy.  This chapter 
investigates the impacts of an oil price shock on Oman’s government revenue, government expenditure, 
and GDP. Additionally, it examines the influence of fiscal policy on economic growth. The study uses 
the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) framework with six variables, namely: oil price, exchange 
rate, government revenue, government expenditure, inflation, and GDP.  
The study provides a comprehensive dynamic effects analysis of the oil-dependent Omani 
economy. To study the cause and effects of subcomponents, a number of different specifications of 
government revenue, government expenditure, and GDP are included in the analysis. These 
subcomponents include petroleum and non-petroleum revenue, current government expenditure and 
investment government expenditure, and petroleum and non-petroleum GDP. According to Hausmann 
and Rigobon (2003), oil price volatility is found to be harmful for growth, investment, and income 
distribution. To capture the effects of an increase in oil price volatility, we re-estimate the models where 
the oil price is replaced with oil price volatility.  
Chapter Three titled ‘Trade and fiscal balances in an oil-based economy – the Omani 
experience’, explores the Twin Deficits Hypothesis on the relationship between fiscal and trade 




to trade balance. This assumption may hold for countries where the government expenditure is largely 
funded through tax revenue, but the Omani economy is an oil-reliant economy, where the fiscal balance 
heavily relies on oil export revenue.   
 The chapter investigates the nexus of trade balance and fiscal balance and it includes the oil 
price and oil price volatility into the analysis. First, the chapter analyses the short-run relationship 
between oil price, trade balance, and fiscal balance using the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
framework. Besides the full period analysis (1989Q4-2017Q4); to provide valuable insight into the twin 
deficit nexus over time, the study analyses the relationship between oil price, trade balance, and fiscal 
balance in three different sub-periods. We breakdown the study period into 1989Q4-1996Q4, 1989Q4-
2006Q4, and 1989Q4-2013Q4 as each sub-period includes events such as the Kuwait invasion, Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC), and Global Financial Crisis (GFC) respectively. The chapter also analyses the 
long-run relationship between oil price, exports, imports, government revenue, and government 
expenditure using structural vector error correction model (SVECM). 
Chapter four titled ‘The transmission of the global shocks to the Omani economy through trade 
linkages’, investigates the impact of the international shocks on the Omani economy. The exports plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP is generally high for Oman and the oil commodity, which is Oman’s 
main export commodity, has a strong relationship with global economic activities. The study explores 
the impact of trade shocks originating from Oman’s main trading partners which received 89.5% of 
Omani oil export value in 2019 (NCSI, 2020). The trade partners are the United States, China, Japan, 
Korea, Thailand, and Singapore. The chapter assesses the bilateral spill over to the Omani economy 
through trade linkages using Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model. So, the policy implications 
are based on a close inspection of the relationship between Oman and its trading partners, as the trade 
relationship varies from country to country.  
The GVAR framework allows us to include both domestic and foreign variables such as output, 
inflation, short-term and long-term interest rates, and exchange rates along with oil price as a global 
variable. Using GVAR, the study carried out a rich analysis of the direct and indirect impact of shocks 
from Oman’s trading partners on its real GDP, petroleum GDP, and non-petroleum GDP due to the 
importance of petroleum to the Omani economy as the main export commodity and economic activity. 
In addition, we use different trade weights to account for Oman’s changing trade patterns over time. 
Finally, due to the importance of the United States monetary policy to the Omani economy, as the 
Omani currency is pegged to the US dollar since 1973, the chapter studies the impact of US 
expansionary monetary policy shocks on the Omani interest rate and exchange rate.  
Overall this dissertation gives an overview of the Omani economy in the global context. In the 




balance and the impacts of global shocks on small oil-dependent developing economy. The results 
affirm the need for economic diversification for the oil-dependent Omani economy and provide 
empirical evidence and policy recommendations that help in evaluating the current situation and for 



























2 OIL PRICE SHOCKS, FISCAL POLICY AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OMANI ECONOMY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The 1970s oil price shock caused by reductions in oil supply by the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), followed by a global recession, drew attention to the impact 
of oil price fluctuations on macroeconomy. A growing body of literature recognizes the importance of 
oil price shocks for many different types of economies, beginning with the impact on the United States 
(US), followed with an impact examination on other developed countries. Thus, the impact of oil price 
shocks on developed countries is reasonably well documented. 3  
An oil price shock is an essential issue for oil-exporting countries. Over the past five decades, 
oil revenue has contributed a relatively high percentage to government revenue and exports value, 
especially for oil-exporting developing countries. This dependency increased the concern about the 
impact of oil price shocks on these economies and raised concerns on how vulnerable countries deal 
with oil price fluctuations challenges. A recent obvious example of this is the shift in the current account 
balance in oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa; i.e. from 8.8% as a percentage 
of gross domestic products (GDP) surplus to 3.6% deficit between 2014 and 2016 (IMF, 2017). 
Therefore, recent research has focused on the effects of oil price swings on oil-exporting economies. 4   
The objective of this study is to investigate the impacts of oil price shocks on Oman’s 
government revenue, government expenditure, and GDP (petroleum and non-petroleum), and 
additionally to examine the influence of fiscal policy on economic growth. The motivation for this 
research is the consequences of recent oil price drops from more than 100 US$/BBL in 2014 to less 
than 30 US$/BBL in 2016.5 As a result, there was a fiscal budget deficit in Oman, and government 
expenditure decreased by 9.7% and 6.5% in 2015 and 2016 respectively. The value of exports declined 
 
3 See for example Darby (1982); Hamilton (1983); Burbidge and Harrison (1984); Mork (1989); Mork et al. (1994); 
Lee et al. (1995); Hamilton (1996); Balke et al. (2002); Cooper (2003); Cuñado and de Gracia (2003); Bollino 
(2007); Kilian and Murphy (2012); Baumeister and Kilian (2016). 
4 See for example Eltony and Al‐Awadi (2001); Olomola and Adejumo (2006); Mehrara and Oskoui (2007); 
Mehrara (2008); Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009); Berument et al. (2010); Dissou (2010); Farzanegan (2011); 
Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011); Emami and Adibpour (2012); Al‐Abri (2013); Esfahani et al. (2013); Hamdi 
and Sbia (2013); Dizaji (2014); Alley (2016); Hou et al. (2016); Koh (2016).  





by 23% in 2016 while the nominal GDP contracted by 16% and 5.2% in 2015 and 2016 respectively.6 
Rating agencies downgraded the credit rating of the Omani debt in 2015, 2016, and 2017.7 These events 
explicitly show the sizable impact that oil has on Omani government revenue, exports, and output. The 
government reacted to these events in several ways. It removed the subsidy on fuel products in 2016, 
restructured corporate taxes in 2017, and plans to impose 5% value-added taxes in April 2021. The 
government established two new units in the Ministry of Finance: Fiscal Policy and Debt Management 
Office.  
Oil-exporting economies have experienced many dramatic oil price fluctuations in the previous 
decades, caused by different reasons. For example October 1973-early 1974 the October war and oil 
embargo, October 1978-February 1979 Iranian revolution, September 1980 Iran-Iraq war, August 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, March 1999 OPEC meeting (Barsky & Kilian, 2004), 2003-2008 global economic 
expansion, 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, 2008 Global Financial Crisis and recent improvement in the 
shale resource production in North America. The impacts of these oil price shocks have varied across 
oil-exporting countries, depending on the percentage of the oil sector’s contributions to export, 
government income, and GDP (Arezki & Blanchard, 2014), and the ability of the government to boost 
the economy with countercyclical policy through monetary and fiscal policies. Further, because of the 
government expenditure stickiness and the high percentage of oil revenue in the total government 
revenue, oil-exporting countries face considerable challenges in adapting to oil price swings (Arezki & 
Ismail, 2013). 
We use six variable vector autoregressive (VAR) model in this study with quarterly data from 
1989 to 2016 from the National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI). The variables are oil price, 
exchange rate, government revenue, government expenditure, inflation, and GDP. For a better 
understanding of the effect of oil price shocks on Oman’s fiscal situation and economy, we include a 
number of different subcomponents of government revenue, government expenditure, and GDP in our 
analysis. These subcomponents include petroleum and non-petroleum revenue, current government 
expenditure and investment government expenditure, and petroleum and non-petroleum GDP. To 
capture the effects of increasing oil price volatility in the last decades, we examine the impact of oil 
price volatility on the Omani economy where the oil price volatility is replaced for the oil price in the 
model.  
Our results show that oil price shocks affect both government revenue and GDP in Oman. Oil 
price shocks explain 18.65% of the government revenue in the 1st quarter following the shock, and 
55.22% of the GDP. The impact is even higher on petroleum government revenue and petroleum GDP. 
 
6 From different issues of the statistical yearbook, NCSI, Oman 




However, government expenditure only fluctuates and then stabilises within six quarters. When 
examining the subcomponents of government spending, current government expenditure does not 
respond to oil price shocks, while investment government expenditure responds negatively. Considering 
the impact of government revenue and government expenditure, GDP responds positively and 
significantly to both variables’ shocks. The results indicate that oil price, government revenue, and 
government expenditure have an impact on the economic growth in Oman. This is expected for a 
developing oil exporter, where the government is the guardian for the natural resource, and it is the 
conduit for the oil revenue to the economy (Mehrara & Oskoui, 2007). The higher export revenue from 
oil price influences the government’s spending towards expansionary fiscal policy (Akanbi, 2015). The 
results also show that oil price shocks appreciate the exchange rate, a classic symptom of the Dutch 
disease (Arezki & Ismail, 2013).8 For the model specified with oil price volatility, the oil price volatility 
has a negative impact on government revenue, government expenditure, and GDP.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2.2 gives a review of oil price and fiscal policy; 
section 2.3 includes an overview of the Omani economy. Section 2.4 describes the data and introduces 
the methodology, and section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. The last section, section 2.6, includes 
the conclusion and the policy implications.    
2.2 Review on oil price and fiscal policy  
Oil, like other industrial commodities, depends on supply and demand as a consequence of 
global business cycle fluctuations (Kilian, 2009; Baumeister & Kilian, 2016). There are three types of 
oil price shocks: oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and oil-specific demand shock (Kilian, 
2009). Oil price fluctuation caused by changes in the global economy and the political conditions, affect 
the supply and demand for oil (Devlin & Titman, 2004). The reason behind the resource rent volatility 
is that the natural resource supply has low price elasticity (Hausmann & Rigobon, 2003). Thus, an 
increase in oil price volatility in the short run could be due to the steeper oil supply and demand curves. 
Consequently, any possible surplus in oil demand or shortage in oil supply creates a price jump and this 
largely explains the high oil price volatility, since the oil producer could not increase their supply 
immediately to meet the demand (Kilian et al., 2009; Baumeister & Peersman, 2013). Oil price is more 
volatile than 60% of the crude commodities in the US, and it stems from the relatively high storage cost 
of oil, seasonality of oil demand, concentration of oil supply in specific geographic areas, and that 
OPEC is the key producer (Regnier, 2007). 9 In addition, the use of spot market deals and short-term oil 
 
8 The Dutch Disease is a process of a boom in a natural resource sector that results in shrinking the non-resource 
tradables, leading to specialization in the resource and non-tradable sectors leaving the economy more 
vulnerable to resource-specific shocks (Ismail, 2010). 
9 In 2016 Middle East, Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and OPEC produce 35%, 16.9% and 44% respectively of the 
world crude oil production. In term of world proven crude oil reserve:  Middle East has 54%, Latin America has 




future contracts instead of long-term oil contracts, encourages speculative activities and inventory 
practices (Baumeister & Peersman, 2013).  
The short-run price fluctuations are caused by economic or political instabilities. On the other 
hand, long-run oil price changes result from shocks such as finding a new substitute for oil, the 
discovery of new reserves or improvements in extraction technology (Devlin & Titman, 2004). A recent 
example, is the improvement in the technology used for extracting shale resources (oil and natural gas) 
in North America (Huntington, 2015). 
The transmission channel of oil price shocks differs between importing and exporting countries. 
In oil-importing countries, oil is a significant input in their economic activities (Regnier, 2007). For 
these oil importers, high oil prices increase the cost of production, reduce economic growth, decrease 
the productivity, increase inflation, and can even cause a recession (Barsky & Kilian, 2004). Hamilton 
(1983) found that the increase in the oil price contributed to the US post-second World War recession. 
Hamilton (1996) explains that high energy prices draw attention to energy availability and prices which 
may affect the investments decisions by increasing the uncertainty of the investment reward. This is 
likely to lead to the investment being postponed for firms but also a decrease in consumer demand for 
goods such as motor vehicles and electrical products. Therefore it causes a negative impact on durable 
consumption, industrial production, and GDP (Elder & Serletis, 2010).  
For oil-exporting countries, fiscal policies are the propagation channel for oil price volatility to 
the economy (Alley, 2016). For these countries, oil contributes a high percentage to government 
revenue, and the oil revenue is mainly managed by the government, and government expenditure has a 
dominant role in the market (Al-Faris, 2002; Tazhibayeva et al., 2008; Arezki & Ismail, 2013; Alley, 
2016). Moreover, in oil-exporting countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy is the only 
policy mechanism assigned to adjust the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic conditions (Koh, 
2016). 
Developed and developing countries react differently to the business cycle. Developing 
countries typically follow procyclical fiscal policy; i.e. during an economic boom period, the 
government spending as a share of GDP and fiscal deficit increases, while in a recession it decreases 
(Alesina et al., 2008). Arezki and Blanchard (2014) claim that the impact of oil price decline on the 
macroeconomy depends on the monetary and fiscal policy arrangements. Most developed countries 
react with a countercyclical policy to boost the economy during a crisis period, while many developing 
countries follow a procyclical trend (Frankel et al., 2013). Several studies have indicated that 
procyclicality is more explicit in countries with abundant natural resources and commodity exporters 
(Fasano & Wang, 2002; Talvi & Vegh, 2005; Frankel, 2010). The Gulf Cooperation Countries’ (GCCs) 




High government consumption leads to fiscal policy volatility because of the availability of ‘easy 
money’ from natural resources and aid inflow (Bleaney & Halland, 2014). Coupled with limited ability 
to forecast revenue because of oil price volatility, this leads to an increase in government spending over 
the government revenue in the short run (Alley, 2016). Lack of financial depth, imperfect access to 
international credit markets, (Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2004), and political instability (Talvi & Vegh, 
2005) are possible explanations for procyclical policy in developing countries. These also explain the 
responses of oil-exporting countries to oil price swings (Erbil, 2011). Taken together, a high percentage 
of commodities in export, weak institutions, a lack of trust between the government and people, and 
corruption explain why resource-dependent economies may suffer more from fiscal volatility compared 
to non-resource-dependent economies. 
Most oil-exporting countries have established saving and stabilizing funds to cope with the 
impact of oil price uncertainty and volatility (Collier et al., 2010). Fiscal policy stabilization, future 
generation saving, and controlling the impact of inflow payments on local inflation are also reasons for 
establishing saving funds (Aizenman & Glick, 2009). These funds are widely used by OPEC countries 
to react to oil price fluctuations (Erbil, 2011). Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) suggest that the 
importance of saving funds appears strong in relation to oil price shocks. These funds create continuous 
revenue from exhausted natural resources, increase governments’ ability to deal with oil revenue 
shortfalls and create a balance between revenue and expenditure. Therefore, saving funds can be used 
to break the relationship between fiscal spending and oil prices (Devlin & Titman, 2004).  
The amount of resource revenue and population size are two determinants that explain the 
variation in the saving level among oil exporters. In countries with a small population and an abundant 
oil resource, the surplus revenue in boom times adds to the saving fund. In contrast, this is difficult for 
countries with a high population since the surplus may be exhausted before any anticipated oil price 
drop (Devlin & Titman, 2004). 
Most oil-exporting countries have established saving funds; in 2015 around 60% of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds are oil and gas funds (Koh, 2016). Compared with other developing countries, developing 
countries with saving funds show better governance in terms of government effectiveness, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality (Aizenman & Glick, 2009).  
The ability of saving funds to support macroeconomic stabilization during a negative oil price 
shock is still debated and the empirical evidence on the influence of saving funds is mixed (Koh, 2016). 
Devlin and Titman (2004) argue that savings and stabilization funds cannot be used to smooth 
investment expenditures, and therefore, oil price volatility will significantly affect the efficiency of the 
country's infrastructure investment program. In contrast, Fasano and Wang (2002) explain that the 




countries have adopted formal oil saving funds for more than two decades. Devlin and Titman (2004) 
report that government spending in Oman, Chile, and Norway varies less compared with other countries 
because of the impact of their savings funds.  
In order to benefit from saving funds, the funds should be professionally managed in terms of 
supervision, reporting, and accountability. For example, Norway’s Norges Fund (currently ranked 
number one globally), the Ministry of Finance is the supervisory body for the sovereign fund in terms 
of investment, reporting, and evaluation. Parliamentary approval is needed for any transfer (Devlin & 
Titman, 2004). Compared to that, in Oman, decisions are mainly taken by the government; in order to 
use the saving fund to finance the general budget, the Ministry of Finance is expected to approve the 
financial affairs and energy resource council recommendation (Fasano, 2000). 
The Oman General Reserve Fund is one of the seven sovereign funds established before 1990 
(Koh, 2016). It was established in 1980 to manage and invest any surplus revenue from oil and gas to 
diversify government income and secure future generations. This surplus includes what exceed from 
approved five-year development proposed oil price, surplus of the financial year, and the fund’s 
investment revenue. It is independent and supervised by the Ministry of Finance.10,11 A high percentage 
of the saving fund is invested abroad, and only a small portion is held by the Central Bank of Oman as 
foreign currency (Fasano, 2000). 
To summarise this section, oil price shocks are an important issue for developing oil-exporting 
countries, and a growing body of literature investigate the impact of oil prices on macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy reported in Appendix 2.A. The most common variables used in these studies are output, 
exchange rate, inflation, government revenue, and government expenditure. The literature survey also 
shows that vector autoregression (VAR) model and vector error correction (VECM) model are widely 
used methodologies. As the Middle East produces 35% of the world crude oil, there is a number of 
country-specific studies like Kuwait and Iran to examine the impact of oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomy.  
This study provides a comprehensive dynamic analysis of an oil-dependent economy, Oman. It 
is not only studying the petroleum and non-petroleum segment of the economy, but it takes a step 
forward to break down the revenue into petroleum and non-petroleum, the government expenditure into 
current and investment to carry out an extensive analysis of the oil price shocks. The study also analyses 
the impact of oil price volatility on Oman. Oil price volatility has been perceived to be damaging for 
economic growth, investment, income distribution, and educational attainment (Hausmann & Rigobon, 
 
10 https://www.sgrf.gov.om/Index.php?r=en%2Fsite%2Fabout 
11 Five-year development plan is introduced by the government to maximize the economic and social benefit from 
oil asset, each plan set a number of short-term goals, the first development plan was from1976 to 1980 (Al-Saqri, 




2003). The outcome of this study can be used as a guide for policy targeted not only for Oman but for 
other oil-dependent economies, particularly in the Middle East. Effective independent fiscal policy 
actions are essential for oil exporters to deal with oil price fluctuations; for instance, the oil-exporting 
government can use non-oil primary balance as a guide for policymaking (IMF, 2018). 
2.3 Overview of the Omani economy  
 The Omani economy is an oil-dependent economy. Over the last forty years, the petroleum 
sector has been the main economic activity, government income, and export commodity for the country. 
On average, it has contributed up to 80% of the government’s revenue, 60% of export value, and 40% 
of the GDP (NCSI, 2017). Oil has been the main generator of economic growth since it was discovered 
in 1964 and then exported three years later (Al-Saqri, 2010). This free natural gift leads to a transition 
stage in the economy, and the gross domestic product and per capita increased dramatically as Figure 
2.1 shows the logarithm of GDP (LGDP) and the logarithm of GDP per capita (LGDP per capital) from 
World Development indicators published by the World Bank (WB). 
 
Figure 2.1. The GDP and per capita GDP (1960- 2016) 
Source: World Development Indicators from the World Bank database, constant 2010 US$.  
The measurement scale of LGDP and LGDP per capita is in logs. 
Oman achieved good economic growth, and is considered as one of thirteen countries in the 
world with sustained economic growth in the post-war period (WB, 2008).12 Oil price volatility and 
reserve exhaustibility are two critical problems for oil-dependent economies (Devlin & Titman, 2004). 
 
12 Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, 

















































































































































In Oman, oil price fluctuations and oil depletion are the two main challenges that face policymakers in 
sustaining economic growth. Oman’s share in the total global proved reserve is only 0.3% and the 
reserves to production ratio, which gives the length of time remaining if the production rate continues 
on the same rate, is 14.6 years (this information is based on the end of 2016 statistics).13 A recent survey 
by the Central Bank of Oman showed that oil price decreases are considered the greatest threat to 
financial stability in Oman (CBO, 2016b). 
The petroleum sector is the main economic activity; it has contributed up to 40% of GDP. The 
remaining 60% of non-petroleum GDP is dominated by service activities for around 40%, industry 
activities for 19% and agriculture and fisheries for 1.6% (NCSI, 2017).14 As Figure 2.2 displays, 
petroleum GDP (GDP_P) fluctuates considerably compared to the non-petroleum GDP (GDP_NP), 
while its growth rate is relatively lower than the non-petroleum GDP.  
 
Figure 2.2.  Petroleum and non-petroleum GDP  
Sources: Different issues of the monthly statistical bulletin, NCSI. 
 
Both the fiscal stance and trade balance are linked to oil prices. Figure 2.3 shows that a high 
percentage of the total export value is sourced from petroleum and it follows the trend of the oil price. 
For instance, the value of petroleum exports declined from 66% in 2014 to 58% in 2015 because oil 
prices dropped by 45% in 2015 compared to 2014 even though the annual volume production of crude 
 
13 BP statistical review of world energy, June 2017. 
14 Industry activities include mining and quarrying, manufacturing (refined petroleum products, chemicals and 
chemicals products and other manufacturing), electricity and water supply and constructions.  
Services activities include wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transportation, storage and 
communication, financial intermediation, real estate and business activities, public administration and defence, 




















































































































































































oil increased by 5.4% in 2015 (NCSI, 2017). Sometimes, this decline in the percentage of petroleum 
value export is misunderstood and interpreted as an improvement in the non-petroleum export value.  
Figure 2.3 also shows the breakeven external oil price on the right vertical axis.15 It shows when 
the oil prices were 103, 57, and 40 US$/BBL in 2014, 2015, and 2016, the breakeven external oil prices 
were 88, 90, and 75 US$/BBL respectively. As a result, the current account balance dropped as Figure 
2.4 shows. Another important point to note from Figure 2.4, is that despite oil price fluctuations, the 
breakeven fiscal oil price increased gradually from less than 50 US$/BBL in 2005 to more than 100 
US$/BBL in 2015.16 This creates a challenge for the government to adjust to oil price drops and creates 
a gap between government revenue and government expenditure as Figure 2.5 illustrates. Therefore, 
the government debt (as a percentage of GDP) increased dramatically to 4.9%, 15.4%, and 33.3% of 
the GDP in 2014, 2015, and 2016 as Figure 2.4 shows.  
 Figure 2.3. Percentage of petroleum and non-petroleum from the export value, oil price and 
breakeven external oil price (2006-2018) 








15 External breakeven oil price: the oil price at which the current account balance is zero. 




































Figure 2.4. Oil price, fiscal breakeven oil price, government debt, and current account balance (2003-
2018)  
Source: Different issues of the statistical yearbook, NCSI, and IMF. 
 
Figure 2.5. Oil price, government revenue and expenditure (2003-2018)  
Sources: Different issues of the statistical yearbook, NCSI, the value are in million Omani Rial (Mn.O.R), O.R.1 
= US$ 2.6. 
 
GCCs, including Oman, have large public expenditure resulting from high wages, extensive 
public employment, and subsidies (Al-Faris, 2002). Even among oil-producing countries, the GCCs are 
claimed to have the highest government size by measuring the government expenditure by non-oil GDP, 
and high correlation between oil prices and government spending (Tazhibayeva et al., 2008). Fasano 
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1% in Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In Oman, the annual public budget depends on the anticipated oil 
price for that year. Figure 2.6 shows the petroleum government revenue fluctuates more compared to 
non-petroleum government revenue.    
Two-thirds of the government spending in Oman is classified as current expenditure, of which 
72.8% is salaries in 2016 (NCSI, 2017). In early 2011, a protest started in Oman along with the “Arab 
Spring’’ movement, forcing the government to provide redundant jobs just to content job seekers. 
Consequently, as shown in Figure 2.6, the current government expenditure increased by 27.4% between 
2010 and 2011 and by 43.8% between 2011 and 2012. It also shows that investment expenditure 
fluctuates less than current expenditure. Based on national data, about 27.6% of the Omani are between 
18 and 29 years old.17  A survey done by the NCSI reveals that 7 out of 10 graduate students prefer to 
work for the public sector.18 Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of current and investment government 
expenditure between 1989Q4 and 2016Q4. Remarkably, the percentage of investment spending has 
increased between 2005 and 2011. This may be due to recent government spending on the new airport, 
seaports, and free zone areas. As a high percentage of government expenditure is current spending, the 
government does not have enough space to reduce spending when the oil price falls, Table 2.1 shows 
the fiscal surplus and deficit as a percentage of the current expenditure between 1980 and 2016. The 
number shows that the deficit is 51% and 57% of the current spending in 2015 and 2016 compared to 
only 21% and 16% in 1998 and 2009, respectively. Consequently, the commodity-rich countries 
accumulate debt because public spending is not adjusted sufficiently to accommodate falls in 
commodity prices (Arezki & Bruckner, 2010). This puts more pressure on the government to achieve 
fiscal consolidation, sustainability, and to move forward for diversification and pursuing deficit 
reduction. Generally, the deficit is funded by reserves and by local and international public debt. As the 
deficit increases, a vicious cycle is initiated and a high percentage of government expenditure is paid to 









17 Youth and work, a bulletin published in Omani Youth Day, 26/10/2016, NCSI. 




Figure 2.6. The rate of change in oil price, petroleum and non-petroleum government revenue, current 
and investment government expenditure 
Source: Different issues of the statistical yearly book, NCSI. 
 
Figure 2.7. The percentage of current government expenditure and investment government 
expenditure  
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Table 2.1. Fiscal year balance (1980-2016)  
Source: Different issues of the statistical yearly book, NCSI. 
Subsidy expenditure is the third and smallest component of government expenditure. The 
government provides a wide range of non-targeted subsidies. This includes support for development 
loan interest payments, housing loan interest payments, electricity and fuel products, food commodities, 
and investment and operational expenditure for government companies (NCSI, 2017). As a 
consequence of the recent oil price drop, the government removed the fuel products subsidy from 2016. 
Later the government provided a targeted subsidy for low-income people, students, and unemployed 
people. 
Although oil booms play a vital role in improving the Omani economy, they have negative 
effects on the two main traditional economic sectors: agriculture and fisheries. Currently, both sectors 
contribute less than 3% of the non-petroleum GDP sector. An increase in government spending on 
social capital infrastructure and increases in living standards is likely to lead to an increase in the 
demand for imported commodities and services. Consequently, the economic structure tends towards 
the non-tradable sector (Mehrara & Oskoui, 2007). Currently, the service sector dominates the non-
petroleum activities at 43.3%, 44.8%, and 44.3% in 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively (NCSI, 2019), 
and contributes to creating a non-competitive industrial sector. 
Asia is the main market for Omani crude oil. In 2018, Omani oil was exported mostly to China, 
India, and Japan for 83.1%, 7.6%, and 5.8% respectively (NCSI, 2019). Omani crude oil future contracts 
are used as flagship contracts by Dubai Mercantile Exchange Limited (DME) which was established 
for Middle Eastern crude oil exports to Asia.19 
2.4  Data and methodology 
Time series data and vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used in this analysis. In this section, 
we discuss the choice of variables and their properties. Consistent with the literature, we use six 
 
19 http://dubaimerc.com/about-dme. 
Fiscal year 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Surplus or deficit 
as a percentage of 
current 
expenditure 
-4 -27 -1 -26 -14 -2 -21 -26 -17 -14 4 6 9 
Fiscal year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  2017 
Surplus or deficit 
as a percentage of 
current 
expenditure 




variables in the baseline VAR model: oil price, exchange rate, government revenue, government 
expenditure, inflation, and GDP. We also discuss issues concerning foreign block exogeneity 
restrictions and the identification of the contemporaneous structure. The model includes two blocks, oil 
price as the foreign block and the other variables as the domestic block. It studies the petroleum and 
non-petroleum segment of the economy, breaks down the revenue into petroleum and non-petroleum, 
the government expenditure into current and investment. The study also analyses the impact of oil price 
volatility on these components.   
  Data 
Six variables are used to study the Omani economy as a small open economy. Oil prices 
represent the global exogenous factor, and the exchange rate is included representing the open economy 
nature of Oman. Government revenue and government expenditure are two fiscal policy variables, and 
inflation and GDP are two variables representing macroeconomic conditions. Generally, these variables 
are used to study the business cycle movements and are commonly used in the literature (see for 
example Eltony & Al‐Awadi, 2001; Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009; Emami & Adibpour, 2012; 
Hamdi & Sbia, 2013; Dizaji, 2014). A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix 
2.B.   
The data source is a monthly statistical bulletin published by the National Centre for Statistics 
and Information (NCSI), the formal data provider for government data in the Sultanate of Oman.20 The 
gross domestic product and consumer price index are provided quarterly, while government revenue 
(net revenue after transfer to the reserve fund), government expenditure, oil price, and the effective 
exchange rate index are monthly. For government revenue and government expenditure, three months 
of data are accumulated to get the quarterly data, while the average of three months of data is used for 
the oil price and effective exchange rate. The GDP deflator is not available for the whole period. 
Consequently, the consumer price index is used to convert the data from nominal to constant prices, to 
remove the price effects.  
The period of study is from 1989Q4 to 2016Q4, and as shown in Figure 2.8, includes a number 
of oil price fluctuations responding to supply and demand shocks. There are periods of declining oil 
prices associated with Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1998, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, 
and a recent drop because of the decline in global demand mainly from China and Europe, followed by 
an increase in US shale oil production and less impact of geopolitical conflict on the supply in the 
Middle East (Koh, 2016). There are periods of rising oil prices resulting essentially from geopolitical 
 




unrest in exporting countries such as the Kuwait invasion (1990), Iraq invasion (2003), and ‘Arab spring’ 
(2011) as well as an increase in global oil demand (2003-2008).  
Figure 2.8 shows the log of real GDP, government revenue, and government expenditure on 
the left vertical axis, while the log of real oil price on the right vertical axis. There is a co-movement 
between the four variables with an upward trend. The graph clearly shows the fall in oil price, GDP, 
and government revenue in 1998, 2008, and since late 2014. It is worth noting as the oil price spikes, 
the government revenue in Oman does not spike in tandem. This observation is expected as the 
published government revenue is actually the net revenue after transfer to the reserve fund if the oil 
price in that period is higher than the anticipated price for a specific five-development plan. In terms of 
the relationship between government revenue and government expenditure, they are both trending 
closely upwards. However, in periods where revenue falls, the spending does not respond which reflects 
the smoothing policy undertaken by the Omani government plus a large chunk of government 
expenditure is current spending, dominated by salaries. Hence, this provides the government with less 
space to adjust the expenditure. 
Figure 2.8. The GDP, government revenue, government expenditure, and oil price  
Source: Different issues of the monthly statistical bulletin, NCSI. 
 
The first step, before applying the VAR model, is to test the data for stationarity using three 
different tests; Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF), Philips –Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Philips-
Schmid-Shin (KPSS). As appendix 2.C shows, the results are not consistent across the three tests if the 
variables are expressed in level and mostly are integrated of order I(1), while it is more consistent for 
the variables to be stationary in first difference, I(0). Therefore, all data are expressed in the logarithmic 











































































































































































































































 The SVAR model  
In order to study the impact of oil price shock on the Omani economy, the six variables 
described in the previous section are ordered as follows: oil price (OP), exchange rate (EX), government 
revenue (GR), government expenditure (GE), inflation (IN), and GDP. 
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐼𝑁, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]
′ 
 The macroeconomic relationship among these variables is modelled using a structural vector 
autoregression model (SVAR): 
𝐁0𝑦𝑡 = 𝐁1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐁𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑡       (2.1) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 is  (𝑁 × 1)  vector of the endogenous variables at time t. The dimension of  𝐁0 is a 
(𝑁 × 𝑁) matrix that illustrates the contemporaneous relationship between the variables. The 𝐁𝑖 where  
𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑝,  show how each variable is affected by its own lag as well as by lags of the other variables 
and 𝑡 is a (𝑁 × 1) vector of structural disturbances mutually uncorrelated with white noise properties. 
In this research, one lag is used based on lag order selection criteria results reported in Appendix 2.D. 
Since 𝑡 and 𝐁0, … , 𝐁𝑝 cannot be estimated in equation (2.1), we estimate through the reduced 
form of (VAR) model which can be expressed as  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐀1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐀𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡       (2.2) 
Here we have 𝐀1 = 𝐁0
−1𝐁1and 𝐀𝑝 = 𝐁0
−1𝐁𝑝 and 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐁0
−1
𝑡  
This matrix allows us to express the typically mutually correlated reduced form innovation (𝑒𝑡) as 
weighted averages of the mutually uncorrelated structural innovations ( 𝑡) and the elements of 𝐵0
−1 
serving as the weights. 





(𝐼 − 𝐀1𝐿 − 𝐀2𝐿
2 − ⋯− 𝐀𝑝𝐿
𝑃)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 
𝐀(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡      (2.3)  
So, 𝐿𝑃𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−𝑃 defines the lag operator and 𝐀(𝐿) =  𝐼𝑁 − 𝐀1𝐿 − ⋯− 𝐀𝑝𝐿
𝑝       (2.4) 






−1𝑒𝑡 =  𝚯(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 = 𝚯(𝐿)𝐵0
−1
𝑡      (2.5) 
Where 𝚯(L) =  𝚯0 + 𝚯1𝐿 + ⋯+ 𝚯𝑞𝐿
𝑞 therefore, the impact of a shock in 𝑡 on the dependent 
variables in the future 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+2, … are respectively the (𝑁 × 𝑁) parameter matrices 
𝚯0, 𝚯1, 𝚯2, … . 
Through the moving average, we can get the impulse response function (IRF) and forecast error 
variance decomposition (FEVD). Impulse responses trace the impact of an unexpected shock in current 
and future errors of one variable on the other variables while holding other shocks constant. The forecast 
error variance decomposition (FEVD) is the percentage of the variance in the error of a variable 
associated with a specific shock in the model and depends critically on the orthogonality of underlying 
shocks (Stock & Watson, 2001).   
As the Omani economy is a small open economy, the structure of the vector autoregressive 
(SVAR) model consists of two blocks. One block represents the exogenous external variable (oil price), 
and the second block represents the domestic fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables (exchange rate, 
government revenue, government expenditure, inflation, and GDP).  
The oil price will affect the domestic variables contemporaneously and in lag, while the oil 
price is not affected by domestic variables contemporaneously nor in lag as Table 2.2 shows. Oil price 
is the most exogenous variable, as it reflects the relationship between supply and demand in the 
international market. Oman is a price taker and has no impact on the international oil price. In addition, 
Oman is not a member of OPEC, which may assume to have some influence on the oil price. While the 
oil price has an impact on the domestic block contemporaneously and in lag but not vice versa. In 
contrast, the domestic variables affect each other in lag and contemporaneously by using Cholesky 
decomposition order to get the orthogonalized residuals. So, the order of domestic variables started with 
the exchange rate, government revenue, government expenditure, inflation, and GDP.    
Table 2.2. The relationship between oil price and domestic variables 
Dependent Independent variable  
Variable OP EX GR GE IN GDP 
OP *           
EX * * * * * * 
GR * * * * * * 
GE * * * * * * 
IN * * * * * * 





To identify the structural shock, the model should be exactly or over-identified. 𝐵0 has 𝐾
2 
parameters so we need at least 
𝐾(𝐾−1)
2
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𝛼2,1
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The model is exactly identified. For the domestic block, we expect the exchange rate (EX) to 
be affected contemporaneously only by OP. EX is weighted by the imports of major trade partners of 
the Sultanate. Oman has used a pegged exchange rate regime to the US dollar since 1973 (CBO, 2018a), 
and the US currency is the main pricing and settlement currency in oil transactions. The US dollar is 
affected by the US monetary policy, therefore, the fluctuations of the dollar play an important role in 
world oil prices (Hou et al., 2016). In addition, countries with abundant natural resources are expected 
to experience currency appreciation following an oil price hike. So, there is a direct relationship between 
oil and the exchange rate. The third variable is government revenue (GR), where about 80% is 
petroleum revenue and 20% from customs duties, corporate income tax, and other resources. Therefore, 
GR is assumed to be affected contemporaneously by the oil price and exchange rate. The fourth variable 
is government expenditure (GE). The government expenditure is divided into current expenditure 
(dominated by salaries) and investment expenditure (development and capital). We assume that GE is 
affected contemporaneously by the oil price, exchange rate, and government revenue. The fifth 
macroeconomic variable is inflation (IN).  There are three reasons which explain the inflationary 
pressure in Oman; government spending, international prices, and the value of the US dollar (CBO, 
2017). So, inflation is affected contemporaneously by all variables except GDP. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) indicate that “fiscal variables move for many reasons, of which output stabilization is rarely 
predominant, in other words, they are exogenous (with respect to output) fiscal shocks”. In the case of 
Oman, the fiscal variables move mainly for oil prices and social reasons. The last variable is gross 





2.5 Empirical results and discussion 
This section presents the results from impulse responses, variance decomposition, and historical 
decomposition of the baseline model. In addition, it reports the results from different specifications of 
the baseline model which include the subcomponents of government revenue, government expenditure, 
and GDP. In the last specification, oil price volatility replaces the oil price in order to study any possible 
different responses to the variable volatility. 
  Impulse response function  
This section presents the results of the Impulse Response Function (IRF). The IRF traces the 
impact of structural innovations on the current and future value of other variables in the model. The 
graphs below are with 68% confidence intervals. 
2.5.1.1  Baseline model 
This section presents the results of the impact of oil price shocks and fiscal policy shocks in the 
baseline model which includes: [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐼𝑁, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]′. Starting with the responses to oil price 
shocks, the exchange rate responds positively and significantly to the oil price shock as shown in the 
first graph in Figure 2.9. This appreciation is expected for countries with abundant natural resources 
and the result is consistent with Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) finding for the Iranian economy. 
responding to oil price shock.21 
Total government revenue responds strongly and positively to the oil price shock as the second 
graph in Figure 2.9 shows. The response is statistically significant; this is expected since petroleum 
revenue contributes up to 80% of the total revenue. Contrary to expectations, the effect on government 
expenditure is relatively short-lived, stabilizing within six quarters. This result is consistent with Devlin 
and Titman (2004) and Fasano and Wang (2002) who included Oman within the oil-exporting countries 
for their studies. Moreover, the finding is similar to Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), where they 
found only marginal impact of oil price shocks on the government expenditure in Iran. This negligible 
impact of an oil price shock reflects the ability of the government to smooth spending by (i) funding 
the deficit using the reserve fund when the oil prices drop, (ii) obtaining fund through local and 
international debts, and (iii) isolating the impact of oil price increase using reserve fund when the oil 
price increases (as mention earlier, if the oil price is higher than the anticipated price for a specific five-
development plan, the excess goes to the reserve fund). Hamdi and Sbia (2013) highlighted that since 
 
21 In contrast, one study found that the exchange rate in Gulf countries does not appreciated as the oil price 





establishment of Future Generation Reserve Fund in 2006, the total government expenditure does not 
respond to oil revenue in Bahrain as not all oil revenue has been used for government spending. 
The result also shows that GDP responds positively to the oil price shock. This is anticipated 
as petroleum activities contribute a high portion of GDP, i.e. around 40% of the total GDP. In contrast, 
the oil price shock has no impact on inflation in Oman; this may reflect the impact of the subsidies 
system in Oman.  
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Next, we consider the impact of fiscal policy shocks i.e. government revenue and government 
expenditure shocks. Figure 2.10 illustrates the response to a government revenue shock. Both 
government expenditure and GDP respond positively and significantly to a government revenue shock. 
This indicates that the oil price affects government expenditure through government revenue. 22 
However, inflation only responds slightly and is statistically insignificant to the government revenue 
shock. 































Figure 2.11 below illustrates the responses to government expenditure shock. Government 
revenue responds positively and marginally to government expenditure shocks. The GDP response is 
positive and statistically significant, highlighting the expansionary nature of government spending 
shocks. Compared to that, inflation responds negatively and significantly to the shock. The result is 
contrary to expectations since the government expenditure is one of the three reasons which explain the 
inflationary pressure in Oman; along with international prices and the US dollar value (CBO, 2017). 
This difference may be explained by three possible reasons: (i) the inflation in Oman is predominantly 
imported inflation, as it is a small open economy with pegged currency. Therefore it trends with the 
 




global inflation (CBO, 2018b). (ii) The export plus import as a percentage of GDP, which is used as a 
measure for the openness of the economy (Huntington, 2015), is high in Oman. The trade openness as 
a percentage of GDP is 93.6% and 77.4% in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Moreover, import 
merchandise as a percentage of GDP is high; it is around 42.5% and 35.9% in 2015 and 2016 
respectively (CBO, 2017). (iii) The subsidies system in Oman includes subsidies for food commodities, 
electricity sector, fuel products, and housing loans (NCSI, 2017). The model does not capture the source 
of inflation and as reported in Table 2.3, the variance decomposition results highlight that the variation 
in inflation is mostly due to its own shock.   

































  Different model specifications 
This subsection presents different specifications of the baseline model; it includes the 
subcomponents of the government revenue, government expenditure, and GDP. As we notice earlier in 
the baseline model, inflation does not respond to the other variables in the model except to government 
expenditure. Therefore, inflation has been excluded from the extended model specifications. This 
exclusion is perceived to be fine as inflation in Oman is largely imported inflation, and as a small open 




2.5.2.1  Petroleum government revenue versus non-petroleum government revenue 
The next step will study the impact of petroleum government revenue and non-petroleum 
government revenue. In our first specification, we replace the government revenue with petroleum-
government revenue (GR_P). As mentioned earlier, petroleum revenue contributes 80% of the total 
government revenue.  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅_𝑃, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]
′ 
Figure 2.12 shows petroleum government revenue response is higher than the total government 
revenue to oil price shock, peaking at 0.9 for the former and 0.7 for the latter. The government 
expenditure response is minor and slightly statistically significant to a petroleum government revenue 
shock. The impact is slightly lower compared to the response to the total government revenue. This 
result may be explained in that the government expenditure does not react much to the petroleum 
government revenue and oil price changes. Oman adopted a formal saving policy as stated previously, 
and if the oil price is higher than the anticipated price for a specific five-development plan, the excess 
goes to the reserve fund. We notice that both GDP and exchange rate respond positively and 
significantly to the petroleum government revenue. 
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To examine the impact of non-petroleum revenue, we will replace the government revenue with 
non-petroleum government revenue in the second specification.  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅_𝑁𝑃, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]
′ 
Consistent with expectations, there is no response from the non-petroleum government revenue 
to the oil price shock as Figure 2.13 demonstrates. What is surprising is that government expenditure 
responds positively and statistically significant to the non-petroleum revenue even though it only 
contributes 20% of the total revenue. We also observe the non-petroleum revenue responds positively 
and significantly to the exchange rate. This may be associated to the contribution of custom duties in 
non-petroleum government revenue. The exchange rate used in this case is the trade weighted exchange 
rate, which is weighted by imports of major trade partners of the Sultanate. A rise in the index of the 
exchange rate in this case indicates that the purchasing power of the Omani rial is increasing. Therefore, 
as the exchange rate appreciates, we expect the ability of the Sultanate to import increases, and thus the 
government gain more revenue from the custom duties.   
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2.5.2.2  Current and investment government expenditure 
 In this subsection, we will examine the responses of subcomponents of government spending, 
current government expenditure (GE_C), and investment government expenditure (GE_I), to an oil 
price shock and government revenue shock. As mentioned previously, the current expenditure in Oman 
is dominated by salaries, which is less flexible compared to investment government expenditure. The 
variables in this specification are ordered as follows 
  𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸_𝐶, 𝐺𝐸_𝐼, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]
′  
We follow the same order as Dizaji (2014) and the discussion of Farzanegan (2011) for the 
Iranian economy. In comparison, Eltony and Al‐Awadi (2001) started with investment government 
expenditure for the Kuwaiti economy. Figure 2.14 shows the impact of oil price shocks on the current 
government expenditure, it fluctuates within the first six quarters and then stabilises, while it responds 
positively and significantly to the government revenue. Similarly, the oil price shock does not have 
much impact on the current government expenditure on the Kuwaiti economy. We could attribute this 
to the use of the capital reserve to finance current spending commitments (Eltony & Al‐Awadi, 2001).   
In contrast, investment government expenditure responds negatively and significantly to both 
oil price and government revenue shocks, indicating that the Omani government adopts a 
countercyclical policy. This appears to be consistent with Frankel et al. (2013) who analysed the fiscal 
policy in 94 developed and developing countries including Oman. Their results show that the fiscal 
policy in Oman was procyclical between 1960 and 1999 while it turned to be countercyclical between 
2000 and 2009 (Frankel et al., 2013).23 Dizaji (2014), on the other hand, found there is a positive and 
significant impact of government revenue on both current and investment expenditure for the Iranian 
economy compared to the non-significant impact of oil revenue. 
GDP responds positively to the current expenditure, while it responds negatively to the 
investment expenditure, but the results are only marginally significant. In terms of the relationship 
between the two subcomponents, investment expenditure responds positively and significantly to the 
current expenditure; however, current expenditure responds negatively and marginally significantly to 
investment expenditure. This indicates that an increase in investment spending has a negative impact 
on the current expenditure. Nevertheless, investment expenditure does not have a long-run impact on 
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2.5.2.3  Petroleum GDP versus non-petroleum GDP 
Gross domestic product in Oman is divided into petroleum GDP (GDP_P) and non-petroleum 
GDP (GDP_NP). This specification aims to examine the responses of GDP subcomponents to the oil 
price, government revenue, and government expenditure as Figure 2.15 shows. 
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑃]
′ 
Or  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑁𝑃]
′ 
 As expected, petroleum GDP responds strongly to the oil price shock. Similarly, non-
petroleum GDP responds positively and statistically significant to oil price shock; it may be due to the 
impact of the petrochemical industry and government investment in non-petroleum GDP. Turning to 
examine the impact of two fiscal policy shocks: government revenue and government expenditure. 
Petroleum GDP does not respond to government revenue or government expenditure, given that oil 
prices are exogenously determined. It is not surprising to note that the petroleum GDP (GDP_P) is non-
responsive to the government expenditure (GE). It is mainly influenced by the global oil price 
movements which are driven by the global demand and supply conditions, rather than by any domestic 
driven factors. Compared to that, non-petroleum GDP responds positively and statistically significant 
to both government revenue and government expenditure. So, the fiscal policy variables have an impact 
on non-petroleum GDP while it has no impact on petroleum GDP.  
 The model with oil price volatility 
Oil price volatility (OPV) is the degree of variation of oil price series over time, will be 
measured by the standard deviation of each three months of the oil price.24 This captures the concern 
over the effects of increasing oil price volatility in the last two decades (Baumeister & Peersman, 2013). 
Moreover, oil price volatility has an impact on the fiscal and external balances in oil-exporting countries 
due to higher interest burdens, revaluation of foreign debt and financial sector stresses (IMF, 2019). 
Further, commodity price volatilities are considered as a channel for resource curse, causing economic 
uncertainty and delays in budget stability (Majumder et al., 2020).   
Having discussed the impact of oil price shock, the goal of this model specification is to 
examine the impact of oil price volatility on the macroeconomic variables ordered as follow,  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃𝑉, 𝐸𝑋, 𝐺𝑅, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐼𝑁, 𝐺𝐷𝑃]
′ 
 
24 Aghion et al. (2009) use standard deviation to calculate exchange rate volatility, Arezki et al. (2014) used it to 
calculate exchange rate volatility and gold price volatility and Mondal and Khanam (2018) apply it to calculate 
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The outcome of this model specification is as expected in terms of the impact on the government 
revenue, government expenditure, and GDP and their specification compared to the baseline model with 
the oil price.  
The impulse response results in Figure 2.16 show that the exchange rate responds positively 
and statistically significant to the oil price volatility shocks as it reacts to an oil price shock. Likewise, 
Englama et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between oil price volatility and exchange rate 
volatility for Nigeria. For the policy variables, while the government revenue responds positively to the 
oil price shock, it responds negatively to oil price volatility shock. On the other hand, government 
expenditure does not respond to the oil price shock, but it responds negatively and significantly to the 
oil price volatility shocks. Compared to that, using a GMM dynamic panel, El Anshasy and Bradley 




responds negatively to the oil price volatility while it responds positively to the oil price shock. As 
observed for oil price shock, oil price volatility also has no impact on inflation.  








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of GDP to OPV
 
 
Next, we include the oil price volatility in the different model specifications as shown in Figure 
2.17. Petroleum government revenue responds negatively and statistically significant to the oil price 
volatility shocks, while it responds positively to the oil price shock. In Comparison, non-petroleum 
revenue responds negatively to oil price volatility, while it does not respond to oil price shock. Although 
the current government expenditure responds negatively to the oil price volatility shock, government 
investment expenditure does not respond to the oil price volatility. This may be explained by the fact 
that investment decisions are made for the long term; therefore, the government is involved in contracts 




in Figure 2.6 the investment government spending fluctuates less compared to the current spending. Oil 
price volatility has a negative and significant impact on both petroleum-GDP and non-petroleum GDP. 
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  Forecast error variance decomposition 
This section presents the result of forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) for the 
baseline model and for different model specifications. It shows the percentage that each shock in the 
model contributes to the predicted error variance for a specific variable within a specific time horizon.  
2.5.4.1  Baseline model 
The forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline is presented in Table 2.3. The results 
reveal that oil price shocks play a key role in explaining the variance in government revenue and GDP. 
It explains 18.65% of variance decomposition for the former and 55.22% for the latter in the 1st quarter. 




in the 5th quarter and persists until the 15th quarter. Compared to that, besides its own shock, two 
variables contribute to the variance of government expenditure: oil price and government revenue. Oil 
price shock contributes by 5.51% in the 1st quarter then increased to 14.03% in the 10th, and government 
revenue contributes by 3.54% in the 1st quarter increased to 7.41% in the 10th. In contrast, more than 
90% of the variances in the exchange rate and inflation are caused by their own shocks. A government 
revenue shock explains 4.45% of the GDP’s variance in the 1st quarter and increases to 10.63% in the 
5th quarter. In contrast, the contribution of government expenditure is lower to the GDP’s variances, 
only 1.57% in the 1st quarter and increased to 1.72% in 5th, 10th, and 15th.  
Table 2.3. Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline model 
Variable Horizon 
(quarters) 
Source of Disturbance 
OP EX GR GE IN GDP 
EX 
1 0.03 99.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 3.54 95.69 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.35 
10 3.54 95.68 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.35 
15 3.54 95.68 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.35 
GR 
1 18.65 0.34 81.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 22.02 0.34 75.14 0.97 0.71 0.81 
10 22.01 0.34 75.08 1.01 0.74 0.81 
15 22.01 0.34 75.08 1.01 0.74 0.81 
GE 
1 5.51 0.47 3.54 90.48 0.00 0.00 
5 13.98 0.39 7.45 75.13 0.18 2.87 
10 14.03 0.39 7.41 74.77 0.20 3.20 
15 14.03 0.39 7.41 74.77 0.20 3.20 
IN 
1 0.93 0.30 0.14 5.83 92.79 0.00 
5 0.67 0.74 0.16 4.34 94.04 0.05 
10 0.67 0.76 0.16 4.30 94.06 0.05 
15 0.67 0.76 0.16 4.29 94.06 0.05 
GDP 
1 55.22 0.02 4.45 1.57 0.47 38.26 
5 45.62 0.24 10.63 1.72 1.80 39.99 
10 45.58 0.24 10.68 1.72 1.83 39.95 
15 45.58 0.24 10.68 1.72 1.83 39.95 
 
2.5.4.2 Different model specifications 
We now consider the forecast error variance decomposition for the model with different 
specifications.  
2.5.4.2.1 Petroleum government revenue versus non-petroleum government revenue 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the results for forecast error variance decomposition for the model 
with petroleum government revenue or with non-petroleum revenue. As expected, the contribution of 




government revenue. Oil price shocks explain 22.14% in the 1st quarter then increases to 25.63% in the 
10th quarter of the petroleum government revenue variance. Compared to that, on average oil price 
shock contributes only 1% of the variance of non-petroleum government revenue. In terms of the impact 
of the  two government revenue specifications on government expenditure, there is an interesting 
outcome. Non-petroleum government revenue explains a high percentage of the government 
expenditure variance compared to petroleum government revenue. About 11.67% of the variance 
decomposition for government expenditure is attributed to non-petroleum government revenue 
compared to only 4.27% for the petroleum government revenue in the 5th quarter. Referring to Figures 
2.12 and 2.13, government expenditure responds more to the non-petroleum government revenue 
compared to petroleum revenue. Turning to the GDP, petroleum government revenue explains between 
4.34% in the 1st quarter and 6.63% in the 5th quarter of GDP’s variances. Compared to that, non-
petroleum revenue explains close to 0% in the 1st quarter and only increased to 1.46% in the 5th quarter. 




Source of Disturbance 
OP EX GR_P GE GDP 
GR_P 
1 22.14 1.21 76.66 0.00 0.00 
5 25.64 0.98 71.12 1.55 0.72 
10 25.63 0.98 71.04 1.63 0.72 
15 25.63 0.98 71.04 1.63 0.72 
GE 
1 5.51 0.65 1.47 92.37 0.00 
5 14.74 0.56 4.27 77.95 2.48 
10 14.83 0.56 4.28 77.49 2.84 
15 14.83 0.56 4.28 77.49 2.84 
GDP 
1 53.17 0.03 4.34 2.05 40.41 
5 44.93 0.16 6.63 3.04 45.24 
10 44.89 0.16 6.67 3.05 45.23 
15 44.89 0.16 6.67 3.05 45.23 
 
2.5.4.2.2 Current and investment government expenditure  
Table 2.6 shows oil price shocks explain a higher proportion of the variance of the government 
investment expenditure (GE_I) compared to government revenue shocks. In the 5th quarter, 17.11% of 
the investment expenditure is explained by oil price shock compared to only 3.72% by government 
revenue. This stems from the fact that the investment expenditure is planned based on the long-term 
development plans centred on the anticipated future oil prices. In contrast, both oil price and government 
revenue contributed almost equally to the variance of current government expenditure (GE_C), i.e. 




components on the GDP, in the 5th quarter, current expenditure contributes only 1.57% only, while 
investment expenditure contributes by 2.97% to the GDP’s variance.   




Source of Disturbance 
OP EX GR_NP GE GDP 
GR_NP 
1 0.89 1.14 97.96 0.00 0.00 
5 1.01 1.42 97.41 0.01 0.14 
10 1.02 1.42 97.40 0.01 0.14 
15 1.02 1.42 97.40 0.01 0.14 
GE 
1 4.48 0.32 10.53 84.67 0.00 
5 11.89 0.26 11.67 74.68 1.50 
10 11.96 0.27 11.64 74.44 1.69 
15 11.96 0.27 11.64 74.44 1.69 
GDP 
1 53.89 0.11 0.00 3.08 42.91 
5 45.73 0.39 1.46 3.76 48.65 
10 45.67 0.39 1.51 3.77 48.65 
15 45.67 0.39 1.51 3.77 48.65 
 




Source of disturbance 
OP EX GR GE_C GE_I GDP 
GE_C 
1 3.43 1.14 5.67 89.76 0.00 0.00 
5 10.98 0.86 9.25 75.04 1.53 2.34 
10 11.03 0.86 9.22 74.75 1.56 2.57 
15 11.03 0.86 9.23 74.75 1.56 2.57 
GE_I 
1 11.81 0.01 0.76 10.21 77.20 0.00 
5 17.11 0.56 3.72 16.26 60.27 2.07 
10 17.23 0.57 3.75 16.26 59.70 2.49 
15 17.23 0.57 3.75 16.26 59.70 2.49 
GDP 
1 52.67 0.13 4.83 1.47 0.09 40.81 
5 43.42 0.32 10.93 1.57 2.97 40.79 
10 43.28 0.32 11.03 1.60 3.26 40.50 
15 43.28 0.32 11.03 1.60 3.26 40.50 
 
2.5.4.2.3 Petroleum GDP or non-petroleum GDP 
The oil price shock explains a high percentage of petroleum GDP disturbances as reported in 
Table 2.7, i.e. 91.51% in the 1st quarter, and 90.08% in the 5th quarter. However, oil price shocks explain 
only 4.20% in 1st and 3.00% in the 5th quarter of the non-petroleum GDP variances. In terms of the 




negligible percentage of the petroleum GDP’s variance. In contrast, government revenue explains 7.21% 
and government expenditure explains 2.89% of the non-petroleum GDP in the 1st quarter. In the 5th it 
increased to 14.80% for the former and 3.38% for the latter. 




Source of disturbance   
OP EX GR GE GDP_P GDP_NP 
GDP_P 
1 91.51 0.02 0.48 0.04 7.95 - 
5 90.08 0.44 1.10 0.05 8.33 - 
10 90.08 0.44 1.10 0.05 8.33 - 
15 90.08 0.44 1.10 0.05 8.33 - 
GDP_NP 
1 4.20 0.00 7.21 2.89 - 85.70 
5 3.00 0.02 14.80 3.38 - 78.80 
10 3.01 0.02 14.89 3.38 - 78.70 
15 3.01 0.02 14.89 3.38 - 78.70 
  
 Model specification with oil price volatility  
In this subsection, the oil price will be replaced by oil price volatility (OPV) in the baseline 
model as in the different model specifications, to examine the impact of oil price volatility on the other 
macroeconomic variables. 
2.5.5.1 Baseline model  
Table 2.8 illustrates the forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline model. The oil 
price volatility shocks explain less of the variance in government revenue, government expenditure, 
and GDP compared to oil price shocks. Oil price volatility explains 2.05% of the government revenue, 
5.82% for the government expenditure, and 1.12% for GDP in the 5th quarter.   
2.5.5.2 Different specification for the model 
This model specification with petroleum or non-petroleum revenue, most of the disturbances 
in petroleum revenue and non-petroleum revenue are attributed to themselves and the contribution of 
oil price volatility is small. Moreover, the percentage of contribution to the two variables is almost equal, 
around 1.00% as Table 2.9 shows.  
Shifting now to the model specification with two expenditure subcomponents, the results are 
shown in Table 2.10 below. Oil price volatility contributes more to current government expenditure 
variance than to investment expenditure variance, i.e. 7.90% for the former, and only 0.66% for the 
latter in the 5th quarter. Compared to that, an oil price shock contributes higher to the investment 




Moving on, we decompose the GDP to petroleum and non-petroleum. The results in Table 2.11 
shows oil price volatility shocks explain a small percentage of the disturbance in both variables. 
Surprisingly, it explains slightly more of the non-petroleum GDP variance compared to petroleum GDP. 
Table 2.8. Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline model 
Variable Horizon 
(quarters) 
Source of Disturbance 
OPV EX GR GE IN GDP 
EX 
1 6.50 93.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 6.26 89.12 1.67 0.56 0.21 2.18 
10 6.26 89.10 1.67 0.56 0.23 2.18 
15 6.26 89.10 1.67 0.56 0.23 2.18 
GR 
1 2.28 0.01 97.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 2.05 0.74 87.92 0.27 0.17 8.84 
10 2.06 0.74 87.85 0.32 0.18 8.84 
15 2.06 0.74 87.85 0.32 0.18 8.84 
GE 
1 5.28 1.90 0.54 92.28 0.00 0.00 
5 5.82 1.24 0.44 86.51 0.23 5.77 
10 5.82 1.24 0.44 86.44 0.24 5.83 
15 5.82 1.24 0.44 86.44 0.24 5.83 
IN 
1 0.08 0.34 0.24 4.17 95.18 0.00 
5 0.57 0.30 0.15 3.28 95.21 0.49 
10 0.60 0.30 0.15 3.25 95.20 0.50 
15 0.61 0.30 0.15 3.25 95.20 0.50 
GDP 
1 0.76 0.05 30.30 0.02 0.01 68.85 
5 1.12 1.66 31.19 3.22 0.10 62.70 
10 1.13 1.66 31.17 3.23 0.11 62.70 
15 1.13 1.66 31.17 3.23 0.11 62.70 
 
Table 2.9. Forecast error variance decomposition for model specifications with petroleum government 
revenue or non-petroleum government revenue 
Variable Horizon 
(quarters) 
Source of disturbance 
OPV EX GR_P GR_NP GE GDP 
GR_P 
1 1.37 0.45 98.18 - 0.00 0.00 
5 1.56 1.30 86.65 - 0.40 10.08 
10 1.57 1.30 86.56 - 0.49 10.08 
15 1.57 1.30 86.56 - 0.49 10.08 
GR_NP 
1 1.36 1.94 - 96.70 0.00 0.00 
5 1.18 2.38 - 96.37 0.00 0.07 
10 1.18 2.38 - 96.37 0.00 0.07 






Table 2.10. Forecast error variance decomposition for model specification with current government 
expenditure and investment government expenditure  
Variable Horizon 
(quarters) 
Source of disturbance 
OPV EX GR GE_C GE_I GDP 
GE_C 
1 6.54 3.32 1.64 88.50 0.00 0.00 
5 7.90 2.49 1.41 82.91 1.04 4.24 
10 7.90 2.49 1.41 82.88 1.06 4.26 
15 7.90 2.49 1.41 82.88 1.06 4.26 
GE_I 
1 0.01 0.00 3.51 14.97 81.51 0.00 
5 0.66 0.05 2.24 25.27 67.63 4.15 
10 0.67 0.05 2.24 25.28 67.50 4.25 
15 0.67 0.05 2.24 25.28 67.50 4.25 
 




Source of Disturbance   
OPV EX GR GE GDP_P GDP_NP 
GDP_P 
1 0.23 0.00 23.12 3.26 73.38 - 
5 1.11 3.15 21.44 5.58 68.73 - 
10 1.11 3.15 21.44 5.58 68.73 - 
15 1.11 3.15 21.44 5.58 68.73 - 
GDP_NP 
1 1.87 0.16 10.76 1.55 - 85.65 
5 1.63 1.04 16.29 3.22 - 77.82 
10 1.63 1.04 16.30 3.31 - 77.72 
15 1.63 1.04 16.30 3.31 - 77.72 
 
 Historical decomposition  
This section presents historical decomposition for the three main variables in the model, namely 
GDP, government revenue, and government expenditure. The historical decomposition quantifies the 
importance of different shocks on a variable. Figure 2.18 shows GDP as mostly affected by its own 
shocks and the oil price shock, particularly in 1997-1998, 2008-2009, and recently in 2014-2016. 
Considering the historical decomposition of government revenue and government expenditure. Figure 
2.19 shows that oil price contributes substantially to the government revenue and compared to that, 
Figure 2.20 illustrates government expenditure decomposition attributes by its own shock mainly. 
Comparing the impacts of the oil price fall in three different periods: Asian Financial crisis, Global 
Financial Crisis, and the recent fall in oil prices 2014-2016. It is clear that the impact of the 1998 Asian 
Crisis and recent fall is higher compared to the impact of the 2008 Global Crisis as Asia is the main 




government revenue is high compared to the previous two events because of an increase in the supply 
of shale oil, and increased production from Russia, and Saudi Arabia.   
 
Figure 2.18. Historical decomposition for GDP 
 
 

















































































































































































































































Figure 2.20. Historical decomposition for government expenditure  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion and policy implication  
The Omani economy is an oil-dependent economy. The petroleum sector has contributed up to 
80% of the government’s revenue, 60% of export value, and 40% of GDP (NCSI, 2017). This study 
aims to study the impacts of the oil price shocks on the Omani economy and its fiscal measures.  
The study provides a comprehensive analysis of an oil-dependent economy, which can be used 
as a guide for policy, targeted not only for the Omani economy but also for other similar economies, 
particularly in the Middle East. We expand the analysis, using different model specifications of the 
subcomponents of the government revenue, government expenditure, GDP, and replace oil price by the 
oil price volatility. 
The results of the impulse responses show that oil price shocks have a positive impact on the 
exchange rate, government revenue, and GDP. Interestingly, the impact of oil price shock on the 
government expenditure is weak and insignificant, although it responds positively to a government 
revenue shock. The high portion of salaries in government spending, establishment of the saving fund, 
and using it along with local and international debt to smooth the government spending are possible 
reasons to explain this weak response. On the other hand, as expected, government revenue, government 
expenditure, and GDP respond negatively and statistically significant when replacing the oil price with 
























































































































Turning to the model specifications, the petroleum components of GDP and government 
revenue respond more to oil price shocks compared with the non-petroleum related components. In 
addition, the oil price has an impact on the non-petroleum GDP, possibly through the petrochemicals 
industry and government spending. Surprisingly, the investment government expenditure responds 
negatively to the oil price and government revenue shocks. This may be caused by changes in the fiscal 
policy in Oman from procyclical to countercyclical between 2000 and 2009. It may also be an indicator 
that the amount allocated for government investment expenditure is not sufficient to create long-term 
sustainable gain because the GDP responds negatively to the investment government expenditure which 
can also be associated with crowding-out effects. This needs more investigations. Oil price volatility 
has no impact on investment spending, which can be associated with the long-term nature of the 
investment expenditure plan.  
The results of forecast error variance decompositions support the results from impulse response. 
Oil price shocks explain more of the variation in the petroleum-related components compared to non-
petroleum. The highest is in case of petroleum GDP; oil price shock explains 91.51% of the variance in 
petroleum GDP in the 1st quarter and 90.08% in the 5th, 10th, and 15th quarters. In contrast, oil price 
volatility shock has less ability to explain the variation in government revenue, government expenditure, 
and GDP and their respective subcomponents. 
The historical decomposition for GDP, government revenue, and government expenditure also 
show that oil price has more impact on GDP and government revenue compared to government 
expenditure.  
The oil price shock has no impact on government expenditure which indicates the ability to 
smooth the spending using saving fund and domestic and international debt. Moreover, since a high 
percentage of government spending is a current expenditure, this causes difficulties for the government 
to decrease the spending in response to negative oil price shocks. Although, the government included 
reduction of fiscal spending as one of the three goals of the 2017 general budget along with enhancing 
non-petroleum revenue and pursuing economic diversification (CBO, 2017) the current government 
expenditure could increase due to social and political reasons.   
The fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries uses public sector employment, higher wage, and 
social welfare as a tool to share the oil wealth (Chemingui & Roe, 2008). Although, these are good 
approaches to distribute the oil rent, managing large size government in oil-exporting countries can be 
a challenge, particularly when oil price declines. Falls in oil prices can be associated with gradual 
increases in the fiscal breakeven price, which leads to the budget deficit, high debt, and depletion of 
reserve funds. These outcomes have a negative impact on the economic legacy for future generations 




investment is only less than one-third of the total government spending, which is not adequate in the 
long run to create sustainable growth.  
Oil is an exhaustible and volatile source of government revenue, and the Omani government is 
planning to apply the value-added tax (VAT) in 2021. As a result of the  recent oil plunge, there is 
increasing interest from GCC countries to adopt the VAT to increase non-oil revenue. 25 But as expected, 
people in Oman are not welcoming the VAT, as they fear it may affect their welfare and prosperity, 
especially for the low-income earners. Another possible policy the government may consider is to 
enforce ‘Azakah’, a compulsory levy imposed on the Muslims to take surplus money or wealth from 
the comparatively well-to-do members of the Muslim society and give it to the poorer members of the 
society. This approach might be more receptive, as it economically helps to improve the poor’s 

















25 Economic diversification in oil-exporting Arab countries, prepared by staff of the IMF, annual meeting of Arab 




2.7 Appendix   
Appendix 2.A: Summary of empirical studies on the impact of oil price shock on the macroeconomic 
variables in oil-exporter economies 




- Study the impact of oil price shock on the macroeconomic variables. 
- Applied VAR and VECM models. 
- The variables used: oil price, oil revenue, government development expenditure, 
government current expenditure, inflation, money demand, and value of imported 





- Study the impact effect of oil price shock on the macroeconomic variables. 
- Applied VAR model. 
- The variables used: Industrial production index, consumer price index, exchange 





- Study the source of macroeconomic fluctuations in oil exporting countries. 
- Applied SVAR model. 










- Study the dynamic relationship between oil price shock and macroeconomic 
variables.  
- Applied VAR model. 
- The variables used: oil price, government expenditure, industry GDP per capita, 




- Study the long-run relationship between GDP, government revenue, exchange 
rate and oil price. 
- Applied VECM model. 




- Study the effect of oil price shocks on exchange rate, inflation and output. 
-  Applied SVAR model. 






- Study the dynamic impact of oil revenue on the government expenditure 
categories. 
- Applied VAR model. 
- The variables used: oil export revenue per capita, government health expenditure, 
government military expenditure, government security expenditure, government 







- Study the impact of oil price fluctuations on the macroeconomy. 
- Applied VECM model. 
- The variables used: GDP, unemployment rates, inflation, exchange rate and 






- Study the impact of oil revenue shocks on the output. 
- Applied SVAR model. 
- The variables used: GDP, government expenditure, liquidity, exchange rate, 




- Study the long run impact of the oil export on the economy. 
- Applied vector error-correcting model (VECX*) model.   
- The variables used: real output, real money balance, inflation, exchange rate, oil 




- Study empirically the dynamic relationships between oil revenue, government 
spending and economic growth. 
- Applied VECM model. 




- Study the relationship between the government revenue and government 
expenditure. 
- Applied SVAR model. 
- The variables used: oil prices, ratio of oil revenues to GDP, and ratio of 








Appendix 2.B: The data source is the monthly statistical bulletin, retrieved from NCSI website: 
(https://www.ncsi.gov.om/Elibrary/Pages/LibraryContentView.aspx)  
The variables Abbreviation  Source  Frequency  Measure  
Gross Domestic Products  GDP 
Table (2): Gross 




Petroleum Gross Domestic 
Products  
GDP_P 
Table (2): Gross 





Domestic Products  
GDP_NP 
Table (2): Gross 




Government Revenue GR 





















Government Expenditure  GE 





















Oil Price  OP 
Table (7): Crude oil and 




Effective Exchange Rate 
Index  
EX 
Table (9): Money and 
banking 
Monthly  Seasonally adjusted, log 












- Study the impact of oil price shocks on the government spending.  
- Applied VAR model. 
- The variables used: oil price and four different government expenditure (social 




- Study the dynamics relationship between GDP, oil revenue and government 
expenditure. 
- Applied VECM model. 




- To study the impact of global shock on the Kuwait economy.  
- Applied GVAR model. 
- The variables used: GDP, inflation rate, short-term interest rate, long-term interest 





Appendix 2.C: Unit root results for the variables in logarithmic difference 
*significant at 1%, while the other results are significant at 5% 
 
 
Appendix 2.D: VAR lag order selection criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 887.4653 NA  2.06E-15 -16.78981 -16.63816 -16.72836 
1 999.3829 208.9129   4.85e-16*  -18.23586*  -17.17428*  -17.80569* 
2 1032.469   57.97864* 5.16E-16 -18.18035 -16.20884 -17.38146 














level 1st diff  
ADF   PP   KPSS   ADF   PP   KPSS   
GDP -3.47 I(0) -3.28 I(1) 0.13 I(0) -13.41 I(0) -16.72 I(0) 0.17 I(0) 
GDP_P -2.43 I(1) -2.08 I(1) 0.14 I(0) -9.37 I(0) -9.52 I(0) 0.11 I(0) 
GDP_NP -3.87 I(1)* -7.52 I(0) 0.09 I(0) -18.63 I(0) -74.59 I(0) 0.11 I(0) 
GR -2.83 I(1) -2.83 I(1) 0.12 I(0) -12.62 I(0) -12.87 I(0) 0.09 I(0) 
GR_P -2.77 I(1) -2.64 I(1) 0.11 I(0) -12.50 I(0) -12.77 I(0) 0.09 I(0) 
GR_NP -3.45 I(0) -9.12 I(0) 0.20 I(1) -12.12 I(0) -36.18 I(0) 0.09 I(0) 
GE -2.76 I(1) -8.45 I(0) 0.24 I(1) -9.26 I(0) -49.18 I(0) 0.10 I(0) 
GE_C -3.19 I(1) -8.91 I(0) 0.23 I(1) -9.50 I(0) -53.05 I(0) 0.15 I(0)* 
GE_I -2.28 I(1) -4.68 I(0) 0.15 I(1) -17.79 I(0) -21.29 I(0) 0.11 I(0) 
EX -1.04 I(1) -0.93 I(1) 0.92 I(1) -8.21 I(0) -8.16 I(0) 0.24 I(0) 
IN -1.04 I(1) -0.26 I(1) 0.70 I(1) -4.62 I(0) -4.76 I(0) 0.23 I(0) 





3 TRADE AND FISCAL BALANCES IN AN OIL-BASED ECONOMY 
– THE OMANI EXPERIENCE  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Oil price fluctuations have an impact on both fiscal balance and external balance in oil-
exporting countries such as Oman. Thus, oil prices are an important determinant of current account 
balance and fiscal policy in these countries. An increase in oil price has an impact on fiscal revenue and 
expenditure. Higher exports revenue from oil increases the government’s ability to spend, leading to 
expansionary fiscal policy (Akanbi, 2015). Oil-exporting countries tend to be less diversified and 
heavily dependent on oil revenue, steering to a strong linkage between the public saving and the current 
account balance (Arezki & Hasanov, 2013). Thus, the degree of economic diversification determines 
the relationship between the oil price and the current account, which determines the economy’s ability 
to absorb oil price shocks. But most of the developing commodity exporters have low trade 
diversification, and the current account balance is strongly linked to oil price changes (Gnimassoun et 
al., 2017).  
Assessing the relationship between the current account and fiscal policy provides a good guide 
for policymakers to achieve macroeconomic stability (Akanbi, 2015). For developing oil exporters such 
as Oman, changes in oil prices have been the main driver of both fiscal and current account balances 
over the years (CBO, 2019). This imposes fiscal challenges and uncertainty for oil-exporting countries 
since oil is an exhaustible resource, with fluctuating prices that are sensitive to the international market 
(Le & Chang, 2013).  
The nexus between the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit gained  particular attention 
in the United States (US) in the 1980s during the Reagan Administration, which accumulated 
government budget deficit led to the current account deficit, commonly known as ‘Twin Deficits 
Hypothesis (TDH)’  (Enders & Lee, 1990).  
We argue that TDH may not be applicable to countries such as Oman. The reason being, Oman 
follows a pegged exchange rate regime, where the Omani rial is pegged to the US dollar since 1973 
(CBO, 2018a), while no restrictions are imposed on foreign capital flow movements (Al-Faris, 2002). 
The focus of monetary policy tends towards maintaining the exchange rate stability, which is deemed 
necessary by the Central Bank of Oman to promote sustainable growth and to achieve price and 




relationship between fiscal deficit and current account deficit may be more applicable for economies 
with flexible exchange rate, where the interest rate and exchange rate are managed by the central banks. 
The TDH theory is more relevant to countries where fiscal revenue relies more on tax contribution. For 
Oman, the contribution of taxes to the total government revenue was 12.25%, 10.38%, and 9.18% in 
2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively, and taxes contributed to the non-oil government revenue segment 
by 38.52%, 38.31%,  and 42.2% of the same three years respectively (NCSI, 2019).  
Following the drop in oil prices between 2014 and 2016, the current account balance in oil-
exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa shifted from 8.80% of surplus to GDP to 3.60% 
of deficit to GDP (IMF, 2017). Following the recovery of oil price in 2018, the current account balance 
shifted back to a surplus of 8.00% of GDP. Though the position remains weak in countries like Oman, 
Yemen, Bahrain, and Algeria (IMF, 2018).  
This study aims to fill the gap in the literature related to the relationship and causality effect 
between the fiscal balance (FB) and the trade balance (TB) in oil-exporting countries and to contribute 
with empirical work to the political discussion about the relation between the fiscal deficit and current 
account deficit. We test the TDH for the Omani economy in the short run and the long run, using the 
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, and the structural vector error correction (SVECM) 
model respectively for the period 1989Q4 to 2017Q4. We use trade balance, fiscal balance, and oil 
prices to assess the short-run relationship while using oil prices, exports, imports, government 
expenditure, and government revenue to assess the long-run relationship. Compared to other studies on 
oil-dependent economies, this study includes the oil price in the short and long-run analyses.    
In the short run, results show that oil price has an impact on both FB and TB for the Omani 
economy, and the direction of causality runs from TB to FB which is opposite to the TDH. TB and FB 
respond positively to oil price shock while they respond negatively to oil price volatility shock. 
By dividing the study period into three sub-periods: the first period which includes Kuwait 
invasion, the second period includes Kuwait invasion, and Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), last period 
includes Kuwait invasion, AFC, and Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The results are consistent across 
the three sub-periods where the responses of TB to a positive oil price shock is higher compared to FB 
responses. TB responds positively to the FB shock only in the first sub-period and responds negatively 
in the two later sub-periods. Compared to that, FB responds positively to TB shocks in all three sub-
periods. This outcome is not surprising, as Oman’s trade balance is dominated by oil export, an 
exogenous variable in the domestic economy, being influenced by global oil prices and global trends. 
The first sub-period includes high oil prices driven by a precautionary oil demand shock associated with 
the Kuwait invasion; in contrast, the latter sub-periods include low realized oil prices driven by low 




In the long-run analysis, there are two cointegration relationships identified between the oil 
price, government revenue, government expenditure, exports, and imports. The cointegration vectors 
are normalised on government expenditure for the first equation and on imports in the second equation. 
The results show oil price shocks have a statistically significant positive impact on government revenue, 
exports, and imports which is consistent with the positive short-run responses of FB and TB. In contrast, 
the response of government expenditure to oil price shocks is statistically insignificant. Government 
expenditure, however, responds statistically significant to government revenue shock but not vice versa. 
On the trade side, imports respond to the exports shock but not vice versa, implying there is a 
unidirectional impact from government revenue and exports toward government expenditure and 
imports respectively.  
 The remaining of the study is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses in more detail the 
twin deficit and oil price, while section 3.3 gives an overview of the Omani economy. Section 3.4 
examines the short-run relationship while section 3.5 illustrates the long-run relationship and section 
3.6 concludes.   
3.2 Fiscal deficit, current account deficit, and oil price 
In this section, we present the four streams of twin deficit arguments in the literature. Then, we 
discuss the literature on the impact of oil price on fiscal deficit and current account deficit.   
 Four streams of twin deficit arguments   
The relationship and causality direction between the government budget deficit and current 
account deficit is a debated topic. There are four streams of literature that explain the nexus between 
the government budget deficit and the current account deficit. The first stream is the TDH based on the 
Keynesian macroeconomic model which argues that there is a unidirectional relationship from 
government budget deficit to current account deficit (Abell, 1990; Akbostanci & Tunç, 2001; Algieri, 
2013). The transmission mechanism between the two variables can be explained by the Keynesian 
absorption theory and the Mundell-Fleming framework. According to the Keynesian absorption theory, 
a rise in the budget deficit through tax cuts or government expenditure increases, raises the domestic 
absorption through imports expansion caused by the income increase, leading to current account deficit 
(Feldstein, 1991; Elhendawy, 2014). Compared to that, the Mundell-Fleming framework assumes that 
under the flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in the government budget deficit raises the 
domestic interest rate which attracts the foreign capital inflows and consequently appreciates the 
domestic currency. The domestic currency appreciation increases imports spending and decreases 
exports competitiveness, leading to a current account deficit. Even under the fixed exchange rate regime, 
the rise in domestic prices due to expansionary fiscal measures can deteriorate the current account 




The second stream is associated with the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, which assumes no 
systematic relationship between the budget deficit and the current account deficit. According to this 
theory, an increase in government deficit financed through bonds will not lead to an increase in income 
or interest rate. The households are assumed to save the revenue they gained from the expansion, 
expecting the government will increase the taxes in the future to finance the debt. Therefore, lower 
public saving is covered by an equal increase in private savings, avoiding any need to borrow from 
abroad. As a result, the current account does not respond to the changes in the government fiscal balance 
or government spending (Barro, 1974, 1989).  
The third stream is the Current Account Targeting Hypothesis, which assume unidirectional 
causality in the opposite direction to the Keynesian absorption theory and Mundell-Fleming framework. 
According to this hypothesis, the nation attempts to maintain external balance, as any deterioration in 
the current account leads to a slower pace of economic growth and increases the fiscal deficit. This 
appears to be true, especially for small open economies with high debt, and the debt services will be 
inflated and worsen the external balance (Summers, 1988). This assumption is a phenomenon in small 
open economies that depend on foreign loans to finance investment and economic development. The 
accumulation of loans will inflate debt service payments in the current account, leading to current 
account deficit and ultimately to budget deficit to finance it (Helmy, 2018). Finally, some authors 
assume bidirectional causality between the government budget deficit and the current account deficit. 
Taken together, there is no agreement if the budget deficit causes the current account deficit or vice 
versa (Kouassi et al., 2004).  
From the above discussions, we can divide the causality between the fiscal deficit and the 
current account deficit into the intertemporal transmission and the intertemporal response mechanisms. 
According to the intertemporal transmission mechanism, a change in government fiscal measure will 
influence the domestic aggregate demand, which will affect the interest rate, therefore, leads to capital 
inflow/ outflow and exchange rate appreciation/ depreciation as in Keynesian and Mundell-Fleming 
modelling framework. Through this transmission mechanism between fiscal policy and the current 
account balance indicates that any improvement in one variable is expected to be translated into an 
improvement in the second variable and vice versa. The intertemporal response mechanism, on the other 
hand looks at the responses of private agents to government fiscal policy actions, assuming the change 
in the government saving is offset by private saving leading toward Ricardian outcome (Akanbi, 2015). 
The causation between the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit also depends on a number of 
factors such as exchange rate regimes, degree of economic openness to the global system, changes in 
output gaps, and the initial level of debt in economies under consideration (Abbas et al., 2011; Akanbi 




 A review of the empirical literature on the twin deficit hypothesis  
As the theoretical explanations for the relationship between government fiscal deficit and 
current account deficit are debated; the empirical studies also come with mixed results with no clear 
consensus (Kouassi et al., 2004; Xie & Chen, 2014). Traditionally there are two ways to test the 
relationship between the government budget deficit and the current account deficit. The first is to test 
the direct relationship between the two variables and the second approach is to test the indirect 
relationship through the intermediate links such as interest rate and exchange rate channels (Salvatore, 
2006). The results of testing the relationship between the nexus have produced different outcomes for 
different countries, and the findings even differ for the same country when using different econometric 
techniques, sample periods, and model specifications (Algieri, 2013; Xie & Chen, 2014).  
 Abell (1990) supported empirically the Keynesian absorption theory and Mundell-Fleming 
theory for the US economy, that the relationship runs from the fiscal deficit to the current account deficit. 
He demonstrated the link between the two deficit is indirect, and the causality runs from government 
budget deficit to higher interest rate, to foreign capital inflow which causes an appreciation of exchange 
rate and finally leads to the trade deficit. Likewise, Ahmad et al. (2015) found that six out of nine 
African countries under the examination support the convergence hypothesis for twin deficit and current 
account deficit. Akbostanci and Tunç (2001) support the twin deficit hypothesis for Turkey, while the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is not valid. Some empirical results supported the bi-directional 
causality relationship (Xie & Chen, 2014). On the contrary, Corsetti and Müller (2006), Müller (2008), 
and Kim and Roubini (2008), found that the budget deficit caused by tax cuts and fiscal expansion 
improve the current account position which some labelled it as ‘twin divergence’. Studies such as 
Bouakez et al. (2014) and Kumhof and Laxton (2013), Bartolini and Lahiri (2006), and Enders and Lee 
(1990) conclude that there is a weak or no link between the fiscal deficit and current account deficit 
with some support for the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis.  
The reverse causality running from the current account to budget deficit is consistent with the 
empirical studies by Helmy (2018), Kalou and Paleologou (2012), Marinheiro (2008), Kim and Kim 
(2006), and Anoruo and Ramchander (1998). Badinger et al. (2017) included fiscal rules like stringent 
balanced budget or debt rules into the empirical investigation for the twin deficit hypothesis. 
Alkswani (2000) pays special attention to the twin deficit phenomena for an oil-dependent 
economy, such as the Saudi Arabia economy where oil is the main source of exports and government 
revenue. For Saudi Arabia, the Keynesian proposition is partially valid, but the causality is reversed 
from a trade deficit to a budget deficit. Similarly, for Kuwait, the causality runs from the current account 
to fiscal stance, and the trade balance surplus leads to current account surplus. This surplus in trade and 




balance surplus for the oil-based economy (Merza et al., 2012). Thus, higher exports revenue from oil 
price influences the government’s spending towards expansionary fiscal policy (Akanbi, 2015). 
Amaghionyeodiwe and Akinyemi (2015) found reverse causation for Nigeria which is an African oil-
based economy and concludes with a recommendation to reduce the twin deficit phenomenon by 
diversifying the exports base and promoting non-oil exports. Akanbi (2015) also investigates the link 
between fiscal policy and current account for Nigeria, by taking into consideration the role of oil price 
which is the main driver for fiscal balance and current account balance, and the finding confirms the 
existence of twin deficit. Though Akanbi (2015) found a positive relationship between government 
budget and current account balance, when he just focused on the non-oil part of the economy, he found 
the relationship to be negative.    
 Role of the oil price shock and fiscal balance 
For oil exporters, particularly Middle Eastern countries, oil is the main source of exports and 
government revenue. For oil-exporting countries, fiscal policies are the propagation channel for oil price 
volatility to the economy (Alley, 2016). For these countries, oil contributes a high percentage to 
government revenue, and the oil revenue is mainly managed by the governments. In addition, 
government expenditure has a dominant role in the market (Al-Faris, 2002; Tazhibayeva et al., 2008; 
Arezki & Ismail, 2013; Alley, 2016). Therefore, oil price movements affect these economies through 
their fiscal policy measures (Alley, 2016). For instance, in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCCs), the 
fiscal policy tends to be procyclical with international oil prices (Al-Faris, 2002; Fasano & Wang, 2002). 
Moreover, even an improvement in the fiscal balance due to oil price increase can be wiped-off by the 
underperforming non-oil sector (Akanbi, 2015). 
For oil exporters in the Middle East and North Africa, the fiscal breakeven oil price, the price 
at which the fiscal balance is zero remain significantly above the oil prices trajectory, and the fiscal 
consolidation is slow. In 2014 the oil price was 103.20 US$/BBL and the breakeven price for Kuwait, 
Oman and Libya was 54.30, 94.81, and 206.03 US$/BBL, respectively. In 2016 the oil price dropped 
to 40.10 US$/BBL and the fiscal breakeven price dropped only to 43.42 US$/BBL for Kuwait but 
increased to 101.68 US$/BBL for Oman and 244.47 US$/BBL for Libya. 
Currently, the limited fiscal space coupled with elevated public debt requires swift and 
substantial economic policy actions to rebuild fiscal space and to insulate the economies from oil price 
swings (IMF, 2019). In this regard, effective independent fiscal policy actions are essential for oil 
exporters to deal with oil price fluctuations, for instance, the oil-exporting governments can use non-oil 
primary balance as guidance for policymaking (IMF, 2018).  
Despite a variety of uncertainties in both the global economy and oil markets, the oil demand 




the petrochemical sector, road transportation, and aviation. Although some countries, mainly developed 
nations tend to reduce oil demand for environmental, energy dependence, and other concerns (OPEC, 
2019), the demand for oil by developing nations is expected to grow due to population growth and 
economic expansions. 
 Role of the oil price shock and current account balance 
The external adjustment for the economy can be achieved through the trade channel and 
financial channel; the former is through the changes in the quantity and prices of goods and services 
while the latter is through the changes in asset prices and returns (Ghironi et al., 2015). There are many 
studies such as Gnimassoun et al. (2017),  Allegret et al. (2014), Le and Chang (2013), and Kilian et al. 
(2009) that examined the relationship between oil price shocks and the external account for oil-
exporting and importing countries.  
In the oil market, there are three different causes for oil price shocks as defined by Kilian (2009), 
(i) oil supply shock, (ii) aggregate demand shock caused by the global business cycle, and (iii) oil-
specific demand shock, which represents the precautionary demand for oil stocks. These oil price shocks 
influence countries’ external balance through the trade channel or financial channel (Kilian et al., 2009; 
Gnimassoun et al., 2017). The adjustment of quantities and prices of goods exported and imported 
reflects the response of the trade account to these shocks. The change in the external portfolio is the 
financial channel, which works through the adjustment of income flow and the foreign liability position 
that reflects the international portfolio structure of oil-exporting and importing economies.  Therefore, 
the adjustments to the external shocks depend on the countries’ initial gross financial asset and foreign 
liabilities (Kilian et al., 2009).  
The dynamics of international oil prices determine the amount of exports revenue for 
developing oil-exporting economies. In these countries, oil revenue is the main source of income and 
foreign exchange  (Allegret et al., 2014). Moreover, most of the oil and gas exporters invest their money 
in rich developed economies, and any changes in the oil windfall in these countries may lead to global 
imbalance. Generally, oil-exporting countries use the oil money in two ways, i.e. spend them or 
accumulate them as a foreign asset, and this decision has an impact on the global imbalance (Arezki & 
Hasanov, 2013). Another factor is the degree of financial development in oil-exporting countries, which 
has an impact on how oil revenue is allocated.  
There is a growing concern about the spill over of crises between economies through the global 
current account imbalances due to macroeconomic interdependence among countries (Kumhof & 
Laxton, 2013). This imbalance is caused by financial integration among heterogeneous financial 




countries contribute to the ‘saving glut’ as they send their excess capital from oil revenue to the 
developed financial markets (Bernanke, 2005) cited by (Allegret et al., 2014).  
Some studies assume the possible drivers for the time-varying nature of the relationship 
between oil price and current account are: energy market regulation, oil intensity of economic activity, 
the capacity utilization rate in crude oil production, the degree of oil market finalization (Baumeister & 
Peersman, 2013). Based on the previous studies, the effect of oil price on the current account depends 
on the characteristic of each economy, i.e. whether they are oil importers/ exporters, the level of 
domestic financial markets development, the level of integration with the international financial market, 
and the ability to manage the foreign exchange rate reserves. Therefore, no clear cut conclusion about 
the impact can be made (Buetzer et al., 2012) cited (Gnimassoun et al., 2017). 
There is a possible indirect negative impact of oil price increase on oil-exporting countries, as 
higher oil prices may increase the imports costs or with less extend decrease their exports of oil to 
importing countries.  But the net impact on the trade balance depends on how much the increase in the 
oil exports revenue compared to the increase in imports cost (Le & Chang, 2013). There is a positive 
relationship between oil price and current account in the oil-exporting countries, as the oil price increase 
causes a surplus in the current account. Some studies assume the oil demand shock has a positive and 
significant impact on the current account, compared to unanticipated oil price increase caused by 
production shortfall (Kilian et al., 2009; Gnimassoun et al., 2017). In terms of the impact of the 
exchange rate, there is a small economic impact of the real exchange rate on the current account in oil-
exporting countries as most exports are in US dollars and the imports are driven by government 
investment strategy (Arezki & Hasanov, 2013).  
3.3 An overview of the Omani economy  
This section gives an overview of the Omani economy in two sub-sections; the first sub-section 
discusses the government budget and current account, and the second sub-section presents the external 
balance.    
 The government budget and current account   
In the modern Omani economy petroleum is a vital economic sector that contributed 41.80%, 
40.40%, and 40.80% to Omani GDP in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. Petroleum is also the main 
exported commodity and its contribution to Omani exports value was 57.93%, 58.22%, and 65.31% in 
2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. Oil is also the major source of government income and contributes 





As discussed in Chapter 2 and like other oil exporters, it is well established that the fall in oil 
price negatively impacts the Omani economy through the fiscal and macroeconomic variables (see for 
example Esfahani et al., 2013; Hamdi & Sbia, 2013; Alley, 2016). In terms of the relationship between 
fiscal and current accounts, some studies such as Al-Fazari (2006) and Hashemzadeh and Wilson (2006) 
argue that the Keynesian model explains the nexus of fiscal deficit and current account deficit in Oman. 
According to these studies, there is unidirectional causality from budget deficit to current account and 
trade deficit, hence a better management of fiscal deficit will help in the external balance. The Central 
Bank of Oman’s annual report stated that ‘Oman is experiencing twin deficits problem with both fiscal 
balance and current account balance turning into deficits, and the former is driving the latter’ (CBO, 
2017). A quick glance at Figure 3.1 below shows the current account balance and fiscal balance have a 
common trend, and both follow the oil price trend. In 2009 oil prices have a clear downside associated 
with GFC and another fall in oil price was observed between 2014 and 2018. Figure 3.1 clearly 
demonstrates a surge in fiscal and current account deficit since 2014.   
Figure 3.1. Current account balance, overall fiscal balance and oil price (2000-2018) 
Source: Different issues of the statistical yearbook, NCSI, and IMF. 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the high contribution of petroleum to exports and government revenue 
between 2000 and 2018. The figure shows three different oil prices: - market oil price, external 
breakeven oil price, and fiscal breakeven oil price. External breakeven oil price is the price at which the 
current account balance is zero, while the fiscal breakeven oil price is the price at which the fiscal 




















































































































While the realized oil price is fluctuating, the fiscal breakeven oil price increasing steadily over 
time. The external breakeven oil price is also increasing but is much flatter, while since 2014 the realized 
oil price is below these prices, which results in the trade deficit and fiscal deficit.  
Two-thirds of the government expenditure in Oman is classified as current expenditure. For 
example in 2016, 72.8% of the expenditure goes towards salaries while only a third of the expenditure 
goes towards capital expenditure (NCSI, 2017). Between 2015 and 2016 the oil price dropped by 
29.03%, and the fiscal balance deficit as a percentage of GDP increased from 17.20% in 2015 to 20.80% 
in 2016. This deficit was 73.00% funded through an external loan, 17.00% from the reserve fund and 
the remaining 10.00% by issuing domestic bonds (CBO, 2017). External loans are an important issue 
to consider as both debt and debt services are raising, but this is beyond the scope of this study.  
Figure 3.2. Contribution of petroleum in exports and total government revenue, external breakeven oil 
price, fiscal breakeven oil price and oil price (2000-2018) 
Source: Different issues of the statistical yearbook, NCSI, and IMF.  
 
 The external balance 
For more than five decades, oil and gas have been the main exported commodity for Oman. 
The contribution of petroleum to the export were 78.52%, 67.37%, 80.2%, and 81.19% in 1995, 1998, 
2001, and 2004, respectively (NCSI, 2009). It was 76.01%, 70.84%, 65.45% and 58.22% in 2008, 2011, 
2014 and 2017, respectively (NCSI, 2018). Asia is one of the most dynamic regions in global trade and 
a major driver of global economic growth (Dungey et al., 2018).  Asia is the main destination for the 
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Percentage of petroleum revenue from total revenue
Oil price (US$/BBL)
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The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP is an indicator of the economy’s 
openness (Huntington, 2015). As reported in Table 3.1, exports and imports as a percentage of GDP in 
Oman is generally more than 90%, implying a high level of trade openness. The level of trade openness 
tends to be sensitive to oil price movements. For example, when the oil price plunged in 2016, the level 
of trade openness dropped to 77.80% and subsequently increased to 84.50% and 85.80% in 2017 and 
2018, respectively with oil price recovery from 51.30 US$/BBL in 2017 to 69.70 US$/BBL in 2018.  
The trade balance reports the difference between merchandise exports and imports. Some 
studies assume in economies with high total trade as a share of GDP, the impact of the fiscal shock on 
the current account will be higher and more persistent (Corsetti & Müller, 2006). As Table 3.1 shows 
the trade balance as a percentage of GDP declined by 68.82% between 2014-2015 and by 35.63% 
between 2015-2016, reach to 5.60% in 2016 compared to 27.90% in 2014. The trade balance recovered 
and bounced back by 50.00% between 2016-2017 to 8.40% of the GDP in 2017. Compared to a 50% 
improvement between 2016 and 2017, the trade balance shows a big jump in 2018 by 132.14% 
compared to 2017. It is apparent from the table that the non-oil exports have an increasing trend between 
2010 and 2013, then gradually decreases, which may indicate an indirect relationship between oil and 
non-oil exports. 
Oil price shocks may lead to reserve depletion and borrowing from abroad to offset the adverse 
terms of trade shocks for both oil exporters and oil importers (Chuku et al., 2011). Since oil contributes 
the biggest proportion to merchandise trade of the Omani’s exports, the current account balance worsens 
when oil prices decline (CBO, 2017). 
Table 3.1. Exports and imports, trade balance and non-oil exports (2010-2018) 
Trade balance 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Export and import as % of GDP 96.50 104.70 105.80 116.80 104.20 94.90 77.80 84.50 85.80 
Trade balance as % of GDP 28.40 34.00 30.80 26.50 27.90 8.70 5.60 8.40 19.50 
Non-oil export as % of GDP 19.40 20.20 20.70 24.30 22.70 21.00 17.60 19.40 18.20 
Source: CBO annual report issues: 2015-2019.  
In 2018, the Omani merchandise exports included crude oil for 48.00%, refined oil for 7.00%, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) for 11.00%, non-oil exports for 23.00%, and re-exports for 11.00%. About 
22.40% of the value of non-oil exports and re-exports are mineral fuels, lubricants, and similar materials, 
followed by chemicals and their products for 20.60% and machinery and transportation equipment for 
19.60%. In contrast, machinery and transport equipment accounted for about 33.30% of the total value 
of the imports and manufactured goods by 22.70% (NCSI, 2019). 
Table 3.2 shows that between 2010 and 2011, the oil price increased by 34.33%, raising both 
exports and imports by 28.66% and 20.26% respectively. In comparison, between 2012 and 2013, the 




2015 the oil price shows the highest fall in recent years by 45.25%. This led to exports and imports 
declining by 33.38% and 4.08%, respectively. In contrast, between 2016 and 2017 the oil price 
recovered by 27.93% ,which drives the exports to increase by 19.39% and imports by 13.32%.  
Table 3.2. Change in oil price, imports and exports and its components (2010-2018)  
% of change  2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
oil price 34.33 6.51 -3.74 -2.18 -45.25 -29.03 27.93 35.87 
imports 20.26 19.22 24.24 -13.02 -4.08 -19.87 13.32 -2.46 
exports 28.66 10.72 8.23 -5.07 -33.38 -22.81 19.39 26.89 
crude oil 33.12 10.65 4.60 -6.05 -42.35 -26.12 17.39 33.35 
refined oil 34.21 -20.08 -38.81 -9.21 -40.65 1.63 116.76 157.45 
LNG 24.92 9.90 3.44 -2.67 -21.28 -20.85 15.13 47.20 
non-oil 23.90 18.49 5.92 8.37 -27.19 -20.15 32.42 17.33 
re-export 16.96 10.62 42.44 -16.87 -12.65 -20.04 2.23 -12.87 
Source: CBO annual report issues: 2015-2019 and NCSI statistical yearly book 2019.  
Moving to the current account, both goods and current transfers are the highest components 
compared to services and income as shown in Appendix 3.A. Between 2010 and 2014, the current 
account was positive. Between 2013 and 2014, oil prices fell by 2.18% thus the current account surplus 
decreased from 6.70% of GDP in 2013 to 5.10% of GDP in 2014. Indeed, the Central Bank of Oman 
expected that low oil prices would affect the country’s external balance in 2015 and that the current 
account at least will be flat or in deficit (CBO, 2015). As predicted, in 2015 the current account recorded 
a deficit of 15.70% of GDP due to a sharp decline in Oman crude oil price by 45.25% from 103.20 
US$/BBL in 2014 to 56.50 US$/BBL in 2015, although the quantity of oil exported increased by 5.40% 
(CBO, 2016a).  
Between 2015 and 2016 the oil price plunged by 29.03%, recording 40.10 US$/BBL in 2016. 
Driven by low oil prices, the current account deficit increased to 18.6 % of GDP in 2016 from 15.7% 
of GDP in 2015. The current account deficit in 2016 was largely attributed to a substantial decline in 
merchandise trade reflecting low crude oil prices. In that year the value of all export categories also 
declined as Table 3.2 shows, except the refinery oil which increased slightly by 1.6%; the crude oil 
exports contracted by 26.1%, the natural gas declined by 20.9%, the re-export and non-oil export 
declined by 20.0% and 20.1%, respectively, caused by subdued in economic growth in the importing 
countries. Due to low oil prices, the value of crude oil exports declined during the year, even though 
the quantity increased by 5.40%. The Central Bank of Oman predicted a continued fall in oil prices 
would cause more adverse impacts on the trade balance and current account balance (CBO, 2017). 
Between 2017 and 2018 oil price improved by 35.87% to 69.70 US$/BBL but was still under the 
external breakeven price which was 84.15 US$/BBL. Therefore, the current account deficit declined to 




The gross national saving includes the gross domestic saving, net primary income from abroad, 
and net current transfers from abroad. Overall, the latter two are negative for the Omani economy. 
Higher growth in national savings compared to domestic saving means a higher share of saving 
available for the domestic investment and indicates a smaller amount of leakages from the domestic 
economy.  
The leakage from gross domestic saving is mainly in the form of remittance of expatriate 
workers and investment income like net interest and dividends paid on external liabilities (CBO, 2017). 
The workers' remittance account for 78% of the saving leakage (CBO, 2019) as the GCCs use non-
restriction policy on the capital movements (Al-Faris, 2002). Current transfers associated with the 
worker remittances increased by 13.1% in 2014 over 2013 (CBO, 2015), and increased by 6.7% in 2015 
‘reflecting a continued increase in expatriate employment in Oman, particularly in the private 
sector’(CBO, 2016a).  
Despite the launch of the ‘Omanisation policy’,26 which aims to reduce the high percentage of 
expatriates mainly in the private sector to mitigate the impact of remittances on the current account (Al-
Fazari, 2006). About 86.29% of the workforce in the private sector and 100% of the family (domestic 
chore) workers are still foreigners (NCSI, 2018). Thus, such leakages through remittances and imports 
could weaken significantly the fiscal multipliers (Espinoza & Senhadji, 2011). 
As the oil price dropped, the percentage of leakage escalated from 15.90% in 2013 to 19.30% 
and 18.60% in 2015 and 2016, respectively, as Table 3.3 shows. In addition to that, the elevation of 
external debt due to the growing fiscal deficit (CBO, 2019) has led to higher debt cost and higher debt 
service which will have a numerous influence on the current account balance in the future. 
From Table 3.3, it worth noting that the ratio of the net foreign asset (NFA) of the central bank 
and ratio of the net foreign asset of the banking system to M2 also decreased between 2014 and 2016. 
When the oil price dropped by 29.03% between 2015 and 2016, the current account deficit increased 
from 15.70% of GDP to 18.60%, the deficit bridged by drowning down the foreign exchange reserve, 










Table 3.3. Gross domestic saving, gross national saving, and the ratios of net foreign asset (2010-
2017) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Gross domestic saving as % of GDP 49.90 53.70 54.40 48.90 44.40 33.50 29.10 34.10 
Gross national saving as % of GDP 33.70 36.70 37.80 33.00 25.60 14.30 9.50 15.90 
Leakage 16.20 17.00 16.60 15.90 18.30 19.30 18.60 18.20 
Ratio of NFA of CBO to reserve money 2.20 3.00 2.20 2.30 1.90 1.30 1.70 1.60 
Ratio of NFA of banking system to M2 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Source: CBO annual report issues: 2015-2019.  
3.4 Twin deficit in the short run   
This section examines the twin deficits in the short run using a structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) model. From the literature review as reported in Appendix 3.B, SVAR is widely used to test 
the twin deficits hypothesis empirically, and the common variables used are trade balance, budget 
balance, current account balance, public debt, imports, exports, exchange rate, and interest rate. 
 Data and methodology  
In this section, we will investigate the short run relationship between the fiscal balance (FB) 
and the trade balance (TB) of Oman. Consistent with the literature, both variables are measured as a 
percentage of real GDP, with a quarterly frequency between 1989Q4 and 2017Q4. The source of data 
is the statistical bulletin published by the National Centre of Statistics and Information (NCSI), refer to 
Appendix 3.C for more details on data description.27 Figure 3.3 shows there is a unison co-movement 
between FB and TB which can deem as an indicator of twin deficit phenomena. We use TB instead of 
the current account balance since oil contributes highly to both trade and government revenue for the 
Oman economy. Thus, the oil price is included in our second model specification to assess the role of 
oil in linking the trade balance and fiscal balance.  
The major falls in oil prices are observed in the early and mid-1980s, in 1991, after the AFC, 
and in late 2008. The oil price (in log) movements in Figure 3.4 show that oil price increases in 1990/91 
following the invasion of Kuwait (Kilian, 2010). This reflects speculative demand shocks due to 
forward-looking behaviour in response to supply disturbances. Figure 3.4 also highlights three demand-
driven oil shocks: (i) between 1997 to 1999, the decrease in demand for crude oil caused by AFC 
followed by an economic crisis in Russia, Brazil, and Argentina. (ii) Between 2008 to 2009, the decline 
in demand for industrial commodities including crude oil due to the global recession and the GFC. And 
(iii) between 2014 to 2016 oil price fall caused by sluggish global economic activity, increases in US 
shale oil production, increases in oil production from Canada and Russia and less impact from 






The period under consideration also includes the tranquil period till 2007 and the post-GFC period 
(Raghavan, 2020). 
 Figure 3.3. Trade balance and fiscal balance as a percentage of the GDP 
Source: Different issues of the monthly statistical bulletin, NCSI.   
 
 Figure 3.4. Oil price with one positive demand shock and three negative demand shocks from AFC, 





















































































































































































































































































































































































 Between the supply and demand-driven oil shocks, the demand-driven oil shocks caused by 
an increase in the precautionary demand for oil or an increase in aggregate demand for all industrial 
commodities including oil, have more impact on oil price compared to supply-driven shocks (Kilian, 
2009). It is important for policymakers, financial analysts, and economists to understand the different 
dynamics of the effects of supply and demand related shocks and the changing nature of the shock 
transmissions in the global oil market (Raghavan, 2020). 
The investigation of twin deficit phenomena started with the use of a simple single equation 
models, then expanded to include the vector autoregressive model to assess the short term relationship 
and the vector error correction models to assess the long term relationship (Corsetti & Müller, 2006; 
Müller, 2008; Abbas et al., 2011; Ahmad et al., 2015).  
 The SVAR model 
To study the relationship between TB and FB, and the impact of oil price (OP), we include the 
three variables in the VAR framework:  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃, 𝑇𝐵, 𝐹𝐵]
′ 
  The macroeconomic relationship among these variables is modelled using a structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model, 
𝐁0𝑦𝑡 = 𝐁𝑖𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐁p𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑡       (3.1) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 is  (𝑁 × 1)  vector of the endogenous variables at time 𝑡. The dimension of  𝐁0 is a 
(𝑁 × 𝑁) matrix that illustrates the contemporaneous relationship between the variables. The 𝐁𝑖 where  
𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑝,  show how each variable is affected by its own lag as well as by lags of the other variables 
and 𝑡 is a (𝑁 × 1) vector of structural disturbances mutually uncorrelated with white noise properties. 
In this research, three lags are used based on lag order selection criteria results reported in Appendix 
3.D. 
Since 𝑡 and 𝐁0, … , 𝐁𝑝 cannot be estimated in equation (3.1), we estimate through the reduced 
form of VAR model which can be expressed as,  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐀1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐀𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + et       (3.2) 
Here we have 𝐀𝑖 = 𝐁0
−1𝐁𝑖 ,  𝐀𝑝 = 𝐁0
−1𝐁𝑝 and 𝐞𝐭 = 𝐁0
−1
𝑡  
This matrix allows us to express the typically mutually correlated reduced form innovation (𝑒𝑡) as 
weighted averages of the mutually uncorrelated structural innovations ( 𝑡) and the elements of B0
−1 









(𝐼 − 𝐀1𝐿 − 𝐀2𝐿
2 − ⋯− 𝐀𝑝𝐿
𝑃)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 
𝐀(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡      (3.3)  
So, 𝐿𝑃𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−𝑃 defines the lag operator and 𝐀(𝐿) =  𝐼𝑁 − 𝐀1𝐿 − ⋯− 𝐀𝑝𝐿
𝑝       (3.4) 
and the inverse of (3.4) gives the vector moving average to identify the dynamic properties of the 
VAR  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐀(𝐿)
−1𝑒𝑡 =  𝚯(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 = 𝚯(𝐿)𝐵0
−1
𝑡      (3.5) 
Where 𝚯(L) =  𝚯0 + 𝚯1𝐿 + ⋯+ 𝚯𝑞𝐿
𝑞 therefore, the impact of a shock in 𝑒𝑡 on the dependent 
variables in the future 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+2, … are respectively the (𝑁 × 𝑁) parameter matrices 
𝚯0, 𝚯1, 𝚯2, … . 
Through the moving average we can get the impulse response function (IRF) and the forecast 
error variance decomposition (FEVD). IRF traces the impact of an unexpected shock in current and 
future errors of one variable on the other variables while holding other shocks constant. The FEVD is 
the percentage of the variance in the error of a variable associated with a specific shock in the model 
and depends critically on the orthogonality of underlying shocks (Stock & Watson, 2001).   
The first step is to test the data for stationarity using three different unit root tests: Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips –Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmid-Shin (KPSS). This step 
is important to determine if the series is stationary for our short-run analysis.  As reported in Appendix 
3.E, OP is integrated I(1) while the TB and FB are stationary in level. Therefore, we will proceed using 
SVAR after taking the first difference of the oil price.  
In our model, we expect OP will affect the TB and FB contemporaneously and in lag, as Table 
3.4 shows, while OP is not affected by TB and FB contemporaneously nor in lag. OP is the most 
exogenous variable, it reflects the relationship between supply and demand in the international market. 
Oman is a price taker and has no impact on the international oil price. In addition, Oman is not a member 
of OPEC, which may assume to have some influence on the oil price. In contrast, TB and FB affect 
each other in the lags but only TB affects FB contemporaneously. We use Cholesky decomposition to 
obtain the orthogonalized residuals (Eltony & Al‐Awadi, 2001; Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009; 
Berument et al., 2010; Dizaji, 2014). As stated before, petroleum has a major role in the Omani economy 




movements will have a significant impact on the TB and FB of Oman. Petroleum exports revenue 
increases the TB and also improve the FB as it is the main source for government income. Further, the 
petroleum sector is managed by the government; thus we assume FB affects the TB in lags because of 
government expenditure contributions in the petroleum sector.  
Table 3.4. The hypothesised relationship between oil price and domestic variables in lag 
Dependent    Independent variable    
variable OP TB FB 
OP *     
TB * * * 
FB * * * 
 
To identify structural shocks the model should be exactly or over-identified. 𝐁0  has 𝐾
2 
parameters, so we need at least 
𝐾(𝐾−1)
2
 restriction to impose on 𝐁0. Thus, the restriction on  𝐁0 matrix 
on the relationship 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐁0 𝑡 are summarised in (3.6), where 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑡 represent the vectors of reduced 
and structural-form disturbances, respectively. 𝑒𝑜𝑝 is oil price shock, 𝑒𝑇𝐵 is trade balance shock, and 



















]            (3.6) 
 
 Granger causality test 
Granger causality test is used to test whether one variable is predictable by the other. Thus, the 
concept of causation in the Granger causality test does not imply an actual cause-effect relationship, but 
it is the contribution in improving a specific variable predictability by adding lags value of another 
variable. Testing that inclusion of past observations (lags) of one variable will reduce the prediction 
error for the another, as the equations show below:  
𝐴 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐴𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐵𝑡−𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝜇𝑡       (3.7) 







The Granger causality test the following null and alternative hypothesis for 𝐴 in equation (3.7), Thus, 




𝐻0: 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = ⋯ = 0   
𝐻1: 𝛿1 ≠ 𝛿2 ≠ ⋯ ≠ 0 
Taking into consideration that Granger causality requires the use of stationary variables, i.e. using 
variables in their first or second differences when they are I(1) or I(2) in level (Marinheiro, 2008; Algieri, 
2013), as Appendix 3.E shows the variables are stationary in first difference.  
 Empirical results and discussion 
This sub-section provides the empirical results of the Granger causality test, IRF, FEVD, and 
historical decomposition from the SVAR model.  
3.4.4.1 Granger causality for trade balance and fiscal balance  
The VAR Granger causality test is carried out to determine the relationship direction between 
the trade balance and fiscal balance. There are two ways to test fiscal balance and trade balance nexus, 
the first one is to test the relationship directly between the two variables, and the second one is to test 
the relationship indirectly through the intermediate links such as interest rate and exchange rate. In this 
study we add OP as an intermediate link between FB and TB for an oil-dependent economy.  Therefore, 
first, we test the causality between TB and FB. As shown in Table 3.5, the null hypothesis that the TB 
does not Granger-cause FB is rejected. This outcome aligns with our expectation, as oil is a vital exports 
merchandise for Oman, and its exports revenue considered as the main source of government income. 
In contrast, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that FB does not Granger-cause TB. This implies 
there is a unidirectional relationship from TB to FB. This finding is contradictory to the direction 
postulated in the traditional TDH. Our result is consistent with other studies on oil-dependent economies 
such as Alkswani (2000) for the Saudi economy, Merza et al. (2012) for Kuwait and Amaghionyeodiwe 
and Akinyemi (2015) for Nigeria.  
Table 3.5. VAR Granger causality test (TB and FB)  
Dependent variable: FB   Dependent variable: TB   
Excluded Chi-sq  Prob. Excluded Chi-sq  Prob. 
TB 19.95  0.0002 FB 1.37  0.71 
All 19.95  0.0002 All 1.37  0.71 
 
As stated before, OP has a significant role in both the trade and fiscal balance and contributes 
more than 70.00% of the government revenue and more than 60.00% of the exports value in 2018 
(NCSI, 2019). Thus, our conjecture is that oil prices are the link between the two balances for small 
open oil-based economies. Table 3.6 provides the results of the Granger causality test by adding OP to 
the model. Both the null hypotheses that the OP does not Granger-cause TB or FB are rejected. 




and it fails to reject the FB does not Granger cause TB. But by testing the null hypothesis for join FB 
and OP, we reject the null hypothesis that both variables do not Granger cause TB. The results 
emphasise the importance of OP in both TB and FB and confirm the one-way relationship between TB 
and FB for the Omani economy. 
Table 3.6. VAR Granger causality test (TB, FB and oil price) 
Dependent variable: FB Dependent variable: TB 
Excluded Chi-sq  Prob. Excluded Chi-sq  Prob. 
TB 16.35  0.00 FB 2.95  0.22 
OP 10.15  0.006 OP 22.05  0.00 
All 23.29  0.00 All 23.91  0.00 
 
3.4.4.2 Impulse response function  
This sub-section presents the estimated IRF. The IRFs in the charts below are given with 68% 
confidence intervals. Figure 3.5 shows one positive standard deviation shocks and responses between 
the TB and the FB. One standard deviation positive shock in TB has a high and statistically significant 
positive impact on FB in the short term, then decreases gradually reach zero after 35 quarters. In contrast, 
a positive shock to FB has a negative impact on TB in the beginning, then turns to be positive after 3 
quarters, the response is volatile, small, slightly significant, and has a humped shape which fades out. 
The outcome is consistent Merza et al. (2012) findings for Kuwait. It also aligns with Summers (1988) 
for the Current Account Targeting Hypothesis which assumes spill over effect runs from TB to FB, than 
to the Keynesian absorption theory and Mundell-Fleming framework. Though we assume the channel 
is different in oil-dependent economies stressing the crucial role of oil price in both trade and public 
finance.28 
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Response of TB to FB
 
 
28 We test the previous model with order 𝑦𝑡 = [ 𝑇𝐵, 𝐹𝐵]
′ , for robustness, we test the model with different order 
𝑦𝑡 = [ 𝐹𝐵, 𝑇𝐵]
′ . The results from impulse response function are in Appendix 3.F, and it still supports the 





Next, we include OP with TB and FB, where we consider the OP as the link between TB and 
FB for the Omani economy. As illustrated in Figure 3.6, both TB and FB respond positively and highly 
to a positive OP shock. It confirms the importance of OP for both variables, while the response of TB 
is higher compared to the response of FB. The significant response on both variables tapers off after the 
15th quarter. A similar outcome has been observed in other oil-dependent economies such as Nigeria 
(Chuku et al., 2011; Akanbi, 2015; Amaghionyeodiwe & Akinyemi, 2015). The positive balance in the 
current account is attributed to crude-oil exports, and the positive fiscal balance is attributed to oil 
revenue received by the government. 
The FB responds positively and statistically significant to a TB shock, increasing immediately 
to 0.20 and peaking around 0.40 in the 5th quarter turns to insignificant around the 15th quarter. In 
contrast, the response of the TB to FB is insignificant.  
As we notice that by adding the OP variable to the model specification, the TB and FB are 
statistically significant affected by OP shocks. The response of FB to TB is still significant in both 
cases, but the strength decreased by adding OP to the model. While the FB shock almost has no 
significant impact on TB in both cases. This finding supports the proposition of impact running from 
TB to FB.29 
Figure 3.6. Impulse response for the model with OP, TB, FB  
  
 









5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45









5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45









5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45




We further examine the impact of oil price volatility (OP_V) on TB and FB by replacing oil 
price volatility for the oil price. Oil price volatility is the degree of variation of oil price series over time, 
measured by the standard deviation of each three months of the oil price.30 This captures the concern 
over the effects of increasing oil price volatility in the last two decades (Baumeister & Peersman, 2013). 
Moreover, oil price volatility has an impact on fiscal and external balances in oil-exporting countries 
due to higher interest burdens, revaluation of foreign debt, and financial sector stresses (IMF, 2019). 
Further, commodity price volatilities are considered as a channel for resource curse, causing economic 
uncertainty and delays in budget stability (Majumder et al., 2020).   
The reason that oil prices are volatile is that the natural resource supply has low price elasticity 
(Hausmann & Rigobon, 2003). Thus, an increase in oil price volatility in the short run could be due to 
steeper oil supply and demand curves. Consequently, any possible surplus or shortage in oil supply or 
oil demand creates a price jump, and this largely explains the high oil price volatility.31  
While TB and FB respond positively to one standard deviation positive OP shock, they respond 
negatively to a positive OP_V shock as shown in Figure 3.7.32 Contrary to the model specification with 
OP, where TB responds higher than FB to OP shock, in the current case, FB responds higher than TB 
to OP_V shock. This implies FB is more endogenous, and thus the Omani economy is able to adjust the 
fiscal policy easily and quickly due to oil price fluctuations compared to TB, which is largely influenced 
by exogenous variables. The responses between TB and FB are consistent with their responses in the 
model specification with OP, though the response of FB to TB is higher in this case (0.2 with OP 
compared to 0.5 with OP_V). The response of TB to FB is small and statistically insignificant.  
Another plausible reason for the lower response of TB to OP_V compared to FB’s response is 
that Oman depends on short future oil contracts. For instance, in August 2020, the market knew that the 
October price for the Oman crude oil will be around 44.00 US$/BBL.33 This explains why the oil price 
in the first three months of 2020 was 62.80 US$/BBL, 65.50 US$/BBL, 64.90 US$/BBL, respectively, 
as the deal was done in late 2019. Later, consistent with the global economic slowdown, the oil price 
declined to 54.60 US$/BBL in April, 34.90 US$/BBL in May, and 23.70 US$/BBL in June.34  As oil 
prices remain extremely volatile, the crude oil volatility index rose to its highest value on record in 
March 2020 (OPEC, 2020). The spot market deals are affected more by speculative activities and 
 
30 Aghion et al. (2009) use standard deviation to calculate exchange rate volatility, Arezki et al. (2014) used it to 
calculate exchange rate volatility and gold price volatility and Mondal and Khanam (2018) apply it to calculate 
household consumption volatility.  
31 For example, given that oil production volatility is low, as the oil producer could not increase their supply 
immediately responding to demand increases (Kilian, 2009; Baumeister & Peersman, 2013).   
32 In chapter 2, we found the government revenue respond positively to a positive oil shock and government 
spending responds insignificant, compared to that both respond negatively to a positive oil price volatility shock.   
33 https://www.atheer.om/ 




inventory practice (Baumeister & Peersman, 2013). The crude oil spot prices dropped by more than 
futures contract as the physical market has been hit by a large oil supply glut and accumulation of unsold 
cargoes (OPEC, 2020). By contrast, when selling oil futures contracts as in Oman’s case, oil producers 
became less responsive to oil price changes because the physical sales of crude oil are hedged 
(Baumeister & Peersman, 2013).  
On the fiscal balance side, for example, the 2020 government public budget was planned on the 
assumption that oil price will be 58.00 US$/BBL. Therefore, when oil prices collapsed due to low 
demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and global economic slowdown, the government 
responded promptly by cutting 5.00% of the government budget, and then reduced the development 
budget by 10.00%. While it is a good sign that the government has the ability to adjust to oil price 
declines, it is also a sign of uncertainty due to commodity price volatility. This explains the differences 
in the responses of FB to OP shocks and OP_V shocks. In addition, any improvement in oil price leads 
to a positive impact on internal and external balance, whereas the price volatility causes more 
uncertainties. The commodity price volatility decreases the government fiscal balance for commodity-
exporting countries (Majumder, 2019).   
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3.4.4.3 Historical decomposition 
 The SVAR model is used to decompose the TB and FB into components shocks. Thus, this 
sub-section presents a historical decomposition analysis of the contributions of OP shocks, TB shocks, 
and FB shocks in TB and FB movement over the study period from 1989Q4 to 2017Q4 as illustrated in 
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9, respectively. The historical decomposition gives an insight into the 
importance of a specific variable shock on a variable at each time point, Thus allows for contribution 
assessment of each shock to the variable over time (Dungey, Osborn, et al., 2014; Raghavan, 2020).  
 Oil, like other industrial commodities, depends on supply and demand as a consequence of 
global business cycle fluctuations (Kilian, 2009; Baumeister & Kilian, 2016). Moreover, issues such as 
geopolitical tensions in oil-producing countries may disrupt crude oil production, changes in crude oil 
demand associated with the global business cycle, the discovery of new fields or improvement in oil-
extracting technology, and expectations about future shortfalls of oil supply relative to oil demand lead 
to different dynamic effects on oil price (Raghavan, 2020). 
  A quick glance at Figure 3.8 and 3.9 reveal same historical decomposition trend of TB and 
FB due to the high contribution of OP in both variables. Furthermore, the former contributes 
significantly to the latter too. As expected, the variation in TB is attributed mostly to the disturbance in 
TB itself and OP, while the FB shock has very limited contribution, as shown in Figure 3.8. By 
comparing three time points of oil price decline, such as during the AFC period, GFC, and the recent 
decline in oil price between 2014 and 2017, the OP shock contributes less during GFC. The variation 
in FB attributed to the OP shock, TB shock, and its own shock are equally important as Figure 3.9 
illustrates, attributing to a high dependence of fiscal policy in Oman on petroleum exports revenue.  
 Oman’s General Reserve Fund was established by the government to manage and invest the 
surplus revenue from petroleum resources, to diversify government income, and to secure future 
generations. Giving the significant importance of oil price in trade and fiscal stance in Oman pose 
challenges for the policymakers. Indeed, high government spending and low realized oil price in 










Figure 3.8. Historical decomposition for TB 
 
Figure 3.9. Historical decomposition for FB 
 
 
3.4.4.4 Change in the responses over time  
 As mentioned before that the period under consideration include demand-driven high oil 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Omani economy under the full period, now we will assess the twin deficit under three different sub-
periods as described in Table 3.7.35   
Table 3.7. Breakdown of the study period  
Description  Period  
Full period 1989Q4 – 2017Q4 
1st sub-period includes the 1990 Kuwait invasion  1989Q4 – 1996Q4 
2nd sub-period includes Kuwait invasion and the 1998 AFC 1989Q4 – 2006Q4 
3rd sub-period includes Kuwait invasion, AFC and the 2008 GFC 1989Q4 – 2013Q4 
 
 Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the responses of TB and FB to OP shocks respectively under the 
different sub-periods described above and the results accord with our earlier results in Figure 3.6. 
Generally, TB responds higher than FB to positive OP shocks. As mentioned before, this could be 
because TB is more exogenous compared to FB, as the government has the capacity to smooth the 
expenditure using domestic and international debt and reserve fund to mitigate the impact of oil prices 
swing.   
 Figure 3.10 shows the response of TB to OP shocks under the sub-periods mentioned above, 
the first sub-period (1989Q4 to 1996Q4) has the lowest impact compared to the latter three time periods. 
This sub-period includes a high oil price driven by a precautionary demand shock caused by the invasion 
of Kuwait in the third quarter of 1990, and it has a short-lived shock as shown in Figure 3.4 above.   
 In the second sub-period (1989Q4-2006Q4), the response of TB to OP shock is higher 
compared to the other two sub-period and the full period. The results can be explained by the fact that 
the Asian market is the main destination for the Omani oil. Between 1980th and 2000, Japan was the 
main export destination for Omani oil; then China took over as the main export destination. In 2018 
China imported 83.10% of the Omani oil, followed by India and Japan for 7.60% and 5.80% 
respectively (NCSI, 2019). This may also explain the steady decrease in the response of TB to OP 
shocks in the third sub-period (1989Q4 to 2013Q4) which includes the GFC that mainly affected the 
US and Europe. In contrast, the response of TB to OP shock using the full period started with an even 
lower point among the four times, but it decreases gradually with long-lived impact compared to two 
previous sub-periods that includes low oil price periods driven by negative demand shock.  
 Figure 3.11 illustrates the impulse response function of FB to OP shocks; in the first sub-
period, there is a steady decline of FB response to an OP positive shock. In the latter two sub-periods 
which includes AFC and GFC respectively, the response of FB to OP shock both have the same pattern, 
though the responses in the first four quarters are slightly different. The full period has the highest 
 





response of FB to OP shocks, and the finding is likely to be related to the steady increase in government 
spending over the years coupled with fluctuations of government revenue which will is shown in Figure 
3.15 later.   
 Moving forward to Figures 3.12 and 3.13 that present the responses of TB and FB to shocks 
in each other under the three different sub-periods described above. Consistent with the previous results, 
the responses of FB to TB shocks is higher than the responses of TB to FB shocks in all sub-periods. 
 TB responds positively to a positive FB shock in the first sub-period and responds negatively 
in the latter two sub-periods and the full period as shown in Figure 3.12. TB responds with the same 
force but with opposite sign in first and third sub-periods. It responds negatively with less force in the 
second sub-periods and the full period. Compared to that, FB responds positively to  positive TB shocks 
in all three sub-period and the full period as Figure 3.13 illustrates. The responses of FB are gradually 
increasing as we move from one sub-period to the subsequent sub-periods. This observed increase of 
FB responses could be attributed to an increasing influence of TB on the fiscal measure over time.  
 These differences in response between TB and FB can be explained by the fact that the TB 
is more exogenous compared to the FB. TB is influenced by oil exports, which move with the global 
trend. For example, the first sub-period includes high oil price driven by a precautionary demand shock 
associated with the Kuwait invasion; by contrast, the latter two sub-periods include low realized oil 
price driven by low demand. Whereas the FB can be relatively managed internally by the government 
policies with less direct influence from global oil price trends.   
The results from the impulse response function reveal that TB and FB responses are not the 
same under different sub-periods. The purpose of dividing the study period into various sub-periods is 
to evaluate the twin deficit phenomena through time. Therefore, the historical decomposition and 
variance decomposition will allow us to contrast the TDH under different sub-periods, which provides 





Figure 3.10. Impulse response of TB to oil price at different times 
Note: The responses are in the y-axis and time index (quarters) in the x-axis in all figures. 
 
Figure 3.11. Impulse response of FB to OP shocks at different times 
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Figure 3.12. Impulse response of TB to FB shocks at different times  
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3.4.4.5 Forecasting error variance decomposition 
 Having discussed the results of IRF in the previous sections, now we present the results of 
FEVD, and the results set out in Table 3.8. The TB shocks play an important role in explaining the 
variance in FB; starting by 12.42% in the 1st quarter and increased to 46.78% in the 20th quarter. 
Compared to that, the contribution of FB in TB variance is lower, ranging between 0.00 in the 1st quarter 
and increased to 2.84% only in the 20th quarter.36   
Table 3.8.  Forecast error variance decomposition for the model with TB and FB  
   Variance Decomposition of TB Variance Decomposition of FB 
 Horizon (Q) TB FB TB FB 
1 100.00 0.00 12.42 87.57 
4 99.61 0.38 37.02 62.97 
20 97.15 2.84 46.78 53.21 
45 97.08 2.91 46.89 53.11 
 
 Extending the model by adding OP; the result in Table 3.9 shows that OP shock plays a vital 
role in explaining the variance in TB and FB. It explains between 35.71% in the 1st quarter and 58.51% 
in the 20th quarter for the former and about 9.39% in the 1st quarter and increased to 44.04% in the 20th 
quarter for the latter. For the contribution of FB and TB on each other, in general, the contribution of 
TB in FB variance is much higher compared to the contribution of FB in TB. The FB shock contributes 
only between 0.00% in the 1st quarter and increased to 0.25% in the 20th quarter to the variance in TB. 
In comparison, TB shock contributes between 1.63% and 20.75% to the variance in FB in the 1st quarter 
and the 20th quarter, respectively.37  
Table 3.9. Forecast error variance decomposition for the model with OP, TB, FB. 
Horizon (Q) 
 Variance Decomposition of TB  Variance Decomposition of FB 
OP TB FB OP TB FB 
1 35.71 64.29 0.00 9.39 1.63 88.99 
4 56.15 43.42 0.43 31.91 9.94 58.14 
20 58.51 41.24 0.25 44.04 20.75 35.20 
45 58.61 41.15 0.24 44.60 21.34 34.06 
 
 
36 For a robustness test, we change the order of the variables in the model to start with FB then TB, 𝑦𝑡 = [ 𝐹𝐵, 𝑇𝐵]
′, 
as appendix 3.F shows the contribution of TB shocks in FB variance remains higher than the contribution of FB 
shocks in TB variance, up to 22.45% for the former and only 20.17% for the latter in quarter 20th which confirms 
our assumption that the direction of the relationship runs from TB to FB.   
37 As we did before in IRF, we replace OP shocks for OP_V shocks. The results in Appendix 3.H show that 




 Next step, we compare the results of forecast error variance decompositions across the three 
sub-periods and the full period, and Table 3.10 summarises the results. Overall, OP shocks play a vital 
role in TB variance compared to in FB variance, by more than 50% in the former and less than 50% in 
the latter through all periods.  
 The contribution of OP shocks in TB variance in the first two sub-periods was high, up to 
78% in the 20th quarter, then it decreased to around 65% in the last sub-period and the full period. This 
high contribution of OP shock in the variance of TB is attributed to the high proportion of petroleum in 
merchandise exports value in the oil-based economy such as Oman.   
 By contrast, the contribution of OP shocks in the variance in FB gradually increased, i.e. 
from 28.14% to 44.65%, 43.58%, and 49.13% in subsequent periods in the 20th quarter. This may 
indicate that the ability of the government to smooth spending in challenging times is declining over 
time. The fiscal space has tightened for Oman now due to elevating public debt, increasing fiscal deficits 
as shown in Figure 3.1 and a steady surge of fiscal breakeven oil price as shown in Figure 3.2.    
 Regarding the trade balance and fiscal balance nexus, the TB shock contributes higher to the 
FB variance, compared to the contribution of FB to the TB variance in all three sub-periods and the full 
period. The contribution of TB to the FB increased gradually, i.e. from 8.78% to 8.84%, 16.19%, and 
18.61% in the 20th quarter. While the contribution of FB to the TB in the 20th quarter decreased over 
time from 2.88%, 0.09%, 1.10% and 0.22% over the three sub-periods and the full period.  
Table 3.10. Forecast error variance decomposition for the model with OP, TB, and FB with different 
periods 
  1st (1989Q4-1996Q4) 2nd (1989Q4-2006Q4) 3rd (1989Q4-2013Q4) Full (1989Q4-2017Q4) 
 Variance Decomposition of TB 
Horizon (Q) OP TB FB OP TB FB OP TB FB OP TB FB 
1 66.10 33.91 0.00 52.39 47.61 0.00 41.80 58.20 0.00 36.44 63.56 0.00 
4 76.69 21.03 2.28 75.50 24.36 0.14 62.49 36.77 0.74 60.18 39.44 0.39 
20 78.37 18.74 2.88 78.45 21.47 0.09 64.14 34.77 1.10 63.35 36.43 0.22 
45 78.37 18.74 2.89 78.52 21.39 0.09 64.17 34.71 1.11 63.47 36.32 0.21 
 Variance Decomposition of FB 
Horizon (Q) OP TB FB OP TB FB OP TB FB OP TB FB 
1 12.16 11.06 76.78 7.66 0.09 92.25 10.23 0.88 88.89 9.82 1.62 88.56 
4 25.92 9.09 64.99 27.53 5.19 67.27 31.25 8.56 60.19 35.84 9.37 54.79 
20 28.14 8.78 63.07 44.65 8.84 46.51 43.58 16.19 40.23 49.13 18.61 32.26 





3.5 Twin deficit in the long run  
 In this section, we will examine the long-run relationship between oil price, exports, imports, 
government revenue, and government expenditure using the Johansen cointegration test and structural 
vector error correction (SVECM) model.  
 Data and methodology 
 We test the long-run relationship between oil price, exports, imports, government revenue, 
and government expenditure. The variables are in monthly frequency, constant, and in logarithm form, 
and data description details are Appendix 3.C. The first step is to test the data for stationarity using 
three different unit root tests: - Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips –Perron (PP), and 
Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmid-Shin (KPSS). The I(1) variables can be used to perform the cointegration 
test and then proceed with an vector error correction (VECM) model. Appendix 3.E shows the unit root 
test results are not consistent across the three tests if the variables are expressed in level and integrated 
of order I(1) and the variables are stationary in the first difference.  
 Due to the high contribution of oil in exports, Figure 3.14 shows a co-movement between 
the three variables: oil price, exports, and imports, as the oil price rises the exports value increases and 
influence the domestic spending and imports. Likewise, Figure 3.15 shows a clear co-movement 
between oil price, government revenue, and government expenditure, as oil price rises the government 
revenue increase and influence the government expenditure (Merza et al., 2012; Akanbi, 2015). 
 Figure 3.14. Exports, imports and oil price 
























































































































































































































 Figure 3.15. Government expenditure, government revenue, and oil price 
Source: Different issues of the monthly statistical bulletin, NCSI.  
 
3.5.1.1 The VECM model  
 The next step is to test variables for long-run relationship. There is an expectation that the 
variables are cointegrated and there is a stationary linear combination among them. In this case, if we 
have K-dimensional VAR(p) process, without deterministic terms for ease of exposition   
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 
Subtracting 𝑦𝑡−1 on both sides of the equation and rearranging give us the VECM: 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = Πy𝑡−1 + Γ1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ Γ𝑝−1Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝑢𝑡  (3.8) 
 
Where  
Π = −(𝐼𝐾 − 𝐴1 − ⋯− 𝐴𝑝) 
 
And  



































































































































































































































In (3.8) the  𝑦𝑡−1 is nonstationary variable, since both sides should be stationary it requires Πy𝑡−1to be 
I(0).  
The variables have unit root individually det(𝐼𝐾 − 𝐴1𝑧 − ⋯− 𝐴𝑝𝑧
𝑝) = 0. The matrix Π is singular if 
the 𝑧 = 1 , but if we have a matrix with rank 𝑟. So, there are 𝑟 linearly independent cointegrating 
relationships. Therefore, 𝐾 × 𝐾 matrix of rank 𝑟 will produce two 𝐾 × 𝑟 matrices of full column rank 
like 𝛼 and 𝛽, Π = 𝛼𝛽′.  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽
′𝑦𝑡−1 + Γ1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ Γ𝑝−1Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
Π = 𝛼𝛽′ the 𝛽 is the matrix of long-run co-integration relationship (cointegrating matrix) and 𝛼 is the 
matrix of adjustment coefficients for I(1) variables (loading matrix). It called VECM because it includes 
the lagged error correction (EC) term 𝛼𝛽′𝑦𝑡−1. For model with 𝑛 blocks or variables and ℎ𝑖 series in 
the 𝑗𝑡ℎ block as 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑛 and the dimension of 𝑌𝑡 is 𝑚 × 1 as 𝑚 = ∑ ℎ𝑗
𝑛



















In our SVECM model, there are five variables 𝑌𝑡 = [𝑂𝑃𝑡 , 𝐸𝑃𝑡 , 𝐺𝑅𝑡 , 𝐺𝐸𝑡 , 𝐼𝑀𝑡]′. Where  𝑂𝑃  is the 
oil price,  𝐸𝑃 is the exports, 𝐺𝑅 is the government revenue,  𝐺𝐸 is the government expenditure, and 𝐼𝑀 
is the imports. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 above demonstrated that there is a common trend among the five 
variables. Oil price is the most exogenous which is influenced by international supply and demand, and 
it has a crucial impact on the Omani exports since up to 60.00% of the exports is petroleum merchandise. 
This oil revenue is managed by the government and is considered as main government income 
contributes up to 70.00% on average. Therefore, it influences the government expenditure as the annual 
government expenditure planned based on predicted government revenue which is from oil mostly, 
finally both government and public spending influence the imports and its trends with exports as 
Appendix 3.A shows.  
 Empirical results and discussion 
 This sub-section presents the long-run relationship between the five variables. We test the 
cointegration relationship first using the Johansen test, and then discuss the two cointegration equations 




3.5.2.1 Cointegration and long-run relationship  
 Figure 3.14 shows a common upward trend among oil prices, exports, and imports. Similarly, 
Figure 3.15 shows a common trend among oil price, government revenue, and government expenditure. 
Thus, we expect a long-run relationship exists between the five variables. Moreover, due to the high 
contribution of petroleum in exports and government revenue, it can be clearly seen there is a close co-
movement between oil price and exports in the first figure and between oil price and government 
revenue in the second figure.   
 As mentioned above the unit root tests indicate the variables are integrated of first-order I(1), 
so, the next step is to test for long-run cointegration relationship. The Johansen cointegration test is 
employed to examine if the variables are simultaneously cointegrated. Following Akanbi (2015), we 
use a model that allows for a linear deterministic trend in data, constant, and trend in the cointegration 
equation and no constant in VAR. According to the results from Trace test and Maximum eigenvalue 
test, there are two cointegration relationships between the five variables at the 5% significant level as 
demonstrated in Table 3.11.38 
Table 3.11. The cointegration tests   
Trace test      Maximum eigenvalue test   
H0 H1 Trace statistic Critical value H0 H1 Max-eigen  statistic Critical value 
r = 0 r ≥1 132.34* 88.80 r = 0 r ≥1 60.19* 38.33 
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 72.16* 63.87 r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 39.21* 32.12 
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 32.95 42.92 r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 20.94 25.82 
* Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level 
 
Government expenditure and imports play a vital role in fiscal balance and trade balance, 
respectively; thus, the cointegration vectors normalized on government expenditure for the first 
equation, and on imports for the second equation. Moreover, to fully identify all cointegration vectors, 
the coefficient of imports is restricted to 0 in the first equation, while the government revenue coefficient 
is restricted to 0 in the second equation.  
𝐺𝐸𝑡 = −0.16𝑂𝑃𝑡 − 0.66𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 1.20𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 
[0.90]        [2.77]        [−8.27] 
𝐼𝑀𝑡 = −1.37𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 1.87𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 3.16𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 
[3.44]     [−3.55]     [−8.29] 
 
38 Akanbi (2015) found three cointegration relationship for Nigeria among government budget surplus, 
government expenditure, real exchange rate, money supply growth and GDP growth.  Hamdi and Sbia (2013) 
found one long-run relationship between oil revenue, government expenditure and GDP for Bahrain. Eltony and 
Al‐Awadi (2001) found four long-run relationship between oil price, oil revenue, government expenditure 




Where  𝑂𝑃  is the oil price,  𝐺𝐸 is the government expenditure, 𝐺𝑅 is the government revenue,  
𝐸𝑃 is the exports and 𝐼𝑀 is the imports, and t-statistics values are in parenthesis.39 
Consistent with expectations, for the first equation, there is a significant positive long-run 
relationship between government expenditure and government revenue. In contrast, a significant 
negative long-run relationship with exports, and insignificant negative relationship with the oil price. 
These results may be explained by the fact that annual government expenditure is based on the predicted 
government revenue. Whereas oil and exports, which is dominated by petroleum exports, have an 
indirect impact on government expenditure through their contribution to government revenue. 
  In the second equation, imports has a significant positive long-run relationship with exports 
and government expenditure and a significant negative long-run relationship with oil prices. The 
positive relationship between imports and exports can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the 
contribution of re-exports in exports is considerable, about  20.00%, 17.00%, 11.00% in 2016, 2017, 
and 2018, respectively (NCSI, 2019).40 Secondly, as exports revenue increases, the government and 
household spending on imports increases. High percentage of people are public employees, and public 
employees’ salaries account for 73.50% of the current government spending (NCSI, 2019). This second 
reason is a possible explanation also for the positive long-run relationship between imports and 
government expenditure since Oman depends largely on import for consumption and investment 
products, food, and increasing demand for services (CBO, 2019).  
 The relationship between imports and re-exports may justify the negative long-run 
relationship between imports and oil price. When oil price falls, the value of petroleum exports decline, 
and the value of re-exports as a percentage of exports increases. For example, in 2016 the oil price was 
40.10 US$/BBL, and the contribution of re-exports in total exports was 20%. When oil price recovers 
and increases to 51.30 US$/BBL in 2017, the re-exports contribution decreased to 17%. It decreased 
more to 11% in 2018 when the oil price was 69.70 US$/BBL. Taking into consideration the petroleum 
exports in this last three years was 57%, 58%, and 66%, respectively and the exported quantity increase 




39 The implied over-identification restrictions on the two co-integrating vectors as imposed above are easily 
accepted in an otherwise unrestricted VECM that employs lagged difference for all five I(1) variables with a p-
value of greater than 0.05. 
40  In 2018, re-exports includes manufactured goods classified by material (22.4%), chemicals and their 
products(20.6%) and machinery and transport equipment (19.6%), and imports dominated by machinery and 




3.5.2.2 Impulse response function 
Will examine the responses of government revenue, government expenditure, exports, and 
imports to a positive shock in all five variables in the model. The shock size is measured by one standard 
deviation of the orthogonal errors, the x-axis is the monthly time index, and the y-axis presents the 
response with a 68% confidence interval and giving a brief outcome in the coming paragraphs.  
The results are similar to the results of the short-run analysis, where fiscal balance and trade 
balance respond positively and statistically significant to oil price shocks. In the long-run model, oil 
price shocks have a significant positive impact on government revenue, exports, and imports, and the 
highest responses are from government revenue and exports and the lowest from imports. In contrast, 
the response of government expenditure to oil price shocks is insignificant. This accords with results 
from other oil-dependent economies such as Nigeria where the exports and government income linked 
to oil revenue, with a long-run relationship between budget deficit and current account deficit 
(Amaghionyeodiwe & Akinyemi, 2015). 
On the fiscal side, government expenditure responds statistically significant to government 
revenue shocks but not vice versa. In the same way, the imports responds statistically significant to 
exports shocks but not vice versa. Thus, there is a unidirectional impact on government revenue and 
exports toward government expenditure and imports.  
Moving on to test the interaction between fiscal and trade balances, government revenue 
responds statistically significant to both exports and imports shocks. A possible explanation for this 
might be that petroleum exports and custom duties are sources of government income. Indeed, the 
introduction of ‘Bayan’ clearing system that facilitates the customs duties collection improves the 
custom duties contribution in government revenue (CBO, 2019).  
While imports respond statistically significant to both government revenue and government 
expenditure; exports responds statistically insignificant to government revenue and government 
expenditure. These results corroborate the findings from the short-run examination that there are 
bidirectional responses between fiscal balance and trade balance but the response of former to latter is 
higher.  
Figure 3.16 shows the impulse response of government revenue to oil price shocks, exports 
shocks, government expenditure shocks, and imports shocks. As expected, government revenue 
responds positively and statistically significant to oil price shocks. It also responds positively and 
statistically significant to exports and imports but lower compared to oil price shocks. In contrast, it 
responds positively but statistically insignificant to government expenditure shocks. The responses 
stabilised after ten months of fluctuations. These outcomes are in line with Granger causality test results 








The responses of government expenditure to one positive standard deviation shocks in oil price, 
exports, and government revenue and imports are presented in Figure 3.17. The responses of 
government expenditure fluctuate to all shocks in the first 10 months then stabilise. Government 
expenditure responds positively and statistically significant to government revenue, while it responds 
positively and insignificantly to oil price shocks and positive but slightly significant to exports shocks. 
This is an indicator that government spending is not adjusting to oil price swings, and therefore can lead 
to public debt accumulation. For example, in 2016 when the realised oil price was 40.1 US$/BBL, the 
fiscal breakeven oil price was 100 US$/BBL and the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP was 21%. 
The causality results are reported in Appendix 3.I appear to support this view, where the null hypothesis 
of government revenue does not Granger cause government expenditure is rejected, while the 




The responses of government revenue and government expenditure to oil price shock are 
consistent with the results obtained from chapter 2. The insignificant impact of oil price shocks on 
government expenditure reflects the ability of the government to smooth spending. The government 
uses different ways, i.e. (i) fund the deficit using the reserve fund when the oil prices drop, (ii) fund 
through local and international debts, and (iii) isolating the impact of oil price increase using reserve 
fund, i.e. when oil price increases higher than the anticipated price for a specific five-development plan, 
the excess goes to the reserve fund. 




Having discussed the responses of the fiscal variables, we will now move on to discuss the 
responses of the trade variables; exports, and imports to shocks in other variables in the model. As 
shown in Figure 3.18, exports respond positively and statistically significant to oil price shocks only. 
In contrast, the responses to imports shocks, government revenue shocks, and government expenditure 








Figure 3.19 illustrates the responses of imports. Interestingly, imports responds positively and 
statistically significant to all four shocks, the responses fluctuate in the first 10 months then stabilised. 
The highest response is to the oil price shocks followed by government expenditure shocks, and the 
lowest is to government revenue shocks and exports shocks. The responses to government revenue 
shocks and exports shocks have the same pattern. These results may be explained by the fact that the 
government has a critical role in the economy as an employer or in the infrastructure investment. Recall 








Figure 3.19. Impulse response of imports. 
   
  
 
3.6 Conclusion and policy implication   
The Omani economy is an oil-reliant economy, where both exports and government revenue 
heavily depend on petroleum. The aim of this study is to examine the twin deficit hypothesis for the 
Omani economy, i.e. testing the relationship between fiscal balance and trade balance in the short run 
using SVAR model, and then testing the relationship in the long run using the SVECM model. 
The results of Granger causality show that trade balance Granger-cause fiscal balance but not 
vice versa. In our short-run analysis, the SVAR impulse response functions show that the trade balance 
and fiscal balance respond to each other positively. The respond of fiscal balance to trade balance shocks 
is higher and statistically significant, while the respond of trade balance to fiscal balance shocks is 
statistically insignificant. As oil plays a crucial role in both trade and fiscal, we extend the model by 
adding oil price, and both trade balance and fiscal balance respond positively and statistically significant 
to oil price shocks, but the trade balance response was higher compared to the fiscal balance. When we 




to oil price volatility shocks. Thus, there is a positive relationship between oil price and trade and fiscal 
balances, while a negative relationship was observed with oil price volatility. As trade balance responds 
higher than fiscal balance to oil price shocks, fiscal balance responds higher than trade balance to oil 
price volatility shocks. This implies fiscal balance is more endogenous, and the government able to 
adjust the fiscal policy to oil price fluctuations compared to trade balance which is a kind of external 
and more exogenous variable. 
The results of forecast error variance decomposition show oil price shock’s contribution is 
higher for trade balance compared to fiscal balance, where it is up to 58.61% for the former and up to 
44.60% in the latter in the 45th quarter. The contribution of trade balance in fiscal balance is much higher 
compared to the contribution of fiscal balance in the trade balance, i.e. about 21.34% in the first case 
and 0.24% in the second case in the 45th quarter, respectively. 
The historical decomposition for trade balance and fiscal balance show oil price and trade 
balance shocks contribute considerably to the change in trade balance. While, the three shocks, oil price, 
fiscal balance, and trade balance have equal contribution to the changes in fiscal balance over time.     
By comparing the impulse response function among the sub-periods, trade balance responds 
positively to a positive fiscal balance shocks in the first sub-period (1989Q4-1996Q4) and responds 
negatively in the two later sub-periods (1989Q4-2006Q4) and (1989Q4-2013Q4). By contrast, fiscal 
balance responds positively to a positive trade balance shocks in all sub-periods. This indicates that 
trade balance is more exogenous variable moving with the global trend compared to fiscal balance, 
where for the latter, the government relatively has more control over it.   
As for the long-run relationship, the results of the Johansen cointegration test demonstrates two 
cointegration relationship among oil price, exports, imports, government revenue, and government 
expenditure. The long run cointegration equation normalized in government expenditure shows a 
positive significant relationship with government revenue and a significant negative relationship with 
exports and an insignificant negative relationship with the oil price. This may indicate the government’s 
ability to insulate the impact of oil price shocks. The second cointegration equation normalized on 
imports shows a positive significant relationship with exports and government expenditure and a 
significant negative relationship with oil price.  
The SVECM impulse response results show all variables except government expenditure 
respond to oil price shocks. Government expenditure responds significantly to government revenue 
shocks but not vice versa and imports responds to exports shocks but not vice versa. Thus, there is a 





For the interaction between fiscal and trade, government revenue responds to both exports and 
imports shocks, due to oil exports revenue and customs duties revenue. Compared to that, government 
expenditure responds to imports shocks only. On the other hand, imports responds significantly to both 
government revenue and government expenditure shocks, whereas exports is not responding to either 
government revenue nor government expenditure. These results corroborate the findings from the short-
run examination for bidirectional responses between fiscal balance and trade balance.  
The high contribution of petroleum in exports and government revenue, the leakage of saving 
in the form of workers’ remittance, and growing external debt due to growing fiscal deficit cause fragile 
stability for Oman’s internal and external balance. Government spending consolidation and exports 
diversification are important to maintain the internal and external balances for the Omani economy and 
to reduce the imbalances. Same policies may not work for all kinds of economies; thus, it is important 
to consider the right policy according to the economic structure. 
To balance the effect of oil price fluctuations, foreign workers’ remittance and the external debt, 
the government may increase their overseas investments. Moreover, the government should put a plan 
for better use of the free zones (namely the Al-Mazunah, Salalah, Sohar, Knowledge Oasis and Al-
Duqm Special Economic Zones) by attracting foreign investment and establishing state-owned projects 
by Oman Investment Authority. 
Due to the focus of this study and data limitation, the trade balance is used instead of the current 
account balance, though it is recommended to investigate the worker remittances and public debt for 
future research. The Central Bank of Oman’s annual report points to that debt to GDP ratio and debt 
service ratio are inched up dramatically between 2014 and 2018 couples with a high fiscal deficit. In 
addition, high leakage from domestic saving in the form of worker remittances due to the high 
percentage of employees in the private sector is non-Omani. Therefore, this study could be extended in 
future, depending on the data availability, to include the debt and saving leakages to analyse the fiscal 












3.7 Appendix   
Appendix 3.A: Current account  
Mn. O.R 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Current account 1,881 3,403 3,006 2,000 1,618 -4,212 -4,743 -4,138 -1,671 
1. Goods 7,200 9,841 10,193 9,376 9,873 3,506 2,406 3,369 6954 
Export 14,073 18,107 20,047 21,697 20,596 13,720 10,591 12,644 16,045 
Import -6,873 -8,266 -9,854 -12,321 -10,723 -10,214 -8,185 -9,275 -9,092 
2. Services -1,753 -2,081 -2,346 -2,631 -2,646 -2,622 -2,471 -2,615 -2,767 
Services (Credit) 694 895 1,033 1,136 1,204 1,305 1,345 1,542 1,713 
Services (Debit) -2,447 -2,976 -3,379 -3,767 -3,850 -3,927 -3,816 -4,157 -4,480 
3. Income -1,373 -1,583 -1,732 -1,244 -1,648 -870 -713 -1,118 -2,030 
Income (Credit) 297 282 276 737 455 252 372 384 449 
Income (Debit) -1,670 -1,865 -2,008 -1,981 -2,103 -1,122 -1,085 -1,502 -2,478 
4. Current Transfer -2,193 -2,774 -3,109 -3,501 -3,961 -4,226 -3,965 -3,774 -3,829 
Current Transfer (Credit) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Current Transfer (Debit) -2,193 -2,774 -3,109 -3,501 -3,961 -4,226 -3,965 -3,774 -3,829 
Worker Remittances -2,193 -2,774 -3,109 -3,501 -3,961 -4,226 -3,965 -3,774 -3,829 
Source: CBO annual report issues: 2015-2019. 
Appendix 3.B: Summary of empirical studies on the relationship between fiscal balance and current account 
balance/ trade balance 
 The study The country Variables  Methodology  
1 Abell (1990) US Money supply, government budget deficit, 
Moody’s AAA rated bonds, merchandise 
trade balance, personal income, and CPI. 
- VAR 
2 Akanbi (2015) Nigeria  Current account balance, government 
budget balance, government expenditures, 
GDP (for overall economy and non-oil 
economy), Naira’s real exchange rate, and 
money supply  
- VAR 
- VECM 
3 Alkswani (2000) Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia  
Trade deficit and budget deficit. - Johansen 
cointegration 
- Granger causality 
direction 
4 Hatemi-j and 
Shukur (2002) 
US Budget deficit and current account deficit/ 
trade deficit. 
- Granger Causality  
5 Bagnai (2006) 22 OECD 
countries.  
Current account to GDP ratio, government 
balance to GDP ratio, and private 
investment to GDP ratio. 
- Structural breaks on 
long and short run 
relationship 






Budget deficit to GDP ratio, current 
account to GDP ratio, nominal exchange 
rate, and short interest rate. 
- Cointegration 







7 Bartolini and 
Lahiri (2006) 
26 developed 
countries and 16 
OECD countries.   
Private consumption, GDP, fiscal deficit, 
government consumption, public debt, 
GDP growth, population growth, and 
current account balance.  
- Panel regression 






Budget deficit and current account deficit.  - VAR  
 
9 Kim and Kim 
(2006) 
Korea Budget deficit to GDP ratio, current 
account deficit to GDP ratio, and 
exchange rate. 
-  Modified Wald test 
10 Salvatore (2006) G-7 countries  Current account balance as percentage of 
GNP, government budget balance as 
percentage of GNP, and growth of real 
GNP. 
- Linear regression 
analysis 
 
11 Chen (2007) US Budget deficit, trade deficit, real interest, 
nominal exchange rate, and real exchange 
rate. 
- Three equation 
dynamic linear 
system  
12 Kim and 
Roubini (2008) 
US Log of real GDP, government deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, current account as a 
percentage of GDP, three months real 




Egypt  External debt, GDP, public consumption, 
current account deficit/GDP, trade 




14 Daly and Siddiki 
(2009) 
23 OECD Real interest rate, current account and 
fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP.  







Trade balance and fiscal balance. - VAR 
 
16 Holmes (2010) US Budget deficit as percentage of GDP, and 





17 Kalou and 
Paleologou 
(2012) 
Greece Budget deficit, short term interest rate, 
nominal effective exchange rate, and 
current account balance. 
- Granger causality  
- Cointegration 
- VECM 
18 Merza et al. 
(2012) 
Kuwait Budget balance and current account 
balance. 
- VAR 
- Granger causality 
 
19 Algieri (2013) Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain. 
Budget balance, current account and trade 
account. 
- Granger causality 










External variables: world interest rate, real 
exchange rate, terms of trade, internal 
variables: domestic resources, and fiscal 
policy. 
- Covariance  
- General methods of 
moment (GMM) 






Government budget deficit as percentage 
of GDP and current account deficits as 










Tax, government spending shocks on the 




Egypt Budget deficit, current account balance, 
exchange rate, government consumption, 
inflation, and total debt service.  
- Cointegration  
- Granger causality 
- VECM 
24 Xie and Chen 
(2014) 
11 OECD Current account to GDP ratio, government 
balance to GDP ratio, and private 
investment to GDP ratio.  
- Panel Granger 
causality test with 
bootstrap critical 
values 




Budget deficit to GDP, and current 
account deficit to GDP 
- Threshold 
cointegration 
approach of Hansen 
and Seo. 
26 Neaime (2015) Lebanon Government expenditure, tax revenues, 
budget deficit, total public debt, current 
account, external debt, exports, imports, 
and ratio of external debt to GDP. 
- Cointegration 
- Granger causality 
test 
27 Akanbi and Sbia 
(2017) 
31 oil exporters  Current account balance, government 
budget surplus, government expenditure, 
exchange rate, money supply, GDP, non-
oil GDP, and economic openness. 
- Two-stage least 
squares estimation 
technique.  
28 Helmy (2018) Egypt  Ratio of current account to GDP, ratio of 
government deficit (revenue – 
expenditure) to GDP, ratio of trade 
merchandise deficit to GDP, annual 
interest rate, and log of nominal exchange 
rate. 
- VAR 
- Granger causality  











Appendix 3.C: Data description and source 
The Variables* Abbreviation Frequency Measure 
Oil Price OP monthly (1989M07-2017M12) Constant, seasonally adjusted, log 
Exports TOTAL_EXPORTS monthly (1989M07-2017M12) Constant, seasonally adjusted, log 
Imports IMPORTS monthly (1989M07-2017M12) Constant, seasonally adjusted, log 
Government 




E monthly (1989M07-2017M12) Constant, seasonally adjusted, log 
Fiscal balance FB Quarterly (1989Q4-2017Q4) 
Government revenue - government 
expenditure as a percentage of the real 
GDP 
Trade balance TB Quarterly (1989Q4-2017Q4) 
Exports - imports as a percentage of 
the real GDP 
* Variables are in local currency (O.R) 
Appendix 3.D: VAR lag order selection criteria. 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 475.6509 NA  5.76E-07 -8.69084 -8.64146 -8.67082 
1 553.7837 151.9648 1.48E-07 -10.0511  -9.902930* -9.991 
2 560.1445 12.13789 1.42E-07 -10.0944 -9.84748  -9.994262* 
3 565.6624   10.32709*   1.38e-07*  -10.12225* -9.77657 -9.98206 
4 566.6945 1.893781 1.46E-07 -10.0678 -9.62335 -9.88755 
 
Appendix 3.E: Unit root results for TB, FB and OP 
    level 1st difference  
Variables   ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
               
TB  1% level I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
               
FB  1% level I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
        
OP 1% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 










Unit root results for OP, exports, imports, government revenue and government expenditure  
    level 1st difference  
Variables   ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
OP 1% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
                
Exports 1% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
                
Imports 1% level I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
                
Government revenue 1% level I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
                
Government expenditure  1% level I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 5% level I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
  10% level I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 






   Variance Decomposition of FB Variance Decomposition of TB 
 Horizon (Q) FB TB FB TB 
1 100.00 0.00 12.42 87.58 
4 83.05 16.95 14.36 85.64 
20 77.55 22.45 20.17 79.83 
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VAR Granger Causality 
The high frequency variable OP is significant in the third month only while is insignificant in first and 
second months 
Dependent variable: TB   Dependent variable: FB  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.   Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
OP_1 1.48 2 0.48  OP_1 3.26 2 0.19 
OP_2 2.15 2 0.34  OP_2 1.31 2 0.52 
OP_3 23.77 2 0  OP_3 13.43 2 0.001 
FB 0.83 2 0.66  TB 10.73 2 0.005 
All 29.74 8 0.0002   All 38.62 8 0 
FEVD42 
Horizon (Q 
 Variance Decomposition of TB:      Variance Decomposition of FB: 
TB FB TB FB 
1 59.55 0.000 0.02 85.81 
4 33.40 0.130 4.23 53.07 
20 28.16 0.644 6.001 41.21 





41 IRF are 95% since the scaled IRF cause error in EViews 11. 
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Appendix 3.H: FEVD for model with OP_V, TB and FB. 
Horizon 
(Q) 
 Variance Decomposition of TB  Variance Decomposition of FB 
OP_V TB FB OP_V TB FB 
1 0.21 99.78 0.00 0.74 11.95 87.31 
4 0.85 99.13 0.03 7.56 36.34 56.10 
20 1.03 98.93 0.04 6.64 46.29 47.07 
45 1.03 98.93 0.04 6.63 46.33 47.03 
 
Appendix 3.I: Pairwise Granger causality test* 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob. 
 OP does not Granger Cause EXPORT 7.15 0.00 
 OP does not Granger Cause GOV_REVENUE 3.85 0.00 
 OP does not Granger Cause GOV_EXPENDITURE 1.53 0.11 
 OP does not Granger Cause IMPORTS 1.63 0.08 
 GOV_REVENUE does not Granger Cause OP 0.57 0.87 
 GOV_REVENUE does not Granger Cause EXPORT 0.49 0.92 
 GOV_REVENUE does not Granger Cause GOV_EXPENDITURE 2.07 0.02 
 GOV_REVENUE does not Granger Cause IMPORTS 1.81 0.05 
 GOV_EXPENDITURE does not Granger Cause OP 0.88 0.57 
 GOV_EXPENDITURE does not Granger Cause EXPORT 0.68 0.77 
 GOV_EXPENDITURE does not Granger Cause GOV_REVENUE 0.56 0.87 
 GOV_EXPENDITURE does not Granger Cause IMPORTS 1.25 0.25 
 EXPORT does not Granger Cause OP 1.48 0.13 
 EXPORT does not Granger Cause GOV_REVENUE 3.27 0.00 
 EXPORT does not Granger Cause GOV_EXPENDITURE 1.17 0.30 
 EXPORT does not Granger Cause IMPORTS 2.16 0.01 
 IMPORTS does not Granger Cause OP 0.95 0.49 
 IMPORTS does not Granger Cause EXPORT 1.87 0.04 
 IMPORTS does not Granger Cause GOV_REVENUE 1.69 0.07 
 IMPORTS does not Granger Cause GOV_EXPENDITURE 1.70 0.07 

















4 THE TRANSMISSION OF THE GLOBAL SHOCKS TO THE 
OMANI ECONOMY THROGH TRADE LINKAGES  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The rising global interdependencies result in rising global shock spill over across countries 
because now the global economies are closely connected through trade and financial linkages. These 
linkages act as channels for shock transmission across economies. The growing interdependencies 
across markets, countries and national economies need to be understood and assessed for 
macroeconomic policy analysis and risk management (Dees, Mauro, et al., 2007).  
Trade shock from emerging economies exert significant influence on demand and prices of 
global commodities. The trade linkages are the main transmission channels through which foreign 
shocks impact the resource-rich countries such as Sub-Saharan and Middle Eastern economies (Yang 
& Samaké, 2011; Gauvin & Rebillard, 2018). Oil prices, compared to metal prices, appear to be more 
sensitive to shock originating from China and the United States (US). China’s shock is also found to 
have more persistent effects on commodity prices (see for example Chatterjee & Saraf, 2017).  
The world business cycle movements are associated with rising trade and financial linkages 
(Kose et al., 2008). The growing spill overs among economies may be through direct channel, i.e. 
bilateral trades, foreign direct investments, exchange rate movements, and technological changes. The 
spill over could also be through indirect channels such as global demand, international commodity 
prices, and world interest rates (Yang & Samaké, 2011). In fact, since the 1960s, the growth rate in 
world trade is higher than the world output growth. The trade linkages create demand and supply spill 
overs across economies (Kose et al., 2003), making it an important shock transmission channel across 
countries (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005; Chatterjee & Saraf, 2017; Gauvin & Rebillard, 2018). More 
specifically, for oil commodity, there is a strong relationship between oil price shock and global 
economic activities  (Kilian, 2009; Dong et al., 2019; Raghavan, 2020). 
The assessment of bilateral spill overs and policy implications should be based on a close 
examination of the relationship among countries, as the bilateral relations often vary from country to 
country (Yang & Samaké, 2011). This study aims to investigate the impact of trade shocks originating 
from Oman’s main trading partners, namely China, Japan, South Korea,43 Singapore, Thailand, and the 
US. Oman is a small open petroleum-reliant economy, and Asia is the main exports destination for the 
 




Omani oil. The Asia Pacific region is considered as one of the most dynamic regions in the global trade 
and a major driver of global economic growth (Dungey et al., 2018). For a long time, Japan accounts 
for the largest portion of Omani oil exports. Since 2000s China is Oman’s main export destination. This 
study examines the effects of the changing trade flows between Oman and its trading partners, and their 
implications on the Omani economy amid changing oil prices.  
Recently Oman along with its Middle Eastern neighbours and North African countries are 
dealing with several uncertainties and external risks which have economic sequences. For examples, 
the external risks are trade tensions between the US and China, geopolitical risks and oil price volatility 
and its impact on the fiscal and external balances of these oil-exporting countries. The volatile global 
financial conditions result in higher interest burdens, revaluation of foreign debt and financial sector 
stress in these countries (IMF, 2019). As oil prices remain extremely volatile, the crude oil volatility 
index rose to its highest value on record in March 2020 (OPEC, 2020). This intensified the concern 
over the effects of the increase in oil price volatility (Baumeister & Peersman, 2013), and causing 
economic uncertainties and delays in budget stability leading to low economic growth (Majumder et al., 
2020).  
Sultanate of Oman is a commodity exporter and for more than five decades, petroleum 
contributes up to 78.5%, 84.2% and 58.4% of the Omani total exports in 1995, 2005 and 2015, 
respectively (NCSI, 2018). In 2019 petroleum contributes up to 68.4% of the total exports, where 94.0% 
of the petroleum exported to East Asia (NCSI, 2020). Among the Middle Eastern oil exporters, Oman 
has the highest export intensity, measured as a percentage of GDP to China, where about 19.0% of its 
exports are concentrated with China, while only 1.0% with the US and 1.0% with Euro Area (IMF, 
2018). In  2016, 2017 and 2018, Oman exports about  78.0%, 76.9% and 83.1% of its oil to China 
(NCSI, 2019). The boom in the Chinese economy led to an unprecedented demand for natural resources 
(Yang & Samaké, 2011; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2012; Kilian & Hicks, 2013; Dungey, Fry-McKibbin, et 
al., 2014; Chatterjee & Saraf, 2017; Gauvin & Rebillard, 2018; Raghavan, 2020). In 2011, China 
consumed around 11.0% of the global oil consumption and while in the last ten years, 42.0% of the 
increase in global oil consumption has been driven by China (Gauvin & Rebillard, 2018). 
The slowdown in the Chinese economy can have direct and indirect effects on commodity 
exporters’ economies. The commodity price emerges as an important channel for China’s shock 
transmission, and China’s effect is higher on emerging countries as compared to advanced economies 
(Chatterjee & Saraf, 2017). Any Chinese hard-landing would cause commodity prices to fall (Gauvin 
& Rebillard, 2018). The impact from China due to a direct link via bilateral trade and indirect link 
through the impact on the commodity prices would affect China’s main trading partners (Cashin et al., 
2017). These expected impacts are confirmed by COVID-19 crisis which originated in China, spread 




We use Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) methodology developed by Dees, Mauro, et al. 
(2007) to investigate the impact of the global shocks on the Omani economy through trade linkages. As 
in a standard VAR model, the solution of GVAR is also used for shock scenario analysis and forecasting. 
The main benefit of using the GVAR is that it contains number of cross-section countries and each 
cross-section countries contain number of variables. Thus GVAR utilizes a panel structure (Chudik & 
Pesaran, 2016). Conditional on alternative configurations of cross-country linkages in the world 
economy, the spill over happens across economies via financial, trade and commodity linkages can be 
captured at the world level using the GVAR framework (Dees, Mauro, et al., 2007; Alawadhi et al., 
2018). For Oman, the exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP is generally high. Moreover, for the 
oil commodity, which is Oman’s export commodity has a strong relationship with global economic 
activities. We investigate the impact of trade shocks originating from Oman’s main trading partners to 
Oman as a small open petroleum-dependent economy. These trading partners received 89.5% of Omani 
oil exports value in 2019 (NCSI, 2020). We used quarterly data over the period 1989Q4 to 2016Q4. 
Our results show the Omani economy is relatively susceptible to shocks from China, 
highlighting its high trade exposure and vulnerability to the state of China’s economy. The response of 
Oman’s GDP to a shock to China’s GDP is considerable and persistent, compared to other trading 
partners, including the US and Japan. By re-estimating the model using different trade weights, Oman’s 
responses to the US shocks are almost similar across different periods. The influence of China is still 
the highest among all partners using different trade weights. In contrast, the influence of Japan’s shocks 
declined over time. By breaking down the total GDP into petroleum and non-petroleum GDP, the results 
show that the international shocks have a higher and more persistent impact on the petroleum GDP 
compared to the non-petroleum GDP.  
The remaining of the study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief about the Omani 
economy. Section 4.3 details the methodology and the data used, section 4.4 reports the empirical results 
and discussion. Finally, section 4.5 concludes and propose some policy recommendations.  
4.2 An overview of the Omani economy 
Oman is a small oil producer and exporter with daily oil production less than one million barrels. 
Although Oman is a small oil producer, petroleum plays a crucial role in the Omani economy, as the 
main source of government revenue, exports commodity and economic activity.  
Petroleum is a vital economic activity in Oman as it contributes relatively high to GDP. Despite 
oil price swing, the contribution of petroleum activities to Omani GDP appears to be almost similar 




40.8% of the total GDP, respectively (NCSI, 2019).44 This could be due to an increase in quantity 
exported as oil price declined. For instance, when oil price declined by 29.03% between 2015 and 2016, 
the exports quantity of oil increased by 5.4% (CBO, 2016a).  
In Oman, both fiscal and trade outlooks are linked to the oil price. The contribution of petroleum 
in government revenue and exports moves in line with the trend of global oil price. In 2016, when the 
oil price was 40.1 US$/BBL, the petroleum contributes around 57.9% of total exports and 68.2% of 
total government revenue. In 2017, oil price improved by 28%, i.e. oil price increased to 51.3 US$/BBL; 
therefore, the contribution to exports increased to 58.2% and around 72.9% to government revenue. In 
2018, when the oil price was 69.7 US$/BBL, the percentage raised to 65.3% of exports and 78.2% of 
government revenue. Thus, the fiscal deficit as a percentage of the expenditure, decreased to 41.1%, 
30.6%, and 19.4% in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively (NCSI, 2019). Moreover, Oman’s external 
account significantly improved with oil price recovery (CBO, 2019). 
 The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP is an indicator of an economy’s 
openness to international trade (Huntington, 2015). Majumder et al. (2020) found that trade openness 
is a possible channel to reduce the resource curse in oil-rich countries as they gain competitive price for 
their resources in the international market. As Table 4.1 shows, the exports plus imports as a percentage 
of GDP in Oman is generally more than 90%, classifying it as a super trading nation. It was 104.2% in 
2014 when the oil price was 103.2 US$/BBL but declined to 94.8% and 77.8% in 2015 and 2016 when 
the oil price declined to 56.5 US$/BBL and 40.1 US$/BBL, respectively. Driven by oil price recovery 
to 51.3 US$/BBL and 69.7 US$/BBL in 2017 and 2018 and with the improvement in non-oil exports, 
the percentage rebounded to 84.5% and 85.8%, respectively (CBO, 2019). The table also illustrates the 
trade balance, which is the difference between merchandise exports and imports, and it is also moving 
with the oil price trend. The trade balance as a percentage of GDP declined by 68.8% between 2014-
2015 and by 35.6% between 2015-2016, reaching 5.6% in 2016 compared to 27.9% in 2014. Then the 
trade balance recovered and bounced back by 50.0% between 2016-2017 to 8.4% of the GDP in 2017. 
Compared to 50.0% improvement between 2016 and 2017, the trade balance achieves a big jump in 
2018 by 132.1% compared to 2017. 
Table 4.1. Exports and imports, and trade balance (2010-2018) 
Trade balance 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Export and import as % of GDP 96.5 104.7 105.8 116.8 104.2 94.9 77.8 84.5 85.8 
Trade balance as % of GDP 28.4 34 30.8 26.5 27.9 8.7 5.6 8.4 19.5 
Source: CBO annual report issues: 2015,2019.  
 




Petroleum is the main export commodity for Oman since the late 1960s. The importance of oil 
export can be seen in Figure 4.1 below, with a high contribution of petroleum in the total exports value 
between 1995 and 2018. Though the percentage varies across time, but in general it is high. Closer 
inspection of the figure shows the highest contribution was about 84.0% in 2005. The lowest was 56.7% 
in 2016 when the oil price was 40.1 US$/BBL, then following the oil price recovery to 69.7 US$/BBL 
in 2018 the percentage increased to 65.3% (NCSI, 2019). This substantial contribution of petroleum put 
the Omani economy in a vulnerable state to any external shocks through trade linkages from the global 
economic slowdown and or a slowdown in the trade partners’ economies.  
Figure 4.1. The percentage of petroleum and non-petroleum from the total exports (1995-2018)  
Source: Different issues of the Statistical Yearbook, NCSI. 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the destinations for Omani oil exports from 1980 to 2018. It is obvious 
from Figure 4.2 that the Asian market is the main destination for Omani oil. As stated in the literature, 
Asia is one of the most dynamic regions in global trade and a major driver of global economic growth. 
In addition, the rapid growth of China over the past decades has been one of the main drivers for the 
rise in demand and prices of mineral commodity and energy. Currently, China is the main exports 
destination for Omani oil. China started to import the Omani oil in 1993, and since then it has dominated 
as main exports destination, where up to 78.0%, 76.9% and 83.1% of total oil exports of Oman is 
exported to China in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively (NCSI, 2019). Before China, from the 1980s to 


























































































































reasonably large amount of oil to Korea, Singapore and Thailand. Compared to these destinations, 
Oman’s exports to the US is relatively small.45 
Figure 4.2. The exports destination for the Omani oil (1980-2018) 
Source: Different issues of the Statistical Yearbook, NCSI. 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the overall trade flow, which is the average of total exports and imports, 
between Oman and its trade partners. These selected trade partners are the main exports destinations 
for the Omani oil.46 However, about 47.43% of Oman’s non-oil exports, goes to Gulf Cooperation 
Countries (GCCs) and in return, Oman receives about 56.52% of imports from these countries (NCSI, 
2019). Consistent with the discussion above, the trade flow is gradually increasing with China, while it 
is decreasing with Japan. By contrast, trade flows with Korea and Thailand are stable over time. The 
trade flow with the US and Singapore are relatively small compared to other countries.  
There are three types of oil price shocks: oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil-
specific demand shocks (Kilian, 2009). The determinants of oil price movements are global economic 
growth, supply disruption and geopolitical uncertainties, technological changes and or unprecedented 
health crisis like the COVID-19. Ramp in oil production in Saudi Arabia, the reimposition of the US 
sanction on Iran, supply disruption in Libya, Iran and Venezuela, increases in the US shale oil 
 
45 Recently India appearing as a considerable destination for the Omani oil. In 2017, 2018 and 2019 about 9.6%, 
7.6% and 4.8% of the Omani oil exported to India. Before that, there is no individual time series data regarding 
the exported quantity of oil to India may be it included under other countries group (NCSI, 2020).  
46 Taiwan is excluded from the analysis although it is one of the importers since 1980 th till now. This is due to 































production, and weak demand from big trade partners like China, Russia and Europe are examples of 
concern about oil price movements (IMF, 2019).  
 Figure 4.3. The trade flow, an average of exports and imports, between Oman and it’s trade partners  
Source: Direction of Trade and Statistics, IMF. 
 
The policymakers in Oman are aware of their exposure to these vulnerabilities due to the heavy 
dependence on petroleum export. Therefore, Oman vision 2020 and the current 2040 vision emphasise 
on economic diversification to insulate the economy from external shocks. It is deemed important to 
empower the non-petroleum sector for sustainable development and to generate continuous 
employment opportunities. The Omani government have started the National Program for Enhancing 
Economic Diversification, knowns as ‘Tanfeeth’ to improve five non-petroleum sectors namely, the 
manufacturing, tourism, mining, logistics and fishing (CBO, 2019). These sectors were largely ignored 
in the past due to the flourishing oil price, which is considered as a symptom of the Dutch Disease.47  
The spill over from the global economy to Oman may happen directly through bilateral trade, 
foreign direct investment, exchange rate movement and technological change, as well as indirectly 
through global demand, international commodity price and world interest rate. The world trade is 
growing to make the trade linkages as an important shock transmission channel across countries 
associated with business cycle movement. The impact may be due to direct bilateral trade and indirect 
through the impact on commodity prices and third market. As mentioned before the exports plus imports 
as a percentage of GDP is generally high for Oman. Moreover, for the oil commodity, which is the main 
 
47 The Dutch Disease is a process of a boom in a natural resource sector that results in shrinking the non-resource 
tradable, leading to specialisation in the resource and non-tradable sectors leaving the economy more vulnerable 
















































































































































export commodity for Oman, there is a strong relationship between oil price shocks and global 
economic activities. We will investigate the impact of trade shocks originating from Oman’s main 
trading partners to Oman as a small open petroleum-reliant economy. The study will examine the effects 
of changing trade flows and influence from the trade partners using different trade weights to construct 
the foreign variables and link to the Omani economy. Thus, this assessment of bilateral spill overs and 
policy implications are based on a close inspection of the relationship among Oman and its bilateral 
trade relations as the trade relationship often vary from country to country. This interlink between Oman, 
its trade partners and oil price are presented in Figure 4.4, and we are using the GVAR model, that will 
be explained in the next section, to achieve this goal. GVAR can assess the patterns of co-movement of 
core macroeconomics variables for the economies; such as output, inflation, and interest rate, and the 
channels for the global shocks; such as oil prices shocks or specific national shocks and use it for shocks 
scenarios analysis and forecasting. 
4.3 Methodology and Data  
This section provides details about the GVAR model and data used to examine the impact of 
the global shocks on the Omani economy through trade linkages. 
 A general overview of the methodology  
Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model developed by Dees, Mauro, et al. (2007) is an 
extension based on Pesaran et al. (2004) work. Due to globalisation, there are many shock transmissions 
channels across economies; via trade and commodity and financial linkages. These linkages can be 
captured at the world level using a GVAR model. The GVAR is a multi-country model which links 
country-specific models using time series and panel data techniques (Dees, Mauro, et al., 2007; 
Mohaddes & Pesaran, 2017).  
Conditional on alternative configurations of cross-country linkages in the world economy, the 
spill over happens across economies via linkages of finance, trade, and commodity. In GVAR it is 
advisable to use trade weights compared to the financial weights as it captures the political and cultural 
interlinkages across countries and it also revealed to be the most important determinant of national 
business cycle co-movements (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2012; Chudik & 
Pesaran, 2016; Mohaddes & Pesaran, 2016; Cashin et al., 2017; Alawadhi et al., 2018). GVAR can 
assess the patterns of co-movement of core macroeconomics variables for the economies such as output, 
inflation, interest rate and equity prices for the business cycle and several channels for the global shocks 
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The model is estimated in two steps. In the first step, each country modelled as a small open 
economy by estimating country-specific vector autoregressive models (VARX*) in which domestic 
variables are related to both country-specific foreign variables and global variables. In the second step, 
a global model is constructed by combining all the estimated country-specific models and linking them 
via a matrix of predetermined cross-countries linkages. The one large GVAR model solved for various 
shock scenarios analysis and forecasting (Chudik & Pesaran, 2016).  
Most of the GVAR literature has focused on business cycle linkages among developed and 
major emerging market economies, and there is limited attention to growth spill over to the oil exporters 
or the Middle Eastern and North African countries (Yang & Samaké, 2011; Mohaddes et al., 2012; 
Cashin et al., 2014). Also, recently a growing literature draws attention to the growing influence of 
China on the commodity prices (see for example Cashin et al., 2017; Chatterjee & Saraf, 2017; Gauvin 
& Rebillard, 2018). 
 Modelling the GVAR and data 
As mentioned before, GVAR modelled through two steps. In the first step, there are small-scale 
country-specific models conditional on the rest of the world, in which domestic variables are related to 
both country-specific foreign variables and global variables. These models are presented as augmented 
vector autoregressive models (VARX*), including domestic variables and foreign variables known as 
‘star variables’ which treated as weakly exogenous. In the second step, the individual country VARX* 
models stacked and solve simultaneously as one GVAR model. Thus, the base of the GVAR approach 
is a small-scale country-specific models which can be estimated separately. 
Consider (𝑁 + 1) countries in the global economy indexed by 𝑖 = 0,1, … ,𝑁. Except for the US 
which is modelled as a reference economy 𝑖 = 0; all countries are modelled as small open economies. 
This set of individual VARX* models is used to build the GVAR model. Following Pesaran (2004) and 
Dees, Mauro, et al. (2007), VARX* (𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖)  model for 𝑖 th country (𝑘𝑖 × 1)  vector of domestic 
macroeconomic variables treated as endogenous variables (𝑥𝑖𝑡) related to (𝑘𝑖
∗ × 1) vector of country-
specific foreign variables (𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ ) treated as weak exogenous, and to (𝑚𝑑 × 1) vector of observed global 
factors (𝑑𝑡) variables with constant and deterministic time trend as in equation (4.1):  
 
𝜱𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖)𝒙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖0 + 𝛼𝑖1𝑡 + 𝜦𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖)𝒙𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜰𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖)𝒅𝑖 + +𝒖𝑖𝑡           (4.1) 
 
For 𝑡 = 1,2,… , 𝑇, where α𝑖0 and α𝑖1are (𝑘𝑖 × 1) vector of fixed intercepts and coefficients on 
the deterministic time trends respectively. and 𝐮𝑖𝑡 is (𝑘𝑖 × 1) vector of country-specific shocks, which 




𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, ∑𝑖𝑖) . Furthermore, 𝚽𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖) = Ι − ∑ 𝚽𝑖𝐿
𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1 , 𝚲𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) = ∑ 𝚲𝑖𝐿
𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑖=0  and 𝚼𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) =
∑ 𝚼𝑖𝐿
𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝑖=0  are the matrix lag polynomial of the coefficients associated with domestic, foreign and global 
variables, respectively.  
The VARX* models are including a maximum of six domestic variables (endogenous variables), 
depending on whether data are available for a variable, and exogenous variables. The domestic variables 
are real GDP, (𝑦𝑖𝑡), the rate of inflation,(𝜋𝑖𝑡), short term interest rate, (𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑠), long-term interest rate, 
(𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ), exchange rate, (𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡), and real equity prices, (𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡). There is a pattern of co-movement between 
these variables and the business cycle which increases the economic and financial cointegration leading 
to essential macro-economic policy spill overs across countries (Dees, Mauro, et al., 2007). In addition, 
these variables are the commonly used variables in the GVAR literature (Cashin et al., 2014).  
Following the literature, and due to the dominance of the US in the world economy; it is 
modelled differently. The global variable oil price in this case, (𝑑𝑡), treated as endogenous in the US 
model, while a weakly exogenous for other countries in the model. Between 1979 and 2010 US 
consumed, on average, about 27% of world oil. Compared to the other three major oil importers, China, 
Euro Area, and Japan; the US consumption is far larger than other countries. Also, including oil price 
in the US model acts as a transmission mechanism for the global economic conditions to the oil price 
(Cashin et al., 2014). Moreover due to the importance of US financial variables in the global economy, 
the US-specific foreign variables (𝑟𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗𝑠 ), (𝑟𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗𝑙 ), and (𝑒𝑞𝑈𝑆,𝑡
∗ ) are not included in the country-specific 
model. In addition, the domestic currency price of the US dollar is by construction determined outside 
this model.   
The data for the domestic variables (𝑥𝑖𝑡) for each country, as well as the oil price, is obtained 
from the GVAR package.48  Then the dataset is augmented with the Omani economy’s variables. For 
more details see Smith and Galesi (2014) and Mohaddes and Raissi (2018).49  Refer to Appendix 4.A 
for data description.  
As the lag orders of these variables (𝑝𝑖) and (𝑑𝑖) are selected on a country-by-country basis, 
we are explicitly allowing for  𝚽𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖), 𝚲𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) and 𝚼𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) to differ across countries. 
The country-specific foreign variables (x𝑖𝑡
∗ ) are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the 
domestic variables using data on bilateral trade as the weights, w𝑖𝑗: 
 
48 The oil price is from the GVAR database and not the Omani oil price. The oil price in this case is a Brent crude 
oil price which is the quarterly series, the average of the daily closing price for all trading days within the quarter 
(Mohaddes & Raissi, 2018). The correlation between the world oil price and country-specific oil supply shocks 
tend to be zero as there are large number of oil producers, except for Saudi Arabia (Mohaddes & Pesaran, 2016). 






∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝒙𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0                                           (4.2) 
 
Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 0, 1, … , 𝑁,  w𝑖𝑖 = 0  and  ∑ w𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=0 = 1 . In the GVAR literature, different 
trade weights have been used (see for example Mohaddes et al., 2012; Cashin et al., 2014; Mohaddes 
& Pesaran, 2016; Cashin et al., 2017; Alawadhi et al., 2018; Gauvin & Rebillard, 2018). 
For empirical application and following Dees, Mauro, et al. (2007); in this study we have 
applied the trade weights that are computed as fixed weights based on the average trade flows measured 
over the period 1999 to 2001.50 The estimation of foreign variables and solution of GVAR is based on 
fixed trade weights, using a three-year average to reduce the impact of individual yearly movement on 
the weights: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
𝑇𝑖𝑗,1999 + 𝑇𝑖𝑗,2000 + 𝑇𝑖𝑗,2001
𝑇𝑖,1999 + 𝑇𝑖,2000 + 𝑇𝑖,2001
 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the bilateral trade of country 𝑖  with country 𝑗  during a given years 𝑡  and is 
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country 𝑖 with 𝑗 and 𝑇𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0  (the total trade 
of country 𝑖) for t = 1999,2000, and 2001. 
The bilateral trade weight is calculated as the average of exports and imports of a specific 
country with its trade partner over a specific time (Cashin et al., 2014). In our study, petroleum is the 
main source of exports and government revenue for the Oman economy; therefore, the selected trading 
partners include the partners which received 89.5% of Omani oil exports value in 2019 (NCSI, 2020). 
These countries are China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the US, and they account for around 
93.0%, 84.0%, and 89.0% of Oman’s total oil exports in 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively (NCSI, 
2019). We consider the exports and imports because Oman depends largely on imports for food, 
consumption, and investment products (CBO, 2019), and government revenue from oil has an impact 
on government investment plans. Therefore, including exports and imports will capture more 
comprehensively the trade pattern for the Omani economy.  
In addition to the 1999-2001 trade weight, we also use three different trade weights as shown 
in Table 4.2. They highlight three demand-driven oil price shocks: (i) between 1997 and 1999, the 
decrease in demand for crude oil caused by Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), followed by an economic 
 
50 The trade weights can based at any time period or can be allowed to be time-varying (Mohaddes et al., 2012; 




crisis in Russia, Brazil and Argentina, (ii) between 2007 and 2009, the decline in demand for industrial 
commodities including crude oil due to global recession and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). And 
(iii) between 2014 and 2016, oil price drop caused by sluggish global economic activity, increase in US 
shale oil production, increase in oil production from Canada and Russia, and less impact from 
geopolitical conflict on the supply-side in the Middle East (Baumeister & Kilian, 2016; Koh, 2016). 
Table 4.2. Trade weights period’s description  
Description  Three years average weight 
AFC  1997-1999 
GFC  2007-2009 
Sluggish global economic activity 2014-2016 
 
By focusing on these three sets of average trade weights, we can quantify how changes in trade 
patterns may have altered the impact and the transmission of shocks to the Omani economy. Indeed, 
including three different weights will give a better sense of time evolution of estimated impacts and 
provide evidence on the robustness of the results. 
Although the estimation is done country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved for the 
world, taking in account that all variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. After estimating 
each country VARX*(𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) model separately, all the 𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0  endogenous variables collected in 
the 𝑘 × 1  vector 𝐱𝑡 = (𝐱0𝑡
′ , 𝐱1𝑡
′ , … , 𝐱𝑁𝑡
, )′ , need to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix 
defined in terms of the country-specific weights. Thus, we can write the VARX* model in equation 
(4.1) more compactly as:  
𝜜𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖)𝒛𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝑡                       (4.3) 
 
For  𝑖 = 0,1,… ,𝑁, where  
 
𝜜𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖) = [𝜱𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖) − 𝜦𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖)], 𝒛𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′∗)′, 𝜑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜶𝑖0 + 𝜶𝑖1𝑡 + 𝜰𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖)𝒅𝑡 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡 (4.4) 
 
Note that given equation (4.2) we can write:  
 





Where 𝐖𝑖 = (𝐖𝑖0,𝐖𝑖1, … ,𝐖𝑖𝑁) with 𝐖𝑖𝑖 = 0 weight matrix for country 𝑖 defined by the country-
specific weights, 𝑤𝑖𝑗. using equation (4.5) we can write equation (4.3) as:  
 
𝜜𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝)𝑾𝑖𝒙𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝑡                                  (4.6) 
 
Where 𝚨𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝) is constructed from 𝚨𝑖(𝐿, 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖) by setting 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝0, 𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑁 , 𝑞0, 𝑞1, … , 𝑞𝑁) and 
augmenting the 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖 or 𝑝 − 𝑞𝑖 additional terms in the power of the lag operator by zeros. Stacking 
equation (4.6), we obtain the GVAR(p) in domestic variable only: 
 

























      (4.8) 
 
The GVAR(p) model in equation (4.7) can be solved recursively and used for several purposes, 
i.e. to generate impulse response functions or forecast.  
 Unit root test, lag order selection, cointegration, and persistence profiles  
We need to consider the unit root properties of the variables included in our GVAR model. If 
the domestic variables (x𝑖𝑡), foreign variables (x𝑖𝑡
∗ ), and the global variable (d𝑡) in the country-specific 
models are integrated of order one I(1), then we can distinguish between short and long-run 
relationships, and interpret the long-run relationship as cointegrating. We perform the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on the level and first difference for all variables. We also perform weighted 
symmetric (WS-ADF) test introduced by Park and Fuller (1995), because it has been shown to have 
better power properties than the ADF test. The results reported in Appendices 4.B, 4.C, and 4.D support 
the treatment of variables in our model as I(1) and they are stationary in the first difference. 
 The VARX* model allows the cointegration among domestic and foreign variables. 
However, before we examine the cointegration relationship among the variables; we need to determine 
the lag orders of domestic and foreign variables (𝑝𝑖) and (𝑞𝑖). For this purpose, we use the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). Following the GVAR literature and given the constraints imposed by data 





are reported in Table 4.3. The specification seems satisfactory, except for two countries Singapore and 
Thailand for which AIC selected  𝑝 = 𝑞 = 1 . 
Having established the lag order of country-specific models, we proceed to determine the 
number of long-run relationships. Cointegration test with the null hypothesis of no cointegration, one 
cointegration, and so on are carried out using Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics 
developed by Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous I(1). Choosing the number of 
cointegrating relations (𝑟𝑖)  based on trace test statistics because it has better small sample properties 
compared to maximum eigenvalue test using 95% critical values from MacKinnon et al. (1999). The 
number of cointegrations in the specific-country models are shown in Table 4.3 and more details in are 
provided Appendix 4.E.  
 Table 4.3. VARX* lag order and number of cointegrating relations  
Country 𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖 Cointegrating relations (𝑟𝑖) 
OMAN 2 1 1 
JAPAN 2 1 1 
KOREA 2 1 1 
SINGAPORE 1 1 1 
THAILAND 1 1 1 
CHINA 2 1 1 
USA 2 1 2 
 𝒑𝒊 and  𝒒𝒊 are lag order of domestic variables and foreign variables respectively and selected by Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). The number of cointegration relations (𝑟𝑖) are selected using the trace test statistic based on the 95% critical values 
from MacKinnon et al. (1999) for all countries. The number of (𝑟𝑖) are reduced below that suggested by trace statistic to ensure 
the global model stability.    
  
If the variables are cointegrated, the shocks will be transitory and eventually disappear as the 
economy returns to the equilibrium, but if the variables are not cointegrated, the impact of shocks will 
persist forever  (Pesaran & Shin, 1996). Persistence profiles (PPs) are the time profiles of the effects of 
the system or variable-specific shocks on the cointegrating relations in the GVAR (Dees, Holly, et al., 
2007). Persistence profiles capture the difference between cointegrating and non-cointegrating 
relationships to provide unique time profiles for the effect of these shocks of the cointegrating relations. 
The impact of PPs is normalised to unit value, and the rate at which they tend to zero provides 
information about the speed in which the equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks. The 
PPs could initially over-shoot and exceed unity but eventually must tend to zero if the relationship under 
consideration is cointegrated.  
If there is a slow speed of adjustment and convergence for some economies, reducing the 
number of cointegration for these economies will lead to a well-behaved PPs (Mohaddes & Pesaran, 




cointegrating relationships in economies under consideration. Moreover, the speed of convergence is 
also high, which is a good indication that identified cointegrating vectors are appropriate.  
 Trade weights and contemporaneous effects  
The trade weight matrix is the bilateral trade weight calculated as the average exports and 
imports of country 𝑖 with country 𝑗 over the total trade of country 𝑖 in a specific time (Cashin et al., 
2014), and it sums down to one as shown in Table 4.4. The trade weight matrix is built based on the 
trade flows between Oman and its trading partners (The US, China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and 
Singapore), and used to estimate the foreign variables and linking country-specific models in the GVAR 
model. The full trade weights matrices are available in Appendix 4.G.  
  Figure 4.5 visualises the evolving of trade patterns between Oman and its trade partners over 
time. The most interesting aspect of this graph is the changing importance of two main trade partners 
of Oman: China and Japan. The trade weights show the growing influence of China and the declining 
influence of Japan. Using average trade weight 1997-1999, Japan was the main trading partner for Oman, 
which accounts for 36.0% of total exports and imports, compared to only 19.2% with China. The 
percentage of trade with China jumped to 36.6% and 64.1% using trade weight 2007-2009 and 2014-
2016, respectively. In contrast, the trade share with Japan declined by half between these two weights, 
to 23.4% and 11.2%, respectively. Our findings are consistent with Mohaddes et al. (2012), who used 
different trade weights averaged over 1986-1988 and 2006-2008, and found the trade between China 
and MENA countries increased many folds in the latter period. The trade relationship with the US 
ranges between 5.7% and 7.5%, while Korea varies between 12.0% and 19.9%. The trade declined 
substantially with Thailand, from 19.0% to 3.6% using trade weights 1997-1999 and 2014-2016, 
respectively. The trade relations with Singapore are small and stable, around 2.8% across all four trade 
weights. In the next section, we will explore the influence of these countries’ shocks on the Omani 
economy through trade linkages. We will assess how the Omani economy reacts to different weights 
over time.  
Table 4.4.  Average trade weights: 1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2007-2009 and 2014-2016  
  1997-1999 1999-2001 2007-2009 2014-2016 
JAPAN 0.360 0.325 0.234 0.112 
KOREA 0.161 0.199 0.196 0.120 
SINGAPORE 0.021 0.038 0.028 0.028 
THAILAND 0.190 0.130 0.106 0.036 
CHINA 0.192 0.252 0.366 0.641 
USA 0.075 0.057 0.070 0.063 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 





Figure 4.5. Changes in Oman’s trade flow with its’ trade partners over time  
 
The contemporaneous effects given by the estimated coefficients of contemporaneous 
relationships of the foreign variables on their domestic counterparts. It can be interpreted as impact 
elasticities between domestic and foreign variables, and it provides information about the international 
linkages between domestic and foreign variables. High elasticity between domestic and foreign 
variables, imply strong co-movements between the two variables.  
Table 4.5 shows the elasticity measure of Oman’s GDP elasticity using different average trade 
weights. Though the results show there is a positive elasticity between the domestic and foreign GDP 
across all four trade weights, only the last two trade weights are statistically significant. This shows 
increasing trade integration of the Omani economy with the global economy over time.  
Table 4.5. Contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on domestic counterpart  
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To examine the importance of petroleum in the Oman economy, we break down the GDP into 
petroleum and non-petroleum GDP. As expected, the elasticity of petroleum GDP to changes in the 
corresponding foreign counterpart is way more sensitive compared to that for GDP, as Table 4.5 above 
shows. In contrast, the elasticity of non-petroleum GDP is small, statistically insignificant, and is 
negative in three out of the four trade weights.   
4.4 Empirical results and discussion  
 This section presents the results of the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) and 
generalized forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD).  
 The generalized impulse response functions 
The impulse response functions are the time profile of the effects of variable-specific shocks or 
identified shocks like technology shocks or monetary policy shocks on all the variables in the model. 
Due to spill over effects across countries in a multi-country context, there is a need to allow for the 
possibility that some of the structural shocks might be correlated. To allow for non-zero correlations 
across the structural shocks, we use the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) introduced by 
Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). GIRF is based on the moving average representation 
of the GVAR model, and it is invariant to the variables and countries order, which is important in the 
multifactor macroeconomic model (Dees, Mauro, et al., 2007). The GIRF approach is not based on prior 
economic theory or canonical system, but it is a counterfactual exercise based on a historical correlation 
of shocks as given (Chudik & Pesaran, 2016).  
 The GIRFs graphs illustrate the responses of Oman’s GDP to a number of adverse shocks 
with bootstrap random draws and 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The GDP is used as a core 
indicator for a country’s economic assessment over time, and for assessment relative to other economies 
(Van den Bergh, 2009). The results section includes the GIRFs of Oman’s GDP, petroleum GDP 
(GDP_P), and non-petroleum GDP (GDP_NP) using the four different average trade weights.  
4.4.1.1 GIRFs of Oman’s GDP to shocks to the trade partners’ GDP  
 Figure 4.6 illustrates the responses of Oman’s GDP to one standard deviation negative GDP 
shock to Oman’s trade partners using average trade weight 1999-2001. The response of Oman’s GDP 
to a shock from China’s GDP is considerable and persistent, compared to the other five countries, 
including the US and Japan. The initial impact of China is around 1%, compared to only 0.4% from the 
US. Given the size of China and its role in the global value chain, any economic slowdown in China 
will spill over to the global economy, particularly through trade linkages (Cashin et al., 2017). In 
contrast, the impact of Japan is sizeable in the first four quarters, up to 0.6%, then it declines to 0.3%. 
This outcome is consistent with that reported by Dungey et al. (2018), that  China’s influence overtook 




countries. Moreover, Oman’s exports of oil to China grew from 77% in 2017 to 83.1% in 2018 (NCSI, 
2019). Thus, commodity price emerges as an important channel for the transmission of Chinese shocks, 
and the Chinese effect is felt higher in emerging countries as compared to advance countries (Chatterjee 
& Saraf, 2017). The GVAR forecast, reported in Appendix 4.H, shows China is leading the global 
economic growth with a steady increase in GDP, reflecting the continuous growth since 2000 (Cashin 
et al., 2017; Dungey & Osborn, 2019). While growth levels in the US and Japan have flattened, growth 
in Singapore, Korea, and Thailand have a similar level. Consequently, our finding supports the 
vulnerability of the Omani economy to the Chinese shocks.51 Oman’s GDP also responds significantly 
to negative shocks from Korea and Thailand. The response of Oman’s GDP to shocks from Singapore 
















51 China surpassing the US in 2016 as the world’s largest oil importer, consumes 14 million barrels a day, 







Figure 4.6. The median impulse responses of the Omani GDP to one standard deviation fall in the 















































































4.4.1.2 GIRFs of Oman’s GDP to shocks to the trade partners’ GDP over time     
 To investigate the evolving effects of Oman’s trade relations over time, we use the three 
different average trade weights described in Section, 3 i.e. for the periods 1997-1999, 2007-2009, and 
2014-2016 to estimate the GVAR. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the responses of Oman’s GDP to negative 
output shocks to Oman’s trade partners, and the results appear to be in line with those using trade 
weights for the period 1999-2001. Since the relative trade weights with the US is stable across times, 
Oman’s responses to the US shocks are also similar for different trade weights. This outcome is 
consistent with Mohaddes et al. (2012), who also found the impact of US GDP shocks on the Middle 
East and North Africa countries (MENA) countries has not changed much since the mid-1980s. 
Contrary to the expectations, the responses to China’s shocks have remained significant across time, 
even though the trade share with China evolved dramatically from 19.2% in 1997-1999 to 64.1% in 
2014-2016. The Chinese GDP shock affects Oman more strongly using trade weights 1997-1999; this 
negative response could be associated with the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The effect is considerable 
and persistent using trade weights 2014-2016, compared to 2007-2009 weights. By contrast, using two 
different trade weights averaged over 1986-1988 and 2006-2008, Mohaddes et al. (2012) found the 
impact of Chinese GDP shocks on the Middle East and North Africa countries has significantly 
increased particularly for less-diversified commodity exporters. The influence of Japan’s shocks 
declined compared to decades ago, corroborate with the decline in trade weight from 36.0% in 1997-
1999 to 11.2% in 2014-2016. In fact, the response to Japan’s shocks turns to be statistically insignificant 
using the last two trade weights 2007-2008 and 2014-2016 after the 4th quarter. Likewise, the response 
to Thailand’s shocks declined as the trade weights declined over time. The effect of Thailand’s shock 
was highest using trade weights 1997-1999, as the AFC started from Thailand. By contrast, the response 
of Korea is relatively stable and similar across the different trade weights, while the response to 












Figure 4.7. The median impulse responses of the Omani GDP to one standard deviation fall in the 
trade partners’ GDP, using three average trade weights (1997-1999, 2007-2009, and 2014-2016) 








































































































Figure 4.8. The median impulse responses of the Omani GDP to one standard deviation fall in the 
trade partners’ GDP, using three average trade weights (1997-1999, 2007-2009, and 2014-2016)  














































































































4.4.1.3 GIRFs of GDP sub-components: petroleum and non-petroleum    
 Due to the importance of petroleum to the Omani economy as the main export commodity 
and economic activity, this section investigates the difference in responses between petroleum GDP 
(GDP_P) and non-petroleum GDP (GDP_NP). The percentage of petroleum GDP to the total GDP was 
41.8%, 40.4% and 40.8% in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively (NCSI, 2019). The non-petroleum GDP 
includes agriculture and fisheries, industry sector, and services activities. Appendix 4.H illustrates 
smooth upward parallel growth of oil price, total Omani GDP, and GDP subcomponents: petroleum and 
non-petroleum. The total GDP is expected to grow with the oil price, and the prediction of non-
petroleum GDP is expected to grow higher than petroleum GDP, which is a good indicator in line with 
Oman’s aim to diversify the economy. 
 Figures 4.9 and 4.10 display the responses of petroleum and non-petroleum GDP to one 
standard deviation negative GDP shock to Oman’s trade partners using 1999-2001 average trade 
weights. The results show that international shocks have more impact on the petroleum GDP compared 
to the non-petroleum GDP. The petroleum GDP reactions are larger, persistent, and statistically 
significant to shocks from all trade partners except for Singapore. In contrast, the responses of non-
petroleum GDP are smaller and statistically significant to only China, Korea, and Thailand. Consistent 
with the response of total GDP; petroleum and non-petroleum GDP respond higher to China’s shock 
compared to other economies. Both petroleum and non-petroleum respond highly in the first four 















Figure 4.9.  The median impulse responses of the Omani GDP subcomponents to one standard 
deviation fall in the trade partners’ GDP, using trade weight 1999-2001 


















































































Figure 4.10. The median impulse responses of the Omani GDP subcomponents to one standard 
deviation fall in the trade partners’ GDP, using trade weight 1999-2001 

































































































 Figure 4.11 and 4.12 display the responses of petroleum and non-petroleum GDP following 
a negative shock to Oman’s trade partners GDP by re-estimating the model using three different trade 
weights, (1997-1999-, 2007-2009, and 2014-2016). Likewise, using three different trade weights, the 
petroleum GDP responses are higher than the responses of non-petroleum GDP. By comparing these 
results, the petroleum GDP falls dramatically within the first six quarters, whereas non-petroleum GDP 
falls within the first four quarters. Figure 4.11 display the response of petroleum GDP to China’s shock 
is statistically significant and the largest compared to all other economies. The responses to US shocks 
are all statistically significant and slightly increased with time. In contrast, the response to Japan 
gradually decrease with time, and the responses to Thailand higher during the AFC period and gradually 
decrease with time. 
 The responses of non-petroleum GDP are illustrated in Figure 4.12. Consistent with the 
response of total GDP and petroleum GDP, a Chinese shock affects the non-petroleum GDP in a much 
more prominent way compared to other economies. The responses of non-petroleum GDP to the US, 
China, and Korea are higher using GFC weights, while the response to Japan and Thailand is higher 
using AFC weights. The response to Singapore is statistically insignificant in all three weights. As it is 
important to address ways to mitigate the influence of the international economic shocks on the 

















Figure 4.11. The median impulse responses of the Omani petroleum GDP to one standard deviation fall 










































































Figure 4.12. The median impulse responses of the Omani non-petroleum GDP to one standard deviation 







































































4.4.1.4 GIRFs of the Omani interest rate and exchange rate to shock to the US interest rate52  
 The US monetary policy is important to the world in general and to Oman in particular as 
the Omani currency is pegged to the US dollar since 1973 (CBO, 2018a)53. This sub-section presents 
the responses of the Omani interest rate and exchange rate to the US expansionary monetary policy 
shocks. The impact of the US could be direct, as the change in the Federal Reserve is automatically 
transmitted to monetary policy in Oman due to the currency peg arrangement (CBO, 2019). The US 
dollar is the main pricing and settlement currency in oil transactions. Therefore, the fluctuations of the 
dollar plays an important role in world oil prices (Hou et al., 2016), which may affect the Omani 
economy indirectly, through oil price which is an important commodity for the oil-dependent Oman.  
 Figure 4.13 shows the responses of Omani interest rate and exchange rate to an expansionary 
US interest rate shock, illustrated by one negative standard deviation. Overall, the Omani interest rate 
and exchange rate responded statistically significant to the US interest rate shocks, negative from the 
former and positive from the latter. The exchange rate, in this case, is the bilateral exchange rate with 
the US dollar. According to the Mundell-Fleming modelling framework, under the flexible exchange 
rate regime, an increase/ decrease in the interest rate, will lead to foreign capital inflow/ outflow and 
consequently an appreciation/ depreciation of the domestic currency (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963). 
Due to the US expansionary monetary policy, the US dollar depreciates, leading to capital outflow and 
dollar depreciation, therefore, the Omani Rial appreciate. Consistent with the same currency 
arrangement of the Omani monetary policy since the early 1970s, the overall influence of the US 











52 This part will not be included when we submit the essay for publication.  




Figure 4.13. The median impulse responses of the Omani interest rate and exchange rate to one standard 
deviation fall in US interest rate, using trade weights (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2007-2009, and 2014-
2016) 











































































































 The generalized forecast error variance decomposition 
In the VAR model, the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) is performed based on a 
set of orthogonalized shocks and calculate the contribution of the orthogonalized innovation to the mean 
square error of the n-steps ahead forecast of the model. In the case of GVAR, the shocks across countries 
are not orthogonal and some evidence shows, on average, they are positively correlated, therefore, here 
we use the generalized forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD). The GFEVD is the proportion 
of n-steps ahead forecast error variance of variable 𝐴 which is accounted for the innovations in variable 
𝐵 in the VAR (Pesaran & Shin, 1998). Unlike the case of the orthogonal where the FEVD sum to unity, 
the non-orthogonal shocks do not sum to unity (Chudik & Pesaran, 2016). Moreover, the GFEVD is 
invariant to the order of the variables allowing for the contemporaneous correlation between the shocks.  
4.4.2.1 GFEVD for Omani GDP, petroleum GDP and non-petroleum GDP  
After investigating the responses of the Omani GDP to different shocks, now we will quantify 
the importance of those shocks. Figure 4.14 shows the relative weights of the different shocks computed 
using GFEVD over different horizons (40 quarters) for variation in the Omani GDP, petroleum GDP 
and non-petroleum GDP. Before considering these plots, it is important to bear in mind that these shocks 
together account for only a small of the total variation in the Omani GDP. As highlighted by Mohaddes 
and Pesaran (2016) one should note that the GFEVD figures below show the relative share of the shocks, 
and thus do not represent the absolute importance of such shocks for the Omani economy.   
The results reveal that shocks from China play a key role in explaining the variance in Omani 
GDP. What is surprising is that using average trade weight 1999-2001, the Chinese shocks are more 
important for non-petroleum GDP compared to petroleum GDP. Oil price also contributes considerably 
to non-petroleum GDP variance, same as to petroleum GDP variance. This considerable contribution 
to non-petroleum GDP may be due to government investment, as government expenditure have a 
dominant role in the market which is planned based on oil price revenue. It may also be due to the 
petrochemical industry, which classifies as a non-petroleum segment of the GDP. The contribution of 
all other trade partners is almost same in GDP and its components except for the US, which contributes 








Figure 4.14. The proportion of GFEVD of the Omani GDP, petroleum GDP, and non-petroleum GDP 
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4.4.2.2 The GFEVD using three different trade weights   
We re-estimate the model using three different trade weights 1997-1999, 2007-2009, and 2014-
2016 for the Omani GDP and its components. Starting with the GFEVD of the Omani GDP using the 
three different weights, as shown in Figure 4.15. Comparing between the contribution of the trading 
partners shocks, reveal that the effects of China’s shocks are pronounced and stable using different trade 
weights, reflects the importance of China in Asia. By contrast, the importance of Japan and Thailand 
becomes less pronounced over time. The pattern of the contribution in Oman’s GDP variance from 
trade partners may differ in the first four quarters then become stable and persist with same contribution 
pattern over time.  
The contribution of China’s shocks over three different trade weights is pronounced and stable 
for non-petroleum GDP, as illustrated in Figure 4.17. The importance of China’s shock is increasing 
over time for petroleum GDP variation, as shown in Figure 4.16, which stems from increasing Omani 
oil exports to China over the last decade. Interestingly, the importance of China’s shocks even 
outweighs the importance of oil price shocks in petroleum GDP over time. However, oil price shocks 



















Figure 4.15. The proportion of GFEVD of the Omani GDP explained by contemporaneous and future 
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Figure 4.16. The proportion of GFEVD of the Omani petroleum GDP explained by contemporaneous 
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Figure 4.17. The proportion of GFEVD of the Omani non-petroleum GDP explained by 
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4.5 Conclusion and policy implication 
The Omani economy is a small open economy. The exports plus imports as a percentage of 
GDP is generally more than 90%, classifying it as a super trading nation. The objective of this study is 
to investigate the effects of shocks on the Omani GDP from its trade partners through trade linkages 
using the GVAR model. The trade partners are the US, China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Singapore, 
and are the main destinations for the Omani oil. To investigate any changes in the responses of the 
Omani economy to shocks in trade partners’ GDP, we estimate the model using four different trade 
weights for the period 1989Q4-2016Q4.   
Using average trade weights 1999-2001 to estimate the foreign variables and link the GVAR 
model, the results show the response of Oman’s GDP to a shock to China’s GDP is substantial and 
persistent, compared to the other five countries including the US and Japan. The response to all trade 
partners is statistically significant except for Singapore, which is only statistically significant in the first 
four quarters.  
To reflect the evolving nature of the Omani trade patterns, we used three different trade weights. 
The results show the influence of China is the highest among all trade partners, and the effect felt most 
during the Asian Financial Crisis. Compared to that, the influence of US shocks is smaller, but stable 
across time, while the influence of Japan is declining over time.   
Due to the importance of petroleum GDP in the total Omani GDP, which accounts for 40% on 
average, we examine the impact of international shocks on petroleum and non-petroleum GDP. 
Generally, the petroleum GDP falls dramatically within the first six quarters, whereas non-petroleum 
GDP falls within the first four quarters. Using trade weights 1999-2001, the results show that the 
response of petroleum GDP to the global shocks is higher than the response of non-petroleum GDP. 
Likewise, the response of the total GDP, the responses of petroleum and non-petroleum GDP is largest 
to the Chinese shocks compared to shocks from other trading partners. By using different average trade 
weights, we found China has a greater influence on both petroleum and non-petroleum GDP compared 
to other trading partners.  
Due to the importance of the US monetary policy to the Omani economy as the Omani currency 
is pegged to the US dollar since 1973, we investigated the response of the Omani interest rate and 
exchange rate to the US expansionary monetary policy shocks. The results show the Omani interest rate 
responds negatively and statistically significant to the US accommodative interest rate shocks. In 
contrast, the Omani exchange rate responds positively and statistically significant to the US interest rate 
shocks. The US expansionary monetary policy, depreciate the US dollar, leading to capital outflow and 





 The results of generalized forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD) reveal the 
contribution of specific shocks to the variation in the Omani GDP. The results show that Chinese shocks 
play a key role in explaining the variance in Omani GDP and its components. Using average trade 
weight 1999-2001, the Chinese shocks are more important for non-petroleum GDP compared to 
petroleum GDP. Stems from increasing Omani oil exports to China over the last decade, and using 
different average weights, the importance of the Chinese shock is increasing over time for petroleum 
GDP variation, and the importance of other countries is declining. 
The exports diversification is very important for the Omani economy’s stability. The 
concentration of its exports in one commodity and for one client put the country in a vulnerable situation. 
Currently, the contribution of petroleum to total exports is high: 57.9%, 58.2%, and 65.3% in 2016, 
2017, and 2018, respectively. China is the main oil export destination, account for 77.1%, 78.0%, and 
76.9%,  in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively and up to 83.1% in 2018 (NCSI, 2019). This raises a 
concern about the Omani economy’s vulnerability to its main trading partner. The trade concentration 
and over-reliance on a particular destination and commodity could be risky for Oman, and thus the 
Omani government should consider diversifying its trade relation and the composite of products that it 
exports.  
For future work, it will be good to extend the GVAR model to include all trade partners of 
Oman, and to group these countries into regions. In the current framework, it was not possible to include 
all trade partners due to lack of data availability. The inclusion of more countries would provide more 
insights about the shock transmission to the Omani economy due to globalization and provide the 
















Appendix 4.A: Variables description 
Variable Abbreviation  Construction Data source 
Real GDP 𝒴𝑖𝑡 
  
𝒴𝑖𝑡 = ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 
GVAR database 
and NCSI for 
Oman data  




𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
GVAR database 
and NCSI for 
Oman data 
Short-term interest rate 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑠  𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = 0.25ln (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆 /100) 
GVAR database 
and IFS for 
Oman data 






𝑙 = 0.25𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐿 /100) 
GVAR database 




𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln (𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
GVAR database 
and IFS for 
Oman data 




𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 = ln (𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡/𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
GVAR database 
Oil prices  𝑑𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑑𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 = ln(𝑃𝑡





















Appendix 4.B:  Unit root (ADF) test for domestic and foreign variables 
Domestic Variables OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
y (with trend) -1.28919 -3.00187 -2.13081 -1.94752 -2.62542 -1.36142 -1.35635 
y (no trend) -1.17716 -0.77658 -2.42115 -2.05447 -1.85255 -1.0668 -1.26316 
Dy -6.13349 -6.36763 -5.90505 -5.59277 -6.36378 -3.29332 -4.45962 
DDy -9.75839 -8.40915 -9.43094 -7.75795 -8.49636 -7.98516 -7.37754 
Dp (with trend) -6.48147 -3.83882 -5.12703 -4.1071 -5.83125 -3.02606 -4.49692 
Dp (no trend) -6.41453 -3.85573 -3.72406 -4.1236 -5.16765 -2.62328 -4.0104 
DDp -7.36395 -12.6826 -7.39 -6.74386 -7.93179 -5.71658 -8.81057 
DDDp -9.74234 -8.8002 -8.79074 -8.85534 -8.70838 -9.18223 -10.2874 
eq (with trend) -3.32702 -3.85493 -4.05046 -1.84665  -2.04913 
eq (no trend) -3.45736 -1.50987 -3.52902 -1.82186  -1.79474 
Deq  -5.42381 -6.28538 -7.01406 -7.29707  -5.87947 
DDeq  -7.37943 -7.0208 -8.04745 -8.26406  -7.58903 
ep (with trend) -1.03109 -2.95915 -3.00224 -1.49349 -2.07046 -2.5849  
ep (no trend) -1.26785 -2.93842 -1.55449 -1.35822 -1.45549 -0.34075  
Dep -6.5818 -4.19016 -7.65953 -5.40132 -6.79456 -7.81959  
DDep -7.36553 -10.4097 -7.70245 -7.85257 -8.36119 -9.13076  
r (with trend) -2.57517 -3.5259 -2.90327 -4.11252 -3.63117 -1.77059 -4.84395 
r (no trend) -2.0583 -4.40368 -1.71662 -3.16832 -2.93852 -1.25331 -2.31311 
Dr -3.91526 -4.6011 -6.35828 -5.46363 -6.37528 -5.04376 -4.35227 
DDr -6.37744 -6.55796 -8.77847 -8.59537 -7.07841 -7.7263 -5.7997 
lr (with trend) -4.12441 -2.24256    -5.0167 
lr (no trend) -4.82168 -1.09596    -1.5246 
Dlr  -5.59199 -8.46738    -6.17058 


















Foreign Variables OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
ys (with trend) -2.2034 -1.20368 -1.59053 -1.58524 -2.07281 -2.44304 -1.60495 
ys (no trend) -1.57965 -1.79846 -1.22863 -1.45494 -1.32631 -1.51757 -1.32205 
Dys -5.3712 -4.2548 -5.58849 -5.64204 -5.55577 -5.91832 -5.5386 
DDys -7.22133 -7.3618 -7.27458 -7.13506 -7.72784 -7.58587 -7.55078 
Dps (with trend) -3.57332 -3.54533 -3.42433 -3.64781 -3.80765 -5.08066 -2.77286 
Dps (no trend) -3.0072 -3.10359 -3.12385 -3.18716 -3.49324 -4.52998 -2.45934 
DDps -9.61336 -7.79701 -7.13004 -7.28894 -7.1535 -7.62827 -9.28986 
DDDps -8.27404 -10.0175 -9.41285 -9.63857 -8.69989 -8.8396 -8.03498 
eqs (with trend) -3.62181 -2.89474 -2.82608 -3.20994 -3.41923 -3.5783 -3.78225 
eqs (no trend) -3.16344 -1.72756 -2.39034 -2.13893 -2.70897 -2.50136 -3.79609 
Deqs -5.91482 -6.75719 -5.28282 -5.53763 -5.49488 -5.60719 -6.50489 
DDeqs -7.96452 -8.38781 -7.1291 -7.96836 -7.8201 -7.90198 -7.82709 
eps (with trend) -2.14581 -2.00521 -1.59818 -1.94867 -2.03709 -2.61976 -1.65345 
eps (no trend) -1.31462 -0.47835 -1.21777 -1.04113 -1.52776 -2.24732 -1.22879 
Deps -7.34654 -7.35233 -8.28825 -7.72042 -5.14851 -4.9038 -7.91652 
DDeps -8.02892 -8.78914 -8.25307 -8.17219 -7.99171 -8.31869 -8.17598 
rs (with trend) -2.42591 -3.15139 -3.27455 -3.02288 -3.38252 -3.23413 -1.8475 
rs (no trend) -2.15051 -1.81095 -2.28672 -2.04931 -2.62948 -2.75088 -2.06956 
Drs -6.57529 -4.892 -4.35478 -5.47209 -4.10168 -6.78127 -5.311 
DDrs -7.52671 -6.21436 -11.7736 -6.41753 -10.1998 -6.87164 -6.91654 
lrs (with trend) -2.6631 -4.55379 -3.54542 -3.19085 -3.30218 -2.91711 -3.12275 
lrs (no trend) -2.43409 -1.33719 -2.61361 -2.27007 -2.75509 -2.37995 -3.35092 
Dlrs -7.2585 -6.7314 -6.15116 -6.37223 -6.12638 -6.38384 -7.18504 
DDlrs -8.85435 -7.7294 -8.05295 -8.04763 -8.1855 -8.31727 -8.76898 


















Appendix 4.C:  Unit root (WS-ADF) test for domestic and foreign variables 
Domestic Variables OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
y (with trend) -1.74885 -3.07055 -0.67121 -1.20939 -1.42797 -1.63781 -1.57446 
y (no trend) 0.33922 0.812767 1.720734 1.57355 2.136623 -0.25213 0.990011 
Dy -5.90824 -6.41789 -6.02075 -5.80473 -6.44193 -3.17833 -4.6246 
DDy -8.76602 -8.3807 -9.66738 -8.15714 -8.76086 -8.19119 -6.66351 
Dp (with trend) -6.55028 -3.85669 -4.85597 -4.22185 -5.96581 -2.95721 -4.20655 
Dp (no trend) -6.5224 -3.68334 -2.78368 -4.21689 -5.33158 -2.82361 -3.24413 
DDp -7.59209 -12.8585 -7.33365 -6.92522 -8.09625 -5.9092 -8.43541 
DDDp -9.94931 -9.63098 -8.18143 -9.18439 -9.28749 -8.38258 -11.3379 
eq (with trend) -2.57663 -3.07102 -4.22266 -2.12413  -1.98878 
eq (no trend) -2.07327 -1.84461 -3.66203 -2.06468  -0.49347 
Deq  -5.16064 -6.33905 -7.16493 -7.43034  -6.03464 
DDeq  -7.56612 -7.24997 -8.2872 -8.52883  -7.34748 
ep (with trend) -1.43406 -2.65695 -3.19021 -1.60661 -2.33402 -1.38905  
ep (no trend) -1.50723 -1.89881 -1.56678 0.273125 -1.34528 -0.65009  
Dep -6.5781 -4.29507 -7.83412 -5.46056 -6.95985 -7.37028  
DDep -7.5854 -10.1741 -7.93984 -8.26645 -8.63215 -9.2162  
r (with trend) -2.68455 -2.13923 -3.14455 -3.65527 -3.70079 -2.00406 -4.94918 
r (no trend) -1.41756 -1.40059 -0.9478 -1.69163 -2.3973 -0.60688 -1.65477 
Dr -4.26055 -3.73101 -6.59139 -5.67705 -6.61365 -4.66775 -4.53925 
DDr -6.62872 -6.52234 -8.99516 -8.02308 -7.20297 -8.59848 -5.54899 
lr (with trend) -1.75699 -2.50409    -5.07316 
lr (no trend) -0.24069 0.143149    -0.22561 
Dlr  -4.996 -8.69011    -6.31802 


















Foreign Variables OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
ys (with trend) -1.77102 -1.55077 -1.84749 -1.6705 -2.06992 -1.85255 -1.75696 
ys (no trend) 1.77473 0.288966 1.499577 1.507406 1.650607 1.632581 1.661858 
Dys -5.48843 -4.39657 -5.75378 -5.80156 -5.69088 -5.95577 -5.69366 
DDys -7.43156 -7.35143 -7.54056 -7.39075 -7.9863 -7.82937 -7.73452 
Dps (with trend) -3.72254 -3.70128 -3.60457 -3.80949 -3.9948 -4.80147 -2.90023 
Dps (no trend) -3.16621 -3.27081 -3.27849 -3.34179 -3.56566 -3.73163 -2.68513 
DDps -9.51256 -7.93342 -6.48783 -6.77965 -6.77506 -7.6072 -9.24459 
DDDps -8.34417 -9.83088 -9.26163 -9.50097 -8.8167 -9.46413 -7.8578 
eqs (with trend) -3.22804 -3.02035 -3.01887 -3.36141 -3.47142 -3.51282 -3.12553 
eqs (no trend) -3.10611 -0.96356 -2.40072 -2.26077 -2.91808 -2.71889 -3.13503 
Deqs -5.81593 -6.90509 -5.14662 -5.44544 -5.33868 -5.40519 -6.56406 
Ddeqs -8.18227 -8.54498 -7.14947 -8.10402 -7.95299 -8.0552 -8.0298 
eps (with trend) -2.39759 -1.582 -1.91508 -2.17944 -2.29221 -2.61274 -1.96383 
eps (no trend) -0.65316 -0.5449 -0.41322 -0.54049 -0.63614 -1.32532 -0.46079 
Deps -7.33022 -7.15896 -8.01055 -7.48659 -5.31072 -5.08944 -7.73127 
DDeps -8.13528 -8.9118 -8.25941 -8.26285 -7.96507 -8.48732 -8.20883 
rs (with trend) -2.16704 -3.17772 -2.87928 -2.70613 -2.3534 -2.23447 -1.51797 
rs (no trend) -0.35455 -0.26114 -0.62234 0.070544 -0.04946 -0.04069 0.14545 
Drs -6.71426 -5.16378 -4.51196 -5.78984 -4.29078 -6.79111 -5.58014 
DDrs -8.37076 -6.52901 -11.5931 -6.61339 -10.0835 -8.03022 -7.3232 
lrs (with trend) -2.05608 -4.71146 -2.64591 -2.55305 -2.29493 -2.21444 -1.86539 
lrs (no trend) 0.352276 0.24598 0.080047 0.318497 0.228989 0.427476 0.163563 
Dlrs -6.67945 -6.85014 -6.0482 -6.25817 -5.913 -6.18772 -5.86251 
DDlrs -8.53864 -7.87595 -7.37529 -7.63884 -7.48716 -7.92805 -7.82636 
The critical value of WS-ADF statistics with a trend is -3.24, and with no trend is -2.55 at the level 5% of 
significance. 
Appendix 4.D:  Unit Root tests for the global variable 
Global Variables Test Statistic Test Statistic 
poil (with trend) ADF -0.82726 WS-ADF -1.10647 
poil (no trend) ADF -1.46344 WS-ADF -1.48886 
Dpoil ADF -5.48346 WS-ADF -5.60593 













Appendix 4.E: Trace statistics and critical values for trace statistics  
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
Endogenous variables 4 6 6 5 5 4 6 
Exogenous variables 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 
r=0 139.4192 227.4244 347.8188 213.7379 243.7466 137.9331 217.236 
r=1 86.78835 165.9959 232.0777 142.6931 147.8682 77.69921 150.4289 
r=2 44.58836 109.983 153.1386 80.69376 84.7006 36.3349 103.6622 
r=3 15.4152 65.80142 85.88718 37.36008 45.8828 11.87299 62.46191 
r=4  29.84875 40.01043 12.38678 20.50946  31.40411 
r=5   12.34299 17.14006       9.902111 
 Details statistics for testing cointegration for country-specific models  
 
Critical Values for trace statistics  
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND CHINA USA 
Endogenous variables 4 6 6 5 5 4 6 
Exogenous variables 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 
r=0 119.03 197.7 197.7 156.44 156.44 119.03 158.01 
r=1 85.44 156.44 156.44 119.03 119.03 85.44 122.96 
r=2 55.5 119.03 119.03 85.44 85.44 55.5 91.81 
r=3 28.81 85.44 85.44 55.5 55.5 28.81 64.54 
r=4  55.5 55.5 28.81 28.81  41.03 
r=5   28.81 28.81       20.98 
The critical values at the 5% significance level MacKinnon et al. (1999).   
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Appendix 4.G: Trade weight matrices  
Average trade weight 1997-1999     
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND USA CHINA 
OMAN 0 0.0057 0.0072 0.0017 0.0186 0.0011 0.006 
JAPAN 0.3604 0 0.2695 0.23 0.327 0.4081 0.4019 
KOREA 0.1613 0.0891 0 0.0584 0.0418 0.1042 0.1528 
SINGAPORE 0.0211 0.0559 0.0512 0 0.128 0.0776 0.0552 
THAILAND 0.1897 0.0514 0.0207 0.0881 0 0.0431 0.0246 
USA 0.0751 0.4804 0.3616 0.3509 0.2964 0 0.3596 
CHINA 0.1923 0.3176 0.2899 0.271 0.1881 0.3659 0 
Average trade weight 1999-2001     
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND USA CHINA 
OMAN 0 0.0062 0.0109 0.0029 0.0158 0.0011 0.0094 
JAPAN 0.3252 0 0.2708 0.2271 0.3273 0.383 0.3931 
KOREA 0.1987 0.0999 0 0.0686 0.0443 0.1168 0.1582 
SINGAPORE 0.0381 0.052 0.0474 0 0.12 0.0678 0.0502 
THAILAND 0.1297 0.0501 0.0198 0.0856 0 0.0421 0.0299 
USA 0.0567 0.4515 0.3508 0.3251 0.2885 0 0.3591 
CHINA 0.2516 0.3403 0.3004 0.2908 0.204 0.3891 0 
Average trade weights 2007-2009     
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND USA CHINA 
OMAN 0 0.0101 0.0134 0.0023 0.0184 0.0026 0.0105 
JAPAN 0.2344 0 0.2081 0.1402 0.3014 0.2278 0.2977 
KOREA 0.1958 0.1133 0 0.1027 0.0579 0.0948 0.2044 
SINGAPORE 0.0279 0.0426 0.0556 0 0.0991 0.051 0.06 
THAILAND 0.1061 0.0626 0.0223 0.0814 0 0.0369 0.0464 
USA 0.0703 0.2795 0.2015 0.2155 0.1834 0 0.3811 
CHINA 0.3656 0.4919 0.4991 0.4579 0.3399 0.5869 0 
Average trade weight 2014-2016     
Country OMAN JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE THAILAND USA CHINA 
OMAN 0 0.0074 0.0081 0.0022 0.0069 0.0028 0.0149 
JAPAN 0.1123 0 0.1476 0.1079 0.254 0.1788 0.2259 
KOREA 0.12 0.1022 0 0.1052 0.0566 0.1035 0.2143 
SINGAPORE 0.0279 0.0378 0.0498 0 0.0778 0.0419 0.0605 
THAILAND 0.0358 0.0671 0.0227 0.0667 0 0.036 0.0587 
USA 0.0629 0.2691 0.2194 0.177 0.1791 0 0.4258 











Appendix 4.H: Forecast to 2026Q4 based on last date in-sample estimation 2016Q4  
Forecast of Omani GDP, petroleum and non-petroleum GDP and oil price 
 
 































5 CONCLUSION  
 
5.1 Summary of findings and policy recommendations  
This dissertation analysed the impact of oil prices on the fiscal policy, external balance, and the 
transmission of external shocks to the Omani economy through trade linkages. The main findings of 
the thesis are summarised below.  
Chapter Two investigated the impact of oil price shocks on the Omani economy and its fiscal 
measures using the SVAR model. The findings show that oil price shocks have a significant impact on 
government revenue and GDP. Interestingly, the impact of oil price shocks on the government 
expenditure is weak and marginal, although it responds significantly to a government revenue shock. 
The high portion of salaries in government spending, establishment of the saving fund, and the use of 
local and international debt to smooth the government spending are possible reasons to explain this 
weak response. On the other hand, as expected, government revenue, government expenditure, and 
GDP respond negatively and significantly when replacing the oil price with oil price volatility.  
The petroleum components of GDP and government revenue responded more to oil price 
shocks compared with the non-petroleum related components. In addition, the oil price has an impact 
on the non-petroleum GDP, possibly through the petrochemicals industry. Surprisingly, government 
investment spending responds negatively to the oil price and government revenue shocks. This may be 
caused by changes in the fiscal policy in Oman from procyclical to countercyclical between 2000 and 
2009. Alternatively, it may be an indicator that the amount allocated for government investment 
expenditure is not sufficient to create long-term sustainable gain as the GDP responds negatively and 
only marginally to the government investment spending. This can also be associated with crowding-out 
effects, and thus requires more investigation. Oil price volatility has no impact on investment spending, 
which can be associated with the long-term nature of the investment expenditure plans.  
Managing large size government in oil-exporting countries can be a challenge, particularly 
during the oil price plunge. Falls in oil prices with no balance between government revenue and 
expenditure can be associated with gradual increases in the fiscal breakeven price. This leads to a budget 
deficit, high debt, and depletion of reserve funds. These outcomes have a negative impact on the 
economic stability and legacy for future generations. 
Chapter Three examined the Twin Deficit Hypothesis for the Omani economy, i.e. testing the 




model, and in the long-run using the SVECM model. The results show that in the short-run, Oman’s 
trade balance and fiscal balance are mostly determined by oil price movements, where both balances 
respond positively to oil price shocks and negatively to oil price volatility shocks. The trade balance’s 
response to oil price shocks is quantitatively larger compared to fiscal balance, while fiscal balance’s 
response to oil price volatility shocks is larger than trade balance. The fiscal balance responds positively 
and significantly to trade balance shocks, while the responses of the trade balance to the fiscal balance 
shocks are marginal. In the dynamic long-run analysis, oil price shocks have a significant impact on 
fiscal revenue, exports, and imports. These results provide evidence that in Oman, the casual effect runs 
from the trade balance to the fiscal balance. Oman’s trade balance is dominated by oil export, which is 
an exogenous variable in the domestic economy, being influenced by global oil prices and global trends. 
In comparison, the fiscal balance is more endogenous, and the Omani government is able to adjust the 
fiscal policy in response to fluctuations in the oil price and trade balance, thus contradicting the 
traditional twin deficit hypothesis. 
 We argue that for an oil-dependent small open economy, like Oman, policies that help to 
diversify away from depending heavily on oil revenue would help the economy to absorb international 
oil price shocks more effectively. High contribution to petroleum in exports and government revenue, 
the leakage of saving in the form of foreign workers’ remittance, and elevated external debt due to 
growing fiscal deficit, cause fragile stability for Oman’s internal and external balance. Government 
spending consolidation and export diversification are important to maintain the internal and external 
balances for the Omani economy, and to reduce the imbalances. Same policies may not work for all 
kinds of economies; thus, it is important to consider the right policy harmony with the economic 
structure and consideration. 
Chapter Four studied the impact of the global shocks transmitted through the trade linkages to 
the Omani economy using a GVAR model. To reflect the evolution of the Omani trade pattern over 
time, we used four different trade weights to estimate the foreign variables and link the GVAR model. 
The finding of this essay showed the influence of Chinese-generated shocks on the Omani economy is 
pronounced across time. Compared to that, the influence of the United States is modest but stable across 
time, while the influence of Japan is declining over time.   
The empirical results also highlight that any unexpected shocks originating from East Asian 
economies or the US economy have a higher impact on the petroleum GDP compared to the non-
petroleum GDP. Generally, the petroleum GDP falls dramatically within the first six quarters, whereas 
non-petroleum GDP falls within the first four quarters. Same as the responses of the total GDP, the 
responses of petroleum and non-petroleum GDP are largest to the Chinese shocks compared to shocks 
from other trading partners. Finally, due to the importance of the US monetary policy to the Omani 




exchange rate respond significantly to the US accommodative interest rate shocks. The trade 
concentration and over-reliance on a particular destination and commodity could be risky for Oman, 
and thus the Omani government should consider diversifying its trade relation and the composite of 
products that it exports. 
In conclusion, this dissertation provides a deeper understanding of the impact of global shocks 
on the Omani economy through oil prices and trade linkages. In all three chapters, we provide empirical 
evidence of the interactions of oil price, trade patterns, with the Omani macroeconomic variables and 
policies.    
5.2 Future research directions 
Based on the empirical analysis carried out in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, this dissertation 
suggests the following research directions.  
Chapter Two shows that Oman has high government operating expenditure, and this spending 
is inflexible and results in high economic costs. This increases the burden on the government, and its 
ability to adjust to oil price plunge and the slow fiscal consolidation leads to high public debt and debt 
service costs. 
In 2020 the government decided to retire at least 70% of public sector employees who spend 
30 years or more in the government. The government also tightens the salaries in the public sector. 
Given these measures, there are two possible outcomes of this new policy on the employment 
environment. First, it might minimise the competitiveness between the public sector and the private 
sector, which could encourage Omani people to work in the private sector. On the other hand, the private 
sector could downgrade their incentives, and become less popular compared to the public sector, 
therefore less attractive to the Omani. This would be an interesting area to explore for future work, 
especially with the new regulation that does not match the academic qualifications with the minimum 
wages in the private sector. 
In Chapter Three, due to data limitation, the trade balance is used instead of the current account 
balance, though the worker remittances and public debt are recommended to investigate for future 
research. The Central Bank of Oman’s annual reports points out that the debt to GDP ratio and debt 
service ratio are inched up dramatically between 2014 and 2018, coupled with a high fiscal deficit. In 
addition, high leakage from domestic saving is observed in the form of worker remittances, where a 
high percentage of employees in the private sector are non-Omani. Therefore, an interesting addition to 
the study would be to consider the debt and saving leakages to examine their impact on fiscal and 




From Chapter Four, we can deduce that the concentration of oil exports to China has both pros 
and cons. On one hand, China is a growing economy, and thus secures a market for Omani oil. On the 
other hand, the concentration of oil exports to one trade destination put the Omani economy in a 
vulnerable position. Thus, more investigation into this dilemma will be a valuable addition to the 
literature. Additionally, it would be beneficial to extend the current investigation to include all Omani 
trading partners, and group these countries into regions. The extended framework will give more insight 
into the shocks transmitted to the Omani economy due to globalization and provide the policymakers 
with better information for more accurate future planning.  
Given the current global situation, it is imperative to assess the efficiency of petroleum added 
value projects, such as refinery operations, in insulating the oil-dependent economies from oil price 
shocks. The recent oil price drop was due to the economic consequences of COVID-19 pandemic in all 
sectors, including the oil refinery sector. COVID-19 is a current example of how our world is closely 
connected, as it is expanded from a single case in China to a global pandemic in less than a few months.  
The pathway of the pandemic, the intensity and efficiency of containment efforts, the extent of 
supply disruptions, the repercussions of the dramatic tightening in global financial market conditions, 
shifts in spending patterns, human behavioural changes, level of confidence, and volatile commodity 
prices are notable factors that cause the extreme uncertainty for the global oil market. Moreover, it is 
also hard to predict the interaction between these factors and their implications on oil exporters. 
This health crisis results in supply and demand shock caused by disruption, lockdown, and 
quarantines. This disruption reduced the economic activity caused by a negative productivity shock. On 
the demand side, aspects like increased uncertainty, loss of income, fear of contagion causes the 
reluctance to spend. Therefore, there was a drop in the international demand for the global supply and 
demand for dry bulk shipping stocks. The shocks amplified through the international trade and financial 
linkages, dampening global activity, and pushing the commodity prices down.  
Moreover, the oil price collapse in 2020 is due to global slowdown results in a steep contraction 
in oil demand particularly for transportation fuels like jet fuel, gasoline, and diesel, and a significant 
refinery cut worldwide. Consequently, the growth of the oil-exporting countries slows down not only 
due to the COVID-19 consequences, but also due to commodity prices plunge. These consequences are 
expected to weigh heavily on oil exporters with undiversified revenues and exports, particularly on 
high-cost producers like Oman. Therefore, the effects of COVID-19 pandemic and global oil price 
movement on Oman and other similar oil exporters could be investigated in the future by expanding the 
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